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Chapter 1
Introduction
The economic analysis of media markets has received a lot of attention in recent years,
which can be attributed to two main causes: First, political decisions seem to be
increasingly influenced by public opinion, with the advent of horse-race journalism1 in
the late 1970s being indicative of this development. The second cause is the growing
economic importance of the media and advertising industry. Earlier contributions
studied the role of the media for political decisions and democratic societies. The focus
then shifted towards analyzing the microeconomics underpinnings of media outlets’
behavior and their interactions with the advertising industry, which is also central to
this thesis. In the following chapters, this dissertation sheds light on how three major
trends have affected the media market, with each of these trends corresponding to
one of the chapters: the tabloidization of news contents, the regulation of television
advertising, and the rise of online media.
Chapter 2: The effect of entertainment in newspaper and television news
coverage
This chapter investigates the economics of tabloidization, which defines a trend towards
more entertainment and sensationalism in media coverage.2 Empirical evidence sug-
gests that media outlets’ style of coverage shifts towards predominantly entertaining
1The term horse-race journalism refers to news coverage on politicians and politics especially prior
to elections that focusses on confrontation and competition.
2Tabloidization describes changes to the way of media coverage with respect to the style as well
as the contents, and, in most cases, a decline in journalistic standards. Tabloid contents are typically
easily recognizable by sensationalism, bold headlines, and unambiguous coverage that cater to the
audience’s base instincts. For an etymology and a detailed definition see Bird (2008).
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contents. The model derived in this chapter looks into the causes of this shift and
provides a general framework of two competing media outlets with endogenous choice
of the style of news coverage.
Serious and unbiased news had already in the 1960s a reputation for selling worse than
light entertainment.3 This has lead to ”hard” news and information being gradually
replaced by entertaining ”soft” news stories. Figure 1.1 illustrates for the magazine
market in the U.S., how the style of media coverage has shifted towards entertainment.
Figure 1.1: Tabloidization in U.S. magazines
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Note: This figure illustrates the share of the number of editorial pages in U.S. magazines
falling under one of the categories. Entertainment/Celebrities, and Wearing Apparel is counted
as Entertainment, and National Affairs, Business&Industry, Foreign Affairs as well as Cul-
ture/Humanities is counted as Information. The entertainment ratio is calculated by dividing
the share of editorial pages containing entertainment contents by the number of pages containing
information. Data source: American Society of Magazine Editors (2011).
3William S. Paley, former chief executive of Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) allegedly told
his newsroom staff: ”You guys cover the news; I’ve got [the comedian] Jack Benny to make money
for me.” (Kalb, 1998, p.10)
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The growing popularity of ”soft” news and entertainment has been observable since
the mid-1970s and affects all kinds of media types, as shown by a content analysis of
about 4,000 new stories broadcasted in NBC, CBS, and ABC news, as well as on the
covers of the main U.S. news magazines and newspapers from 1977 to 1997 conducted
by The Project for Excellence in Journalism. The findings indicate that the share of
entertaining stories, categorized under celebrity, gossip, and scandal coverage, relative
to the total number of stories rose from 15% to 43% (see Hickey, 1998).
This development is symptomatic of the changes to the media market, although it
is not clear what it has been triggered by. This chapter presents two scenarios that
lead to media outlets’ changing their way of news coverage. The model developed in
this chapter explores how two competing media outlets, a newspaper and a television
channel, choose their equilibrium amount of entertainment in news coverage in a
spatial competition framework. The amount of entertainment (or, more generally, the
style of coverage) is a feature of horizontal differentiation between the two outlets,
and consumers have heterogeneous preferences with respect to the optimal amount
of entertainment. The strategic variables of the media outlets are the amount of
entertainment, and the prices they charge to consumers, similar to a traditional spatial
competition model a` la Hotelling, where firms compete in prices and locations. I
account for type-specific differences between the media outlets by assuming different
cost functions of content production, as well as for different ways of media financing
by analyzing the equilibrium with and without the advertising market. The latter
implies extending the framework from a one-sided to a two-sided markets model.
In order to explain shifts in the optimal amount of entertainment as shown for
instance in Figure 1.1, I introduce directional constraints to the model which implies
that consumers have different costs of choosing a specific platform. The directional
constraints can take two forms: First, they can bilaterally shift consumers’ distance
costs such that accessing the newspaper’s platform becomes more expensive, and
accessing the broadcaster’s platform becomes cheaper, and second, the distance costs
to the broadcaster’s platform can decrease unilaterally. These two scenarios reflect two
of the driving forces behind the trend towards more entertainment: The first type of
directional constraints refers to a decrease in consumers’ inclination to read, while the
second type represents technological progress in audio-visual media which makes the
broadcaster’s platform more attractive to consumers. I find that a bilateral shift in
consumers’ distance costs induces both media outlets to incorporate more entertaining
elements in news coverage. A unilateral decrease of the distance costs to the broad-
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caster’s platform, however, yields different results. It induces a negative effect on the
profits of both media outlets, and increases price competition. As a consequence, the
newspaper offers less while the television channel offers more entertainment. Overall,
the unilateral decrease in distance costs leads to a marginalization of informational
content, as the television channel gains market shares at the expense of the newspaper.
This chapter is based on Greiner (2010).
Chapter 3: How effective are advertising bans? – On the demand for quality
in two-sided media markets
Chapter 3 deals with the question of how advertising regulation affects television mar-
kets. Despite their differences in market size and market structure as well as own-
ership structure (public vs. private) and way of financing (pay-TV, license fees, or
free-to-air broadcasting), the EU countries are subject to the same minimum regula-
tory framework. The EU Directive Television without Frontiers4 regulates the duration
of television advertising in public as well as private channels. By imposing advertising
ceilings (i.e. time restrictions), the EU directive pursues the aim of consumer pro-
tection, as advertisements need to be readily recognizable, and should not interfere
with regular programming.5 Each member country has the right to impose stricter
advertising regulations than those of the TWF Directive, which leads to some coun-
tries asymmetrically discriminating against public service broadcasters by imposing an
advertising ban rather than advertising ceilings as suggested by the EU directive. The
rationale behind this regulation seems to be to increase the market share of the public
service broadcaster by providing consumers with an ad-free environment. This chapter
is devoted to analyzing the impact of an advertising ban on the public service broad-
casters in different financing schemes, which allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of
this regulatory instrument. Table 1.2 gives an overview on the countries’ advertising
regulations.
4Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 1989, amending act 2007/65/EC of 2007.
5For an overview on the EU’s audio-visual regulation policies, see European Commission (2011).
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Figure 1.2: Advertising regulation in the EU
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Advertising ceilings 
 
EU  
 
all channels 
 
no more than 12  min/h;  
but no more than an average of 9  min/h 
 
 
U.K. 
 
public service broadcasters 
 
no advertising allowed 
 
Germany 
 
 
public service broadcasters 
 
full ban from 6pm-midnight 
 
France 
 
all channels 
 
public service broadcasters 
 
 
no more than an average of 6 min/h 
 
full ban under debate 
 
Netherlands 
 
public service broadcasters 
 
ads may comprise up to 6.5% of daily programming 
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
public service broadcasters 
 
no advertising allowed 
 
 
   
Note: This overview of advertising regulation in the European Union shows that some coun-
tries have even stricter regulations than those imposed by the EU (first line). For additional
information, and for advertising regulation outside the EU, see Anderson (2007).
In order to analyze how an advertising ban on the public service broadcasters affects the
television markets, differences in the composition of pay-TV, licensing fees and free-TV
channels on the respective television markets play an important role (see Figure 1.3
for a comparison of broadcasters’ financing structures across EU countries). In some
countries like the U.K., France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and Bulgaria,
more than 50% of the available channels are financed through pay-TV or licensing fees,
whereas the majority of the channels in the other countries are available free-to-air.6
The countries with a large number of paid channels seem to coincide with the ones
imposing even stricter advertising regulations on their public service broadcasters than
required by the EU directive.
6For an overview on the distribution of the market shares of the largest television channels in each
country, see Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3.
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Figure 1.3: Ownership structure and television financing in the EU
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Note: The figure contains the aggregate share of all (national and local) television channels
that can be accessed in one of the countries, and fall under one of the five categories. Pay-
per-View, Video-on-Demand (UK only) and Paid Premium Content is counted as pay-TV.
Mixed ownership channels are not included. In all countries but Spain and the Netherlands,
public service broadcasters charge consumers with license fees. Data source: MAVISE database,
provided by the DG Communication of the European Commission, see European Audiovisual
Observatory (2011).
The model developed in Chapter 3 considers a two-sided market of two competing
television stations that offer content of differentiated quality to ad-averse consumers
and advertising space to firms. The high quality broadcaster corresponds to the public
service provider, and may be subject to an advertising ban. As all consumers prefer
high over low quality content, competition for viewers is vertical. This setup allows
us to capture the effects of an advertising ban in a world in which the ad-free public
service broadcaster provides the most appealing mix of no advertisements and high
broadcasting quality. Taking into account that advertisers pursue a targeted advertis-
ing motive in the sense that their profits increase in reaching the subset of consumers
most likely to buy their products, the advertising side of the market is modeled such
6
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that media outlets compete for advertisers horizontally. We analyze the impact of the
network effects between the consumer and the advertising side of the market, as well
as the effects of advertising regulation on the viewers’ equilibrium demand for high
quality content. The analysis is conducted in a pay-TV as well as in a free-TV regime
in order to be able to apply the model to different media markets. In a pay-TV regime,
an advertising ban on the high quality medium reduces its viewer market share, al-
though consumers dislike advertisements. This result indicates that an advertising ban
in a country with paid public broadcasting may be counterproductive as it lowers the
equilibrium reception of high quality contents. This chapter is based on joint work
with Marco Sahm (Greiner and Sahm, 2011).
Chapter 4: The role of online platforms for media markets – Multidimen-
sional spatial competition in a two-sided market
Chapter 4 examines the changes to the media markets triggered by the introduction
of online platforms. The aim of this chapter is to explain why media outlets offer
online platforms although it is uncertain whether or when they will yield a profit.
To a certain degree, oﬄine platforms have been substituted by online platforms on
both the consumer as well as the advertising market. As the internet penetration and
the availability of broadband access spread throughout most industrialized countries,
consumers’ media consumption habits have changed considerably. The number of
individuals going online for news coverage has increased steadily, as has the number
of platforms.7 Apart from traditional media outlets, a growing number of new players
are competing for consumers’ attention in the online market as for instance webmail
platforms, search aggregators, social networking sites, and blogs. Figure 1.4 illustrates
where individuals get their news from, and shows for the U.S., that online platforms
even attracted more consumers than newspapers in 2008.
7See also Figure 4.7 in Section 4.5 for an overview on the time individuals spend on platforms of
different type.
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Figure 1.4: Main news sources by media type, U.S.
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Note: The figure shows the fraction of individuals in the U.S. naming television, newspapers,
or online media as one of their two main news sources (Q.13 of the Pew Research Center for the
People & the Press’s Political and Economic Survey). N=1,489. Annual data are the average of
the data collected in the respective year with the wording ”How do you get most of your news
about national and international issues?”. Data source: Pew Research Center for the People &
the Press (2008).
Given the exodus of consumers to online news sites, media outlets tried to mark their
turf by providing own online platforms. Besides participating in the revenues generated
on the consumer side of the online market, media outlets have an additional incentive
to go online: The share of the advertising budget allocated to online media has also
increased steadily over time8 See Figure 1.5 for an example of the U.K. advertising
market.
8It is not only the number of consumers that makes the online market attractive to advertisers,
but also the profile of individuals gathering information on the web. Well-educated and wealthy
individuals are more likely to access news websites than less educated and low income groups. 27%
of the individuals holding a College degree (N=802) and 25% of individuals with an annual income of
above USD 75,000 (N=650) have paid for accessing a newspaper or magazine website, or downloaded
an article or special report. Data source: Pew Internet & American Life Project (2010).
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Figure 1.5: Online advertising expenditures, U.K.
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Note: This figure illustrates annual ad expenditures in the U.K., with online ad expenditures
denoting the advertising budget that goes into online platforms in general (rather than only to
news websites of media outlets). The data is from the annual IAB online adspend study carried
out by the Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB) in cooperation with Price Waterhouse Coopers.
Data source: Factsheets 2005-2010, see Internet Advertising Bureau (2010).
Media outlets seem to interpret the trends on the consumer as well as the advertising
market such that it is inevitable to go online in order to remain in the business. Offer-
ing their own online platforms enables them to get a share of the cake from the online
advertising expenditures, and presumably also from consumers, as there seems to be a
positive willingness to pay for online contents.9 The flip side of the medal is, however,
that online platforms also reduce the market share of their oﬄine counterparts, as con-
sumers with a high brand loyalty but a rather low preference for oﬄine media switch
to the online platform. This may decrease media outlets’ total revenues, if consumer
prices are lower in the online than in the oﬄine market, and it will also jeopardize rev-
enues from advertising, as the price per advertising slot typically is a function of the
number of ad impressions, i.e. the number of consumers reached by the advertisement.
9In 2010, 18% of all individuals taking part in the Pew Internet & American Life Project on U.S
online use claimed that they paid for a newspaper website, an online magazine, a journal article or a
special report online. N=2,385; data source: Pew Internet & American Life Project (2010).
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Evidence from the U.S. advertising market suggests that print advertisements have
to certain degree been substituted by online advertisements: In 2003, the advertising
industry in the U.S. has spend $45 billion for advertisements in newspapers, compared
to $1 billion for advertisements on newspapers’ online platforms. The amount spent
for online advertisements has tripled until 2010, but ad expenditures for the oﬄine
platforms dropped about 50% to $23 billion.10
Empirical evidence suggests that entering the online market has - at least for a signif-
icant number of media outlets - reduced their profits. In 2004, only 13% of the U.S.
broadcasters made profits with their online platforms. While this share increased over
time, it still remained at a relatively low level of 31.2% in 2008, where the last data
is available.11 A similar trend is observable in newspaper data. Newspapers went on-
line earlier than broadcasters, presumably due to lower fixed costs of entry. The four
major U.S. publishers, Tribune Company12, New York Times Digital, Knight Ridder,
and Belo, reported their online platforms’ profits to the public only from 2000 through
2003. Tribune Company, New York Times Digital, and Belo incurred losses of $53,
$70, and $46 million in 2000. Three years later, New York Times Digital and Belo
were making profits of $20.4 and $15.2 million, while Knight Ridder still had losses
of $5.5 million.13 Although this trend indicates that online platforms may generate
profits eventually, the distribution effect of consumers switching to the online platform
dims the enthusiasm, as the overall effect on profits may be negative.
In order to address the questions why online platforms may not be profitable, and why
media outlets go online despite the mixed evidence on profitability, I introduce a mul-
tidimensional spatial competition model in a two-sided market framework. Similar to
the two-sided markets section of the model in Chapter 2, media outlets sell contents to
consumers and advertising space to advertisers. Consumers have heterogenous prefer-
ences with respect to two characteristics of the media platform they intend to choose:
10Data source: Newspaper Association of America (2011).
11In most cases, the revenues and profits of the online platform are not stated separately in the
annual reports, which makes it next to impossible to judge the success of online platforms by the
numbers from the outside perspective. The data is based on a RTNDA/Ball State University Survey
among all operating, non-satellite television stations (N=890 in 2004, and N=1,241 in 2008). Data
source: Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism (2004) for 2004 data, and Radio Television Digital
News Association (2009) for 2008 data.
12bankruptcy in 2008
13Note that the New York Time’s profits in the digital market may partly be attributed to their
strategy of providing costly access to premium contents, which the other media outlets did not do
at the time period under consideration. In 2000 (2003), Knight Ridder (Tribune Company) did not
report online profits to the public. Data source: SEC Filings, see Pew Project for Excellence in
Journalism (2005).
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the style of coverage and the type of medium. On the consumer market, the style
of coverage is a feature of horizontal differentiation between the platforms. The type
dimension adds an additional dimension of horizontal differentiation to the framework
and stands for the way how the platform can be accessed (online or oﬄine). A main
insight from adding the additional dimension of product differentiation contradicts
an intuition gained from one-dimensional spatial competition models suggesting that
firms’ profits increase in the degree of product differentiation. In this framework, the
entrance to the online market reduces the profits of media outlets although product
differentiation is two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional. I can show that the
reason for media outlets’ entering the online market nevertheless is them being in a
prisoner’s dilemma situation. This chapter is based on Greiner (2011).
11

Chapter 2
The effect of entertainment in
newspaper and television news
coverage
2.1 Introduction
Media use has increased substantially in the past decades. Although individuals de-
vote more of their time budget to media use, traditional media like newspapers have to
compete harder for the attention of the consumers as competition has increased both
horizontally and vertically: There are more media outlets that offer their services to
consumers, and the variety of styles and formats has increased as well.
This chapter investigates how recent structural changes on the media market have af-
fected the style of news coverage: the emergence of new media (e.g. the introduction
of commercial television, or pay-per-view technologies in digital television), and a shift
in media consumption habits from print to audio-visual media. A variety of studies
show that the way how media outlets cover the news is relevant for political outcomes.1
Anecdotal evidence suggests that media coverage in general became more sensational
1A large part of the political economics literature on media markets (Besley and Prat, 2006;
Djankov et al., 2003) has focussed on showing that a deviation from neutral (and truthful) media
coverage, or over-representation of certain groups or opinions may distort political outcomes. With
respect to public spending, Stro¨mberg (2001) and Besley and Burgess (2002) show that groups that
are politically important or valuable to advertisers are favored by politicians due to their being over-
represented in media coverage or media exposure.
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and entertainment-oriented in recent years.2 The question I intend to investigate in
this chapter is whether a shift in consumer preferences towards more entertaining me-
dia contents is met by a change in the style of news coverage in television broadcasts
and newspapers such that news coverage contains more entertaining elements.
The methodological contribution of this chapter is the analysis of directional constraints
in a spatial competition framework. Directional constraints describe differences in the
per unit distance costs a consumer incurs in a spatial competition model. For instance,
moving to a platform located to the left of the consumer’s position is more costly than
moving to the platform located on the right. I study the strategic interaction of two
competing media outlets of different type where consumers incur distance costs when
choosing a media platform that does not exactly meet their preferred style of news
coverage. Exogenous shocks affecting media consumption habits can alter the distance
costs of consumers and result in directional constraints such that the costs per unit
of distance are no longer equal for the two platforms. In an extension, I introduce a
two-sided market in order to analyze how this affects the benchmark model’s outcomes.
Discussing the model in a media economics context is the most natural application.
However, one could think of a variety of other directional constraints in one-sided spa-
tial competition, as well as in a two-sided markets framework (although there are less
examples for the latter). There are two different kinds of directional constraints: (i)
a shift in consumer preferences such that distance costs to one platform (the one con-
taining more entertaining elements) fall while the costs to the other platform increase
by an equal absolute amount, and (ii) a unilateral fall in the distance costs to one
platform (the entertainment abundant) that decreases the average distance costs. Al-
though in both cases, consumers’ costs of accessing the platform of one type of media
outlet have decreased, the scenarios yield qualitatively different results. In Scenario
(i), the platform with the higher distance costs chooses a location closer to the cen-
ter of the distribution compared to the situation before the shock, and sets a lower
price. It serves the smaller part of the market and has lower profits. The competitor
moves towards the margin of the distribution and sets a higher price which leads to
higher profits. For the style of coverage, this implies that news coverage in television
2A popular saying among journalists reads: ”if it bleeds, it leads”, which implies that a piece of
news has to be sensational in order to become a lead article or broadcast, as neutral information is
uninteresting to most consumers. Oestgaard (1965) and Galtung and Ruge (1965) from the Norwegian
Peace Research Institute in Oslo were the first to analyze how a selection bias in news coverage can
arise. They identified a set of 15 characteristics that increase the probability of a piece of news to
be published. Some of these characteristics are also typical traits of entertainment in news coverage,
as for instance simplification, sensationalism, unambiguity, negativity, and personalization. A similar
argument is made in psychology studies, like in the one of Baumeister et al. (2001), who show why
individuals are more interested in negative than in positive information.
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as well as in newspapers becomes more entertaining. In Scenario (ii), however, product
differentiation increases compared to the situation before the shock which leads to a
content-wise specialization of media platforms, as both platforms move towards the
margins of the distribution. Price competition increases, which leads to declining prof-
its of both media outlets. In this situation, only the television channel shifts towards
more entertainment whereas news coverage in newspapers becomes more neutral and
informative.
This chapter consists of two parts, with Section 2.2 analyzing the question of how
media platforms evolve in a one-sided market without advertising, and Section 2.3 ex-
tending the benchmark model to a two-sided market. Each of these two main sections
is structured as follows: First, the setup and the symmetric case are briefly discussed
(Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1). Then I consider two asymmetric cases that arise due to
exogenous shocks: a bilateral shift in the distance costs of consumers (Sections 2.2.2
and 2.3.2), and a unilateral decrease of the distance costs to one of the two platforms
(Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.3). Section 2.4 concludes.
Related literature
The model developed in this chapter is at the interface between the literature on media
bias and the literature on spatial competition and two-sided markets.
As for the former strand of literature, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) as well as
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) show how slant in coverage arises by explicitly modeling
the emergence of media bias. There are two ways of media bias influencing public
opinion: One way is to slant news in a certain direction as shown by Della Vigna and
Kaplan (2007), and another way is to create a selection bias by covering only a special
kind of news (for instance news in favor of a certain political party) as in the work
of George and Waldfogel (2006). I consider the possibility that media outlets deviate
from neutral coverage not for political or ideological reasons but rather out of a simple
profit-maximizing rationale.
The framework used in this model dates back to the seminal work by Hotelling (1929)
who analyzes spatial competition between two firms that are differentiated in a hori-
zontal dimension (their location). He describes a two stage game, where both a location
and a pricing decision are made. In this chapter, I interpret the location of firms not
in the spatial dimension but as the style of news coverage. I adapt the sequence of the
standard price-location game by letting both media outlets choose the optimal style of
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news coverage in the first stage of the game, and prices in the second stage.
Various authors have modified the Hotelling framework in order to generalize the as-
sumptions. D’Aspremont et al. (1979) find that the linear cost function Hotelling was
using does not necessarily yield a solution in the pricing subgame, and introduces a
quadratic cost function. This opened up many possibilities to extend the framework for
instance by introducing more firms (Anderson et al., 1995; Economides, 1993), vertical
instead of horizontal product differentiation (Mussa and Rosen, 1986), or a non-uniform
distribution of consumers over the characteristics space (Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995).
Anderson et al. (1997) show that deviating from the standard assumption of consumers
being uniformly distributed over the characteristics space by considering more flexible
(yet symmetric) distributions does not alter the results qualitatively.
The two-sided markets part of the chapter primarily builds on Anderson and Coate
(2005) and Armstrong (2006) who analyze two competing platforms in a two-sided
market with content being exogenously given. In this model, however, the decision on
contents (the location stage of the game) is endogenous. The pricing decision of media
outlets is often modeled such that only print platforms set positive prices, and tele-
vision channels offer their services free-to-air. However, recent contributions analyze
equilibria in pay-per-view regimes in which accessing television broadcasts is costly
for consumers, which is motivated by the fact that analogue free-to-air television is
being replaced by digital television, direct broadcast satellites, or cable services. In
the following, television channels directly set prices as in the models by Gabszewicz
et al. (2006) and Ambrus and Reisinger (2006). Alternatively, prices can be set by
cable providers who act as distributers as in Kind et al. (2010).3 For a comparison of
free-to-air and pay-per-view regimes, see Peitz and Valletti (2008).
Contributions on directional constraints in spatial competition focused exclusively on
one-sided market frameworks.4 The larger part of the literature deals with firms hav-
ing asymmetric transportation costs rather than allowing for asymmetric consumer
distance costs (see for instance Lai, 2001; Matsumura and Matsushima, 2010; Sun,
2010; Colombo, 2011). This literature is based on the study of asymmetric transporta-
3Kind et al. (2010) argue, however, that online technologies allow consumers to bypass the cable
provider, which implies that television stations again are the ones to set consumer prices as in this
model.
4Note that directional constraints can either be direction-specific (for instance if the locations on
the Hotelling line are interpreted as certain points in time before which consumption is not possible),
or they can be platform-specific as in the model studied in this chapter (the distance costs hinge on
the characteristics of the platforms). These interpretations differ such that, in the first case, moving
for instance in the left direction causes the same costs irrespective of the platform the consumer moves
towards, and in the second case, moving to the left causes different costs subject to the platform that
is located there.
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tion costs originally proposed by Launhardt (1885), who assumes that firms differ in
their exogenously given locations, as well as in their costs of delivering their products
to the consumers.5 One of the first contributions that analyze directional constraints
in consumers’ distance costs is by Cancian et al. (1995) who discuss the optimal time of
television news scheduling of two competing broadcasters. They show that there exists
no equilibrium in pure strategies, if consumers can only watch news after a certain
point in time (i.e. it is impossible to move in one of the two directions on the Hotelling
line).
The Cancian et al. (1995) framework is extended by a number of contribution: Nilssen
(1997) analyzes the effect of asymmetric distance costs on equilibrium locations in a
setup where firms can locate without any costs anywhere on the unit interval, and
Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) set up a sequential game. Gabszewicz et al. (2008) show
that there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies if broadcasters can randomly at-
tract a fraction of consumers who are not directionally constrained. If consumers have
heterogeneous preferences with respect to an additional horizontal product character-
istic, as in Gabszewicz et al. (2010) and Barros (2008), there exist equilibria in pure
and in mixed strategies.
In this model, the directional constraints are such that consumers can move in both
directions on the Hotelling line (unlike in the Cancian et al., 1995; Nilssen and Sorgard,
1998; Gabszewicz et al., 2008, 2010; Barros, 2008, models where moving in one direc-
tion is prohibitively costly), but incur different per unit distance costs subject to the
direction they choose. For media outlets, the location choice is costly if they deviate
from their point of origin.
2.2 Competition in a one-sided market
Two media outlets - a newspaper, indexed by N , and a broadcaster, indexed by T
- compete by selling news coverage of different style in the form of newspapers or
television broadcasts to a continuum of η consumers. The style of news coverage of a
media outlet is determined by the share of entertaining contributions relative to the
5See Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse (1996) for an extensions of the Launhardt (1885) model in a
vertical and horizontal competition framework.
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total number of contributions as in Gabszewicz et al. (2004).6 Any style of coverage
from full information to full entertainment is feasible.
The game is modeled in three stages, where the style of news coverage is chosen in the
first stage, and Bertrand competition for prices takes place in the second stage. In the
third stage, consumers simultaneously choose their preferred media platform.
Media outlets
Media outlet i ∈ N, T offers a platform of style θi, and maximize profits, given by
Πi = Dipi − C (θi) , (1)
where Di stands for the number of consumers choosing platform i at price pi. The costs
of generating contents depend on the style of news coverage, θi ∈ [0, 1], and are denoted
by C (θi). Both media outlets choose their style of coverage, e.g. whether they want
to present news in a rather neutral or in an entertaining way, with θi = 0 indicating
completely neutral coverage without any entertaining elements, and θi = 1 standing for
the maximum amount of entertainment. I assume that θT > θN , which implies that the
style of coverage is such that television broadcasts always contain more entertaining
elements than a newspaper.7 Figure 2.1 depicts the share of entertaining news topics
subject to media types and illustrates that television channels systematically cover
more stories that fall under one of the ”entertainment” categories than newspapers,
and newspapers are more active in the ”information” categories. This supports the
assumption of θT > θN .
6For simplicity, visual and emotional coverage is subsumed under the term ”entertainment”. This
refers to a large body of literature discussing the shift from informational to entertaining contents,
which treats entertainment and information as being mutually exclusive. See Graber (1988) for a
comprehensive list of formal differences between informational and entertaining news contents.
7The fact that news coverage in television is more entertaining than in print media is well docu-
mented in the literature. See for instance Neuman et al. (1992) and Graber (1990) for a comprehensive
overview.
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Figure 2.1: Topics in news coverage, 2010
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Note: This figure is based on the PEJ’s News Coverage Index and illustrates the topics covered
in the news in U.S. media in 2010 that fall under one of the categories. The data is based
on a content analysis of 52,613 news stories in daily news media. Each column expresses the
average share of news stories of a certain category relative to the total number of news stories
covered in this media type. Television data (red columns) includes Network TV News (morning
and evening) with a total reach of about 43.5 million viewers per day. Newspaper data (blue
columns) consist of a representative sample of large papers (circulation over 650,000 readers
per day) and medium papers (circulation of 100,000 to 650,000 readers per day). Data source:
Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism (2011a).
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The assumption of different media types being ex ante specialized in their style of
coverage is reflected in the cost function. The variable costs do not depend on the
sold copies but only on the style of news coverage. The cost function is discussed in
detail below and can be interpreted as adjustment costs of choosing a type of coverage
the media platforms are not specialized in.8 Marginal costs of reaching one additional
consumer are assumed to be zero for both broadcaster and newspaper, as the costs
for paper and ink (newspaper) are negligible, and an additional viewer does not cause
the broadcaster any costs. Furthermore, there are fixed costs for staff and facilities
(which are for simplicity assumed to be equal across media types). The cost functions
take the form of C (θN) = cθ
2
N + F , and C (θT ) = c (1− θT )2 + F , with c ≥ 1, and
F denoting the fixed costs. The variable costs for the newspaper are zero, if θN = 0,
and the broadcaster has no variable costs of content production, if θT = 1.
9 The
asymmetric cost functions are due to the fact that newspapers and television stations
are media outlets of different types. Newspapers are a type of medium specialized in
transmitting information, and have a set of journalists and experts they are working
with as well as subscriptions to the services of a number of news agencies. Publishing
informational content typically requires no on-site material other than footage provided
by news agencies. If news articles have to be made more entertaining, for instance by
including visual elements, journalists have to be sent on site in order to take exclusive
pictures, or pictures have to be bought from news agencies. These costs are captured
by the adjustment costs. Television stations, on the contrary, have a clear focus on
entertainment as they broadcast films, TV shows, sports events, or games shows in the
majority of their air time. If they have to focus more on information in news coverage,
they have to hire additional staff and expert people, or subscribe to the services of
additional news agencies, which represents their adjustment costs.
Consumers
The consumer market is structured such that there is a mass of η = 1 consumers.
Consumers differ in their preferred style of coverage and are uniformly distributed
on the unit interval of the Hotelling line. I assume that individuals consume news
only once in a given time period, which implies that consumers single-home, i.e.
8The adjustment costs correspond to the relocation costs in a traditional spatial competition
framework where firms have their plant at a certain location and the shops where they sell their goods
to consumers at a different location.
9This can be interpreted as newspapers providing only informational content, and television station
providing only entertaining broadcasts before the styles of coverage are being chosen.
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they choose precisely one platform. Furthermore, the assumption of single-homing
consumers circumvents the distortions on the advertising market that would arise in
a two-sided markets model, if both sides of the market chose to multi-home.10 In
order to provide equal grounds for the comparison to the two-sided markets model in
Section 2.3, consumers are assumed to single-home in the one-sided market model in
this section as well.
The utility of a representative consumer n consuming medium i is defined as fol-
lows:
Uni = u¯− ki |θn − θi| − pi ∀ n, i (2)
where u¯ denotes the reservation utility of being informed about recent events, which is
reduced by the price of the medium pi, and by the distance between the style of news
coverage θi of medium i, and the preferred style of news coverage θ
n of consumer n,
multiplied by the medium-specific distance cost parameter ki. The parameter ki ∈ (0, 1]
indicates that the cost of deviation per unit of distance may vary between the media
types. As k ∈ (0, 1], the distance costs to the platform of one media outlet can be
interpreted as a fraction of the costs to the competitor’s platform. The higher k, the
larger the disutility consumers incur from not obtaining their preferred style of cover-
age. For instance, the cost of the deviation from the preferred style of news coverage of
an individual with a small θn can be interpreted as the cost of figuring out the objec-
tive pieces of news while non-objective news that might be appealing to entertainment
oriented individuals is nothing but nuisance to him. On the contrary, an individual
with a high θn finds it costly to endure lengthy and detailed explanations instead of
having a gripping headline associated with illustrative footage. These distance costs
are the equivalent to the transportation costs in the standard Hotelling setting.
10One of the limitations of two-sided spatial competition models is that it is not possible to obtain
plausible equilibria, if both sides of the market are multi-homing. See for instance Armstrong (2006)
for a general model of two-sided markets where agents of one side of the market are single-homing and
the other agents are multi-homing. He shows that this competitive bottleneck (i.e. media platforms
are monopolists for multi-homing advertisers when it comes to reaching single-homing consumers)
leads to higher prices on the multi-homing side. In the case of multi-homing consumers, it would be
rational for advertisers to place exactly one advertisement (i.e. to single-home), since being exposed
to an advertisement more than once does not increase consumers’ likelihood to buy the advertised
good. As multi-homing is allowed for on the advertising market in my model, the consumer market
must be structured such that consumers single-home, as in the seminal papers by Anderson and Coate
(2005) or Gabszewicz et al. (2001).
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2.2.1 Symmetric model
In the third stage of the game, consumers decide which platform to choose. The pivotal
consumer, indexed by piv, is indifferent, if the utility from reading the newspaper equals
the utility from watching news on television:
UpivN = U
piv
T
⇔ pT − pN = kN(θpiv − θN)− kT
(
θT − θpiv
)
(3)
Since each consumer chooses exactly one platform, all consumers with a preferred style
of news coverage θn below the preferred style θpiv of the pivotal consumer choose the
newspaper while all consumers with θn above θpiv choose the broadcasted news. Solving
this equation for θpiv yields the following demands:
θpiv = DN (pN , pT ) =
kNθN + kT θT − pN + pT
kN + kT
1− θpiv = DT (pN , pT ) = (1− θN)kN + (1− θT )kT + pN − pT
kN + kT
. (4)
In the symmetric case, consumers have equal per unit distance costs when choosing
either of the media, which implies kN = kT = k, with k ∈ (0, 1].
In the second stage, both media outlets simultaneously maximize profits (Eq. 1) with
respect to their respective prices, which yields the equilibrium prices as functions of θi.
In order to solve the first stage of the game, this result is plugged again into (1) and
maximized with respect to θi. Substituting the optimal θi into the reaction functions of
the prices from the second stage of the game, and into (4) and (1) yields the following
equilibrium, with ∗ indicating the symmetric model:11
p∗N = p
∗
T = k, D
∗
N = D
∗
T =
1
2
,
θ∗N =
k
6c
, θ∗T = 1−
k
6c
,
Π∗N = Π
∗
T =
k
2
− 1
c
(
k
6
)2
− F. (5)
11See Section A1 of the Appendix for a formal derivation of the equilibrium.
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Both media outlets set the same price and share the market equally. The style of
news coverage is chosen such that the amount of entertainment in the newspaper is
relatively small whereas the amount of entertainment in television is large with the
deviations from the extreme points being equal for both media outlets. The following
figure illustrates the equilibrium outcome of the symmetric model.
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium of symmetric model, one-sided market
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Note: This figure illustrates market shares, prices, and style of coverage of the two media outlets
in the symmetric model in a one-sided market. The vertical axes illustrate the prices of the two
media outlets, and their respective style of coverage is given by their location on the horizontal
line of unit length.
As depicted in Figure 2.2, equilibrium styles of coverage are such that firms locate close
to their point of origin at the respective endpoints of the distribution.12 This implies
that, contrary to the standard Hotelling model with linear transportation costs, devi-
12θN ≤ 1/6, and θN ≥ 5/6, as 0 < k ≤ 1, and c ≥ 1.
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ating by moving towards the center of the distribution does not yield higher profits.13
The reason is that, in contrast to the traditional Hotelling model, the media outlets
incur disproportionately increasing costs from relocating (convexity of cost function).
Proposition 1 If consumers’ distance costs become larger (k increases), and k ∈ (0, 1]
as well as c ≥ 1,
• prices and profits of both media outlets increase.
• product differentiation in the style dimension decreases.
If media outlets’ adjustment costs become larger (c increases),
• the profits of both media outlets increase.
• product differentiation in the style dimension increases.
Proof. See Section A3 of the Appendix.
Dropping the assumptions of c ≥ 1 and k ∈ (0, 1] yields the following results: The
effect of an increase of k on profits is positive, as long as k < 9c. Note that there only
exists an interior solution as long as k < 3c. Therefore, given that an interior solution
exists, the effect of an increase of k on profits is positive.
The effects of an increase in k is standard to spatial competition models: As k increases,
obtaining the right style of coverage becomes relatively more important for consumers’
choice than low prices, which allows both media outlets to charge higher prices. Both
media outlets have an incentive to move towards the center of the distribution in
order to increase their market share, which raises their adjustment costs. As the price
increase dominates the cost increase, profits are higher. As the adjustment costs c
of media outlets increase (i.e. moving towards the center of the distribution becomes
more costly), the marginal costs of a one-unit increase in θi increases whereas the
marginal gain remains the same. Hence, firms will locate closer to the margins of the
distribution. As the decrease in relocations costs of firms due to moving to the margins
is larger than the increase in c, profits increase.
13Non-existence of an equilibrium as in the original Hotelling model with linear utility in the
characteristics space is not a problem in this model, since firms locate sufficiently close to the margins
of the distribution, as moving towards the center is costly. Hence, choosing the location of the
competitor and serving the entire market decreases the profits, and the equilibrium is stable. See the
proof in Section A2 of the Appendix.
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In the following sections, I analyze how the equilibrium varies when allowing for asym-
metric consumer distance costs. Asymmetric distance costs imply that the costs of a
unit of distance are systematically more expensive for consumers when moving in one
or the other direction. Intuitively, one would expect lower consumer distance costs to
one of the two platforms to be beneficial for the owner of this platform as it should
result in higher profits. In the following sections, I explore why this is not necessarily
the case.
2.2.2 Bilateral shift in distance costs
I analyze the changes induced by a shift in consumer preferences such that the distance
cost parameter of the broadcaster kT decreases by the amount e, with kT = k− e, and
0 < e < k. The distance cost parameter of the newspaper increases by the same
amount, which yields kN = k + e. Thus, the average distance costs remain the same
as in the symmetric model.
One could for instance imagine that such a shift in consumer preferences is triggered by
a decreasing inclination to read, which is met by an increased preference for watching
television in general. This is supported by a number of empirical studies. Television is
the most preferred medium for 70% of the 1,489 participants in the Pew Research Cen-
ter’s study on U.S. media use, while only 35% of the surveyed people name newspapers
are their primary choice (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2008).14
The Audit Bureau of Circulation finds that, in 2009, the newspaper circulation in the
U.S. has hit its lowest level in seven decades, which equals a loss of roughly 10 million
readers since 1940.15 In European countries, one can observe a similar development:
In Germany, for instance, the number of individuals claiming to read a news maga-
zine on a daily basis dropped by 20 percentage points from 1980 to today (Schneller,
2008).16 In contrast to the decline in print media use, the share of individuals who
watch television more than three hours a day rose by 30 percentage points since 1976
14See also Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1.
15The data is based on a study on paid newspaper consumption among 379 of the largest American
newspapers. In 2009, 30.4 million newspapers were sold, compared to 41.1 million in 1940 (Ahrens,
2009).
16The report summarizes the findings of the Allensbacher Markt- und Werbetra¨geranalysen of
the following years: 1987, 1995, 2000, 2008. Magazine data is based on a representative sample of
individuals older than 14 years, in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the circulation rates of the
news magazines Focus, Der Spiegel, Stern, and Time (in 2000).
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to roughly one half of the total population (Schneller, 2008).17 This evidence indicates
that there might be a shift in consumer preferences such that audiovisual media become
increasingly popular, and the popularity of print media decreases. In the following, I
analyze how this affects the style of news coverage as well as the prices and profits of
both media outlets.
The solution of the game follows the same logic as described in Section 2.2.1: In the sec-
ond stage, both media outlets maximize the profit function (1) with respect to prices.
These reaction functions are again plugged into the profit function, which is maximized
with respect to the equilibrium style of news coverage in the first stage. This yields
θ˜N =
e+ k
6c
[
1− e(3c− 2k)
χ˜
]
,
θ˜T =
1
2
− k
6c
+
3c(9ak − k2 + 2ek) + e(k2 − 2ek − e2)
6cχ˜
, (6)
with χ˜ ≡ (9ak − k2 − e2) and tilde variables ∼ denoting the shift in preferences.
Accordingly, the full equilibrium is characterized as follows:18
p˜N = k
[
1− e(3c− 2k)
χ˜
]
, p˜T = k
[
1 +
e(3c− 2k)
χ˜
]
,
D˜N =
1
2
− e(3c− 2k)
2χ˜
, D˜T =
1
2
+
e(3c− 2k)
2χ˜
,
Π˜N =
[
1− e(3c− 2k)
χ˜
][
k
2
− 1
c
(
k
6
)2
− e(2k + e)
36a
]
− F,
Π˜T =
[
1 +
e(3c− 2k)
χ˜
][
k
2
− 1
c
(
k
6
)2
+
e(2k − e)
36c
]
− F (7)
In equilibrium, the broadcaster charges higher prices than the newspaper and serves
the larger part of the market which leads to higher profits. Although the profits of the
broadcaster are higher than in the symmetric case, aggregate profits are lower, as the
newspaper’s profits decrease. Figure 2.3 compares the symmetric equilibrium to the
17according to survey data from the Allensbacher Markt- und Werbetra¨geranalysen, IfD-Umfrage
3037, among individuals in the Federal Republic of Germany older than 14 years (older than 16 years
for 1976 data).
18The formal derivation is analogous to the one in Section A1 of the Appendix.
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equilibrium after introducing asymmetric distance costs.
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium with bilateral shift in consumer preferences,
one-sided market
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Note: This figure illustrates market shares, prices, and style of coverage of the two media outlets
in the model with a bilateral shift in consumers’ distance costs where kN = k+e and kT = k−e
compared to the symmetric model where kN = kT = k in a one-sided market. The vertical axes
illustrate the prices of the two media outlets, and their respective style of coverage is given by
their location on the horizontal line of unit length.
The effects of an increase in the size of the shock
An increase in e implies that the difference between the distance costs becomes larger
such that accessing the newspaper becomes ceteris paribus more expensive for con-
sumers while accessing the television broadcast becomes cheaper.
Proposition 2 An increase in e yields the following effects in equilibrium:
1. Both platforms raise their level of entertainment.
2. The broadcaster sets higher prices, and increases its market share, which leads to
an increase in profits.
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3. The newspaper lowers its price, and market shares fall such that profits decrease.
Proof. See Section A4 of the Appendix.
When it comes to watching television, consumers are willing to tolerate a larger dis-
tance between their preferred style of coverage and the location of the broadcaster, as
a unit of distance has become cheaper for consumers due to the increase in e. Hence,
the broadcaster can set a higher price and reduce its own costs by moving towards the
margin of the distribution. As accessing the newspaper is prohibitively costly for some
consumers from the center of the distribution, the broadcaster serves the larger part of
the market despite the higher price. As a consequence, the profits of the broadcaster
increase. When choosing the newspaper, consumers’ costs per unit of distance are
kN = kT + 2e. Hence, the newspaper has to move towards the center of the distribu-
tion by increasing the entertainment intensity. It also lowers the price as soon as the
marginal costs of increasing θN become larger than the marginal costs of cutting prices.
By moving towards the center of the distribution, the newspaper increases the size of
the uncontested hinterland at the left margin. Since the price as well as the demand
for the newspaper is lower than before the shock, the newspaper’s profits decrease.
These results show that, for the competitive disadvantage of one player being suf-
ficiently high, the other player is able to increase his profits. The higher the cost
disadvantage with respect to distance costs of one player, the higher the profits of his
opponent. However, the results are sensitive to how changes in the distance costs are
modeled. An alternative scenario is presented in the following section. The empirical
relevance of this scenario is discussed in Section 2.4.
2.2.3 Unilateral decrease in distance costs
In the previous section, I have analyzed the case where the average distance costs
remain unchanged and increased preferences for audiovisual coverage are met symmet-
rically by higher distance costs to the print medium. However, it is equally possible
to think of situations where a reduction of distance costs to the television channel has
no effect on the preferences for newspapers. For instance, in recent years, the number
of television channels has increased due to the introduction of Digital Video Broad-
casting Terrestrial (DVB-T).19 Besides the increase in available channels, there has
19The number of news channels in Europe has increased from 5 in 1990 to 88 in 2003, which was
met by an increase in the number of available channels from 103 to 1132 during the same time period
(Europa¨ische Audiovisuelle Informationsstelle, 2004).
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also been a development towards new interactive formats, and novel technologies that
allow consumers to use on-demand services. This has added to the attractivity of the
medium and has lead to more consumers using the medium for various purposes other
than news consumption. Although consumers’ preferences with respect to the style of
news coverage have not changed, the fact that individuals watch more television has
decreased their distance costs towards consuming the news broadcast on television.
Switching channels to consume the news broadcast of the television channel causes
lower costs than switching to a different media type.
The per unit distance costs are now defined by kN = k, and kT = k−e, with 0 < e < k,
which implies that the sum of the distance cost parameters decreases. Therefore, not
only a shift in preferences is considered but also a level effect that comes with the
decrease of the average distance costs. In order to analyze the optimal style of news
coverage for both media outlets, as well as the corresponding prices, quantities and
profits, the equilibrium is derived by solving the game in a similar way as in the pre-
vious sections. The unilateral shift in preferences is denoted by hat variables ˆ. In
equilibrium, media outlets choose the style of coverage as follows:
θˆN =
3ak(3k − 2e)− k(e− k)2
3cχˆ
θˆT = 1− k
6c
+
3ae(5k − 2e)− e2k
6cχˆ
, (8)
with χˆ ≡ (2k − e)(9c+ e)− 2k2. Equilibrium prices, market shares, and profits are:
pˆN =
(2k − e)[3c(3k − 2e) + (e− k)2]
χˆ
pˆT =
(2k − e)[3c(3k − e) + k2]
χˆ
DˆN =
3c(3k − 2e)− (e− k)2
χˆ
DˆT =
3c(3k − e)− k2
χˆ
ΠˆN =
[3c(2e− 3k) + (e− k)2]2[9c(2k − e) + k2]
9c(χˆ)2
− F
ΠˆT =
[9c(e− 2k) + (e− k)2][3c(3k − e) + k2]2
9c(χˆ)2
− F (9)
In Figure 2.4, the equilibrium following a unilateral decrease in distance costs is com-
pared to the equilibrium of the symmetric model.
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium with unilateral shift in consumer preferences,
one-sided market
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Note: This figure illustrates market shares, prices, and style of coverage of the two media outlets
in the model with a unilateral shift in consumers’ distance costs where kN = k and kT = k− e,
compared to the symmetric model where kN = KT = k in a one-sided market. The vertical
axes illustrate the prices of the two media outlets, and their respective style of coverage is given
by their location on the horizontal line of unit length.
Compared to the symmetric case, the newspaper reduces its entertainment intensity
(i.e. θN shifts to the left), while the broadcaster increases its entertainment intensity
(i.e. θT shifts to the right). The price of accessing the broadcast is higher than the
price of the newspaper, and both prices are strictly positive. The demands for both
media products are strictly positive, and add up to one, where the broadcaster serves
the larger part of the market than the newspaper
(
DˆT − DˆN > 0
)
. Again, the profits
of the broadcaster are higher than the profits of the newspaper, as it serves the larger
part of the market at a higher price
(
ΠˆT − ΠˆN > 0
)
. Compared to the symmetric
case, however, aggregate profits are lower.
The effects of an increase in the size of the shock
Proposition 3 If consumers distance costs are altered such that the distance costs
to the broadcaster’s platform fall, and the distance costs to the newspaper’s platform
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remain the same, an increase in e yields the following effects:
1. Product differentiation in the style dimension increases as both firms move to the
margins of the distribution.
2. Both firms set lower prices and have lower profits.
3. The broadcaster increases his market share.
Proof. See Section A5 of the Appendix.
The newspaper can either lower its price, or offer a higher amount of entertainment, in
order to compensate for the fact that the broadcaster has become cheaper for consumers
per unit of deviation from their preferred style. In contrast to the previous section,
where the distance costs of the newspaper increased, the competitive disadvantage of
the newspaper is less pronounced. As a marginal increase in θN is more expensive than
marginally cutting prices, the newspaper sets a lower price. This, in turn, induces the
broadcaster to lower his price as well, up to the point where the increase in market
shares is offset by the decrease in prices. This already indicates that the reduction of
the distance costs is not necessarily profitable for the broadcaster, either.
In contrast to the shock where distance costs shifted bilaterally, both firms move to-
wards the margins of the distribution which indicates some tendency to specialize in
information (newspaper), and entertainment (broadcaster). By moving towards the
margins of the distribution, and thus increasing product differentiation, both media
outlets save adjustment costs as the style of coverage has on average become less im-
portant to consumers. Since the newspaper offers less entertainment, it becomes ceteris
paribus less attractive for the consumers from the center of the distribution to buy a
newspaper. On the one hand, the newspaper has a smaller market share due to the
reduction of the size of the hinterland, and on the other hand it is costly for the news-
paper to attract consumers from the center of the distribution as this requires further
price cuts. This results shows that the reduction in prices does not compensate for
the shift towards less entertainment. Therefore, the broadcaster gains market shares
at the expense of the newspaper.
The decrease in profits of the newspaper comes from the fact that it serves a smaller
part of the market at a lower price. The saved adjustment costs, however, do not
compensate for the price and demand reductions. For the broadcaster, it does not pay
to have the platform with the lower distance costs, as the increase in market shares,
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and the lower adjustment costs do not offset the price reduction, which leads to lower
profits.
In the remaining part of the chapter, I discuss how the effects following the bilateral
and unilateral shocks are affected by the introduction of a two-sided market.
2.3 Introducing a two-sided market: The effect of
advertising
Introducing a two-sided market allows for capturing the effects that are caused by the
inter-market externalities between the advertising and the consumer market. In a two-
sided market where media outlets compete for consumers and advertisers, the number
of consumers on the one side of the market typically exerts a positive externality on
the revenues of advertisers on the other side of the market, which allows the media
outlet to charge higher prices for an advertising slot. The implication of introducing the
advertising side of the market can be summarized as follows: The advertising market
exerts downward pressure on consumer prices as advertising revenues increase in the
number of consumers. The results with respect to the distribution of market shares
and profits, as well as the styles of coverage of the three models discussed in Section 2.2
are not affected by the existence of an advertising market as long as the effectiveness
of an advertisement is equal across media types. If an advertisement in one media type
is systematically more effective than an advertisement in the other media type, some
of the results of the comparative statics analyses in Section 2.2 are reversed.
Media outlets
As profits are not only generated on the consumer market but also on the advertising
market, the profits of media outlet i now read:
Πi = p
c
iDi + p
a
i ai − C(θi), (10)
where the costs of generating content C(θi) do not change due to the introduction of
the advertising market. The price per advertisement ai in medium i is denoted by
pai . The number of advertisements does not enter the utility function of consumers, as
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consumers are assumed to be ad-neutral.20
Advertisers
The advertising market is modeled in the simplest possible way with the advertising
price being linear in the market shares on the consumer side.21 I assume that there
is a large number of m advertisers acting as price takers on the advertising market.
Each of them produces exactly one good which is sold at a price pm normalized to
one. Advertisements serve the purpose of making the goods known to consumers, as a
fraction βi ∈ [0, 1] of all consumers exposed to an advertisement buy the good. Hence,
βi is interpreted as the effectiveness of an advertisement in medium i. Advertising
space per medium ai is limited (either by technological restrictions or by political
regulation) and may without loss of generality be normalized to one in each medium.
Accordingly, the supply of advertising space is fully inelastic. Media outlets charge a
medium-specific price per ad impression22 (similar to the Cost Per Mille), and extract
the full surplus from the advertisers. Hence, the price for an advertisement on platform
i is:
pim = βiDi pm︸︷︷︸
=1
ai,m − pai ai,m ⇒ pai = βiDi, (11)
where ai,m denotes the advertisers’ demand for advertising space in medium i. For
instance, if advertisements are very effective such that each ad impression triggers
exactly one positive sales decision, βi = 1, and the price per advertisement equals the
number of consumers reached by this medium. This condition shows that advertising
demand is perfectly elastic such that equilibrium ad prices are determined by the ad
effectiveness and the number of consumers of medium i, only.
20If advertisements were a nuisance to consumers, it may be optimal for the media outlet to cut
back on selling advertising space in order to remain attractive to consumers. See Chapter 3 for a
model in which consumers are ad-averse.
21See Bergemann and Bonatti (2010); Gabszewicz et al. (2002, 2004) for a similar way of modeling
the advertising side of a two-sided market.
22A consumer contact of an advertisement in medium i is referred to by the term ”ad impression”.
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2.3.1 Symmetric model
In the symmetric case, each unit of distance between the preferred style of coverage
and the style of coverage of the closest medium causes the same costs to consumers.
Hence, kN = kT = k, as in Section 2.2.1.
In the third stage, consumers decide between medium N and T . This stage is as in the
one-sided market due to the assumption that consumers are indifferent with respect
to advertisements which implies that the demand functions of Eq. (4) remain valid.
In the second stage, media outlets choose prices charged to consumers by maximizing
Eq. (10) with respect to pci . As in the case of a one-sided market, these prices are
substituted back into Eq. (10) and the optimal style of coverage θi is derived. This
yields the following equilibrium prices and reporting strategies:
pt,∗N = k︸︷︷︸
=p∗N
− βN︸︷︷︸
TSM effect
+
3c∆β
9c− k︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, pt,∗T = k︸︷︷︸
=p∗T
− βT︸︷︷︸
TSM effect
− 3c∆β
9c− k︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
,
θt,∗N =
k
6c︸︷︷︸
=θ∗N
+
∆β
2(9c− k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, θt,∗T = 1−
k
6c︸ ︷︷ ︸
=θ∗T
+
∆β
2(9c− k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, (12)
with ∆β ≡ βN − βT .
As expected, consumer prices are lower than in a one-sided market which is due to the
standard argument of the positive externality of consumer market shares on advertis-
ing revenues, indicated by the TSM effect in Eq. (12).23 The externality implies that
competition in the consumer pricing dimension becomes more intense if an advertising
market is introduced. The asymmetry ∆β in the ad effectiveness parameters affects
consumer prices differently: If the ad effectiveness of medium i is higher than the ad
effectiveness of his competitor, media outlet i has a stronger incentive to attract con-
sumers via low prices than his competitor, and thus sets lower prices. The asymmetry
in consumer prices increases in ∆β.
The choice of the style of coverage, however, is not affected by the existence of an
advertising market but only by the potential asymmetry in the ad effectiveness. The
media outlet with the higher ad effectiveness competes harder for consumers by pro-
23See for instance Blair and Romano (1993) who show that newspapers set consumer prices below
the marginal costs for paper and ink in order to increase their revenues on the advertising market by
attracting consumers.
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viding a style that is closer to the tastes of the pivotal consumer, i.e. it moves further
to the center of the distribution, which is costly. Product differentiation in the style
dimension, however, remains constant, as the competitor moves towards the margin of
the distribution by the same amount. Using the above prices and styles of coverage,
equilibrium market shares and profits are:
Dt,∗N =
1
2︸︷︷︸
=D∗N
+
3c∆β
2k(9c− k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, Dt,∗T =
1
2︸︷︷︸
=D∗N
− 3c∆β
2k(9c− k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, (13)
Πt,∗N =
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
k
2
(
1− k
18c
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Π∗N
(
1− 6c∆β
(k − 9c)2
)
+
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
c
2
(
9c
k
− 1
2
) ≷0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
∆β(∆β + 6k)
(k − 9c)2
)
−F,
Πt,∗T =
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
k
2
(
1− k
18c
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Π∗T
(
1 +
6c∆β
(k − 9c)2
)
+
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
c
2
(
9c
k
− 1
2
) ≷0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
∆β(∆β − 6k)
(k − 9c)2
)
−F,
with superscript t,∗ denoting the symmetric model in a two-sided market. As prices
are lower, and the hinterland of the media outlet with the higher ad effectiveness has
increased (due to its offering a style which is closer to the center of the distribution),
the respective medium serves the larger part of the consumer market.
If advertisements were equally effective on both platforms, media outlets’ profits would
be as in the symmetric model without advertising (see Eq. 5), as media outlets compete
for consumers by setting low prices, until the per capita gains on the advertising market
are fully offset. In the case of an asymmetry in the ad effectiveness parameters, i.e.
if ∆β ≷ 0, the existence of the advertising market increases the profits of the media
outlets with the higher ad effectiveness. If the ad effectiveness of media outlet i is lower
than the ad effectiveness of the competing medium, however, operating on a two-sided
market may in fact be profit-decreasing.
The result that the advertising market has no positive effect on profits unless there is an
advantage in the ad effectiveness over the competitor is due to the fact that competition
on the consumer market has become much stronger. As demand for advertising space
is inelastic, the marginal return on attracting an additional consumer is pt,∗i +βi, which
induces media outlets to fully subsidize the consumer market via the advertising market
by setting consumer prices below marginal costs. In the symmetric setup where both
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firms have the same ad effectiveness, prices are set so low that the gains from the
advertising market are fully offset by the losses on the consumer market. It is only
when one of the firms has a competitive advantage over the other firms that profits
arise from introducing a two-sided market.
There are two effects that are to be distinguished from one another: The effect of
the introduction of the advertising market, that decreases consumer prices but has no
effects on equilibrium styles, market shares and profits, and the effects of the asymmetry
in the ad effectiveness of different media types.24 The asymmetry in the ad effectiveness
has an impact on all equilibrium values as described above. Taking a look at the
asymmetric scenarios, this effect will become even more pronounced.
2.3.2 Bilateral shift in distance costs
In this section, I analyze how the equilibrium is affected by the introduction of a two-
sided market, if there is a bilateral shift in consumer preferences such that kN = k + e
and kT = k−e as in Section 2.2.2. The derivation is as in Section 2.3.1 and is therefore
not discussed here. The equilibrium is characterized as follows:
p˜tN = p˜N − βN +
3ka∆β
e2 + k(k − 9c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, p˜tT = p˜T − βT −
3ka∆β
e2 + k(k − 9c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
,
θ˜tN = θ˜N +
(k + e)
6c
3c∆β
e2 + k(k − 9c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, θ˜tT = θ˜T +
(k − e)
2
∆β
e2 + k(k − 9c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
,
D˜tN = D˜N +
1
2
3c∆β
e2 + k(k − 9c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, D˜tT = D˜T −
1
2
3c∆β
e2 + k(k − 9c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
. (14)
It is evident that the introduction of a two-sided market primarily affects consumer
prices. Only if advertisements differ in their effectiveness across media types, the other
equilibrium values differ from the case of a one-sided market. The differences to the
one-sided market results are more pronounced, the larger |∆β|, and follow the same
reasoning as discussed in the previous section.
24The difference in ad effectiveness of different media is reflected in the Cost Per Mille (CPM)
which is the price per ad impression.
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The profits of the media outlets are as follows:
Π˜tN =
[(e− k)2 − 3c(3k − e+ ∆β)]2 [18ak − (e+ k)2]
36c [e2 + k(k − 9c)]2 − F,
Π˜tT =
[(e+ k)2 − 3c(3k + e−∆β)]2 [18ak − (e− k)2]
36c [e2 + k(k − 9c)]2 − F. (15)
The result with respect to the profits also have a similar pattern as the results in the
previous section: If medium i has a competitive advantage on the advertising side, its
profits are higher than in the one-sided market. If this is not the case, the profits may
be lower (if the difference in the ad effectiveness is sufficiently large). For equal values
of the ad effectiveness across media types, there is no positive effect on profits due to
the introduction of the advertising market.
The effects of an increase in the size of the shock
As e increases, the difference in the distance costs and hence the disadvantage of the
newspaper becomes larger. The one-sided markets model of Section 2.2.2 predicts that
the prices of the newspaper decrease, and the prices of the broadcaster increase in e.
Maximizing Eq. (14) with respect to e shows that these effects remain qualitatively
the same as in a one-sided markets model with once exception:
With respect to the optimal style of coverage θ˜ti , the relation of the ad effectiveness
∆β determines the results. If ∆β > 0, which implies that advertising space in the
newspaper yields a higher marginal return per ad impression than advertisements in
the television channel, the result of a one-sided market unambiguously survives for the
newspaper but is ambiguous for the broadcaster: The newspaper moves towards the
center of the distribution. The broadcaster, however, chooses θ˜tT subject to the size of
his advantage on the consumer market. If e is large, which implies that consumers are
strongly biased towards choosing the broadcaster, he acts as in the one-sided markets
model and moves towards the margin of the distribution. If e is small, the broadcaster
moves towards the center, as he takes into account that the newspaper has become
more attractive to the consumers from the center of the distribution by decreasing
its price and by increasing the amount of entertainment (product differentiation
decreases).
The argument can be reversed if ∆β < 0, which implies that there is a disadvantage
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for the newspaper on the advertising market. Combined with the disadvantage of
having higher distance costs than the competing broadcaster, it is only profitable for
the newspaper to offer more entertainment, if the disadvantage in distance costs is not
too large (e must be sufficiently small). The effect of an increase in e on the optimal
value of θ˜tT remains unaffected and is positive as in the one-sided market.
For consumer prices, the effects derived for the one-sided market scenarios still hold:
An increase in e induces the newspaper to set lower prices (in order to compensate
for becoming less attractive to consumers), and the broadcaster sets higher prices.
The one-sided market model predicts that, with e increasing, the market shares of
the newspaper will decrease, and the broadcaster will benefit from this loss in market
shares. As a result, the profits of the newspaper decrease, whereas the profits of the
broadcaster increase. Regarding the market shares on the consumer market, it is
unambiguous that the results of the one-sided market model hold if ∆β < 0, as this is,
apart from the higher distance costs, an additional disadvantage for the newspaper.
However, even if ∆β > 0, the results are qualitatively the same as in the one-sided
markets model as the positive effect on market shares is too weak to dominate the
negative effect of an increase in e. The same reasoning applies for the profits.
This simple analysis shows that the results of the one-sided markets model are
not only robust to the introduction of a two-sided market, but hold also if asymmetric
ad effectiveness is being introduced with the exception of the effects of an increase
in e on θ˜ti , if e becomes too large (newspaper’s reaction) or too small (broadcaster’s
reaction).
In the following section, I analyze how the equilibrium of the model with the unilateral
decrease in distance costs is affected by accounting for a two-sided market.
2.3.3 Unilateral decrease in distance costs
In this section, only the distance costs to the broadcaster decrease, and the distance
costs to the newspaper remain unchanged: kN = k, and kT = k − e. The results will
be compared to the corresponding section 2.2.3, where the same scenario is analyzed
in a one-sided market without advertising. The equilibrium is characterized as follows:
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pˆtN = pˆN − βN +
3c∆β(2k − e)
(2k − e)(9c+ e)− 2k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, pˆtT = pˆT − βT −
3c∆β(2k − e)
(2k − e)(9c+ e)− 2k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
,
θˆtN = θˆN +
k∆β
(2k − e)(9c+ e)− 2k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, θˆtT = θˆT +
(k − e)∆β
(2k − e)(9c+ e)− 2k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
,
DˆtN = DˆN +
3c∆β
(2k − e)(9c+ e)− 2k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
, DˆtT = DˆT −
3c∆β
(2k − e)(9c+ e)− 2k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad asymmetry
.
(16)
Again, only the prices react to the introduction of a two-sided market if advertisements
were equally effective in both media types. As the sign of the denominators of the ad
asymmetry terms of Eq. (16) are positive, the sign of ∆β is decisive.
If ∆β > 0, advertisements are more effective in the newspaper than in the television
channel. This increases the newspaper’s incentive to attract consumers. As the distance
costs have become relatively more important for consumers with low θn (due to the
increase in e), N moves towards the center of the distribution by offering a higher
θˆtN than in the case of ∆β = 0. As a reaction, T sets a higher θˆ
t
T as well, but the
degree of differentiation between the platforms is smaller than in the symmetric case.
As a consequence of its higher costs, media outlet N increases its price. In contrast,
T lowers its price by the same amount which leads to T gaining market shares at the
expense of N . For ∆β < 0, the effects are the reverse. The equilibrium profits can be
stated as:
ΠˆtN =
[(e− k)2 + 3c(2e− 3k −∆β)]2 [k2 + 9c(2k − e)]
9c [(9c+ e)(e− 2k) + 2k2]2 − F,
ΠˆtT =
[k2 + 3c(3k − e+ ∆β)]2 [(e− k2)− 9c(2k − e)]
9c [(9c+ e)(e− 2k) + 2k2]2 − F. (17)
Apart from ∆β in both of the terms, the profits are identical to the one-sided market
result. As in the previous section, the medium with the higher ad effectiveness gains
compared to the situation without the ad market. If the ad effectiveness of the respec-
tive medium is lower than that of the competitor, the effect of the introduction of an
advertising market may even be profit-reducing.
39
The effect of entertainment in news coverage
The effects of an increase in the size of the shock
The one-sided market model of Section 2.2.3 predicts that an increase in e has the
following effects: Prices and profits of both firms decrease, product differentiation in-
creases and T gains market shares at the expense of N . Again, all of these effects
persist in a two-sided markets framework with the exception of the equilibrium style
of news coverage, if ∆β 6= 0.
Similar to the previous section, an increase in e affects the equilibrium amount of en-
tertainment as follows: If ∆β < 0, i.e. the advantage of T over N is even stronger, and
the effects remain as in the one-sided market. If, however, ∆β > 0, and e is sufficiently
large, product differentiation decreases as both firms move towards the center of the
distribution. This is due to the distance costs becoming increasingly important for
consumers’ decision.
Extending the model to a two-sided market framework has shown that the effects of a
unilateral decrease in distance costs as discussed in Section 2.2.3 remain almost unaf-
fected. Whether the ad effectiveness of the television channel exceeds the newspapers’s
ad effectiveness is an empirical question which may as well depend upon the specific
outlets.
2.4 Conclusion
The model derived in the previous sections has studied the choice of prices and loca-
tions, interpreted as the amount of entertainment in news coverage, of media outlets of
different types. In symmetric benchmark model in a one-sided market, media outlets
offer differentiated platforms by locating close to the margins of the style-dimension.
In an extension to the model, introducing an advertising market has shown that media
outlets set lower prices than in a one-sided market in order to increase their revenues
on the advertising side of the market. Selling advertising space, however, does not
increase the profits of media outlets, unless one of the two platforms has an advantage
such that advertisements are more effective. I analyzed two scenarios that describe
exogenous shocks on the market for news coverage. Comparing the results of a bilat-
eral shift in consumer preferences in the one-sided as well as the two-sided market to
the effects of unilaterally decreasing distance costs in the one-sided and the two-sided
market yields the following differences: In the case of the bilateral shift (Sections 2.2.2
and 2.3.2), both platforms offer more entertaining contents, and the broadcaster ben-
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efits from the shock as his prices and profits increase. If there is a unilateral decrease
(Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.3), only the television broadcast becomes more entertaining,
whereas the newspaper specializes in transmission of information. Price competition
becomes more intense, which leads to reduced profits of both firms.
Empirical evidence sheds light on (i) consumers’ preferences, which helps to determine
the nature of the shock on the distance costs (unilateral or bilateral), and (ii), media
outlets’ strategic behavior with respect to the style of coverage, the price-setting, and
the profits of the broadcaster.
Consumer preferences and patterns in media use
The advent of novel technologies in the 1980s has motivated a number of authors to
study the implications for consumers’ media use patterns. Compaine (1983) predicts
that the inclination and ability to read complex contents in print media decreases, and
that individuals develop skills which he calls the ”new literacy”, as they are able to
filter information out of broadcasted news, or computer-based services. He describes a
shift in consumer preferences towards audio-visual contents as analyzed in the scenar-
ios where consumers’ distance costs shift bilaterally. Graber (1988) identifies similar
changes in the patterns of media use by studying the recall rates of different news sto-
ries among a representative sample of individuals in the U.S.. She finds that consumers
tend to ignore objective news or pay little attention to the contents, which leads to a
significantly lower recall rate compared to news that are attention-grabbing and enter-
taining. Novel data confirm these findings: Berg and Ridder (2002) analyze long-term
trends in consumers’ media use with data from 1964-2000 of a representative sample
of German television channels, radio stations, and daily newspapers. They find that
consumers’ preference for simple and unambiguous news coverage has increased, and
that the number of consumers indicating television as their preferred medium has also
grown over time.
The popularity ranking of media types also depends upon various socio-demographic
determinants as the area individuals live in (rural vs. urban), education, or the income
distributions, as shown by Oskam and Hudson (1999). They conduct a survey among
492 individuals in the Texas rural area, and find that television is claimed to be the
preferred source of news, as stated by 66% of the respondents, followed by the newspa-
per (18.8%). Supposedly, the gap between television and newspaper popularity is less
pronounced in urban areas, or in wealthier regions.
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In the context of this model, an increased preference for simple and unambiguous
news coverage, as well as an increase in the preference for the medium television is
reflected by lower distance costs to the platform that offers more entertainment (e.g.
the television channel) than to the other platform. Hence, it is most plausible to
interpret the empirically observed preference shift as a decrease in the distance costs to
the news broadcast accompanied by an increase in the distance costs to the newspaper’s
platform.
The change in consumer demands triggered by the exogenous shocks is qualitatively
the same in both scenarios, and stable across the two market structures (one-sided vs.
two-sided). This effect is clearly visible in the data: In recent years, newspapers have
not only experienced a drop in circulation rates, but also a reduction in advertising
revenues. Peters (2010) finds that in 2010, daily newspapers’ circulation in the U.S.
has declined by 5% (compared to a 10.6% drop in 2009), and advertising revenues have
dropped by 6.3% (26% in 2009).
A similar development is reflected in the time individuals devote to using a specific
media type: In 1999, U.S. citizens claimed to watch television 4.5 hours a day, which
increased by 19.4% through 2007. At the same time, the time of reading a newspaper
has decreased from about 72 minutes per day in 1999 by 33% in 2007 (MediaInfoCenter,
2011).
Media outlets’ profits and style of coverage
The decrease in newspaper profits is well documented. For the U.S., the profit margin
of major newspapers was 5% in 2010, compared to about 20% in the 1990s (Pew
Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2011c). For television channels, the previous years
provided an increase in profits. Revenues from cable news rose by 10.7% from 2009 to
2010, and for local news, the revenue increase over the same time period amounted to
17% (Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2011c). The same pattern is observable
in other countries, as well.
Earlier studies argued that a consolidation on the media market inevitably leads to
distortions in news coverage, initiating a downward spiral with respect to objectivity
and news quality (see for instance Alger, 1998). Evidence on television broadcasts
becoming more entertaining is unambiguous. Among others, Barnett et al. (2000),
and Winston (2002) find for British news broadcasts that the composition of topics
covered in the news shifts towards crime, sports, and elite persons. Krueger and Zapf-
Schramm (2001) show in a full sample survey of German television channels that news
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are presented as ”infotainment” in order to compete with new entertainment formats
which is in line with the results of both scenarios analyzed in the above model.
When determining whether newspapers contain more entertaining elements today than
in previous years, the way how newspapers are sold drives the results. If newspapers are
mainly sold at newsstands as in the U.K., for instance, gripping headlines play a larger
role than in a country like Germany where a large number of sales are generated through
subscriptions. For the U.K., Tulloch et al. (2000) develop a number of indicators for
an increased ”tabloidization” of news coverage in major British newspapers from 1952
through 1997, and find for instance that the number of photographs per page and the
number of stories featuring entertaining contents has increased, whereas the number
of stories with international content has decreased. Uribe and Gunter (2004) find
that major British tabloids are increasingly dominated by ”soft” news.25 For other
countries, the trend towards more entertainment in print media is evident but less
pronounced (see Esser, 1999). Schoenbach (2000) finds for German newspapers that
shifting towards entertainment, e.g. following the trend towards more tabloidization,
decreases their profits.
Summary and outlook
This chapter provides a theoretical framework that allows for making predictions on
how the media market will react to future structural changes. One of the major trends
in the years to come will be the switch from analogue technology to digital television
which already took place in the U.S. in 2009. Most European countries and Japan
will follow until 2012. As digital channels require less bandwidth, broadcasters can
provide more channels in the same space, and the number of platforms will increase
dramatically.
The evidence presented above supports the view that the newspaper shifts towards
providing more entertaining contents which is the result of the scenario where distance
costs decrease bilaterally. As the time budget of consumers has to be allocated to more
options available on the media market, inter-media competition between newspapers
and television channels becomes more intense, too. In terms of the theoretical model,
this development implies that the distance costs to the broadcaster decrease even more,
thus decreasing the profits of the newspaper, and leading to more entertaining contents
on both platforms. A growing majority of consumers will watch television, which is
increasingly biased towards predominantly entertaining contents.
25For the trend towards more entertaining contents in U.S. magazines see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1.
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A trend that is beyond the scope of this model is the introduction of online platforms.
Many newspapers have chosen to provide their contents online in order to cushion their
declining revenues. How this affects media profits and market structures is analyzed
in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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Appendix
A1: Derivation of symmetric game equilibrium in a
one-sided market
The consumer demands derived in Eq. (4) are substituted in the profit function of
media outlet i (Eq. 1):
ΠN(θi, pi) =
pN [pT − pN + k(θN + θT )]
2k
− cθ2N − F,
ΠT (θi, pi) =
pT [pT − pN + k(θN + θT − 2)]
2k
− c(1− θT )2 − F. (A1)
Maximizing Eq. (A1) with respect to pi in the second stage of the game yields
∂ΠN
∂pN
=
pT − 2pN + k(θN + θT )
2k
,
∂ΠT
∂pT
=
pN − 2pT − k(θN + θT − 2)
2k
.
(A2)
The prices as a function of the styles of coverage are obtained by solving Eq. (A2) for
pi:
pN(θi) =
k(2 + θN + θT )
3
, pT (θi) =
k(4− θN − θT )
3
. (A3)
In the first stage of the game, Eq. (A3) are substituted into the profit function of
media outlet i:
ΠN(θi) =
k(2 + θN + θT )
2 − 18cθ2N
18
− F,
ΠT (θi) =
k(4− θN + θT )2 − 18c(1− θT )2
18
− F. (A4)
Maximizing Eq. (A4) with respect to θi yields
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∂ΠN
∂θN
=
k(2 + θN + θT )− 18cθN
9
,
∂ΠT
∂θT
=
k(θN + θT − 4)− 18c(θT − 1)
9
.
(A5)
The equilibrium in Eq. (5) is obtained by solving Eq. (A5) for θi, and substituting the
result into Eq. (4), (A3), and (1).
A2: Proof of stability of symmetric game equilib-
rium in a one-sided market
The problem of the original Hotelling model with linear consumers’ distance costs does
not arise, if choosing the same location as the competitor and serving the whole market
does not lead to higher profits.
The profits in the symmetric game equilibrium in a one-sided market are
Π∗N = Π
∗
T =
k
2
− 1
c
(
k
6
)2
− F, (A6)
with θN =
k
6c
, and θT = 1− k6c , and the consumer market being divided equally between
N and T . Suppose that N chooses the same location as T (e.g. θN = 1 − k6c), and
serves the whole market at price pN = pT = k. The profits of media outlet N would
then be
ΠdN = k ∗ 1− c
(
1− k
6c
)2
− F = 4
3
k − c− 1
c
(
k
6
)2
− F, (A7)
with superscript d denoting the deviation from the symmetric equilibrium. If deviating
was profit increasing, the following condition would hold:
ΠdN > Π
∗
N ⇔
4
3
k − c− 1
c
(
k
6
)2
− F > k
2
− 1
c
(
k
6
)2
− F
5
6
k − c > 0. (A8)
Condition (A8) can never be fulfilled, as 1 ≥ k > 0 and c ≥ 1. This implies that
46
The effect of entertainment in news coverage
deviating from the symmetric game equilibrium is never profitable for media outlet N .
Analogically, the same holds for media outlet T , such that the equilibrium is stable.

A3: Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiating the equilibrium of the symmetric model (Eq. 5) where k ∈ (0, 1] and
c ≥ 1 with respect to k and c yields:
∂θ∗N
∂k
=
1
6c
> 0,
∂θ∗T
∂k
= − 1
6c
< 0,
∂p∗i
∂k
= 1 > 0,
∂Π∗i
∂k
=
1
2
− k
18c
> 0,
∂θ∗N
∂c
= − 1
6c2
< 0,
∂θ∗T
∂c
=
1
6c2
> 0,
∂Π∗i
∂c
=
1
c2
(
k
6
)2
> 0. (A9)

A4: Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating the equilibrium of the model with the bilateral shift in consumers’ dis-
tance costs (Eq. 6 and 7) where k ∈ (0, 1] and c ≥ 1 with respect to e yields:
∂θ˜N
∂e
=
e4 − 3ekc(18c+ 7e) + 2k2(9c+ e)(3c+ 2e) + k3(3c− 4e)− k4
6c[e2 − k(9c− k)]2 > 0
∂θ˜T
∂e
=
e4 + 3ekc(18c− 7e)− 2k2(9c− e)(2e− 3c) + k3(3c+ 4e)− k4
6c[e2 − k(9c− k)]2 > 0
∂p˜N
∂e
= −k(3c− 2k)[e
2 + k(9c− k)]
[e2 − k(9c− k)]2 < 0
∂p˜T
∂e
=
k(3c− 2k)[e2 + k(9c− k)]
[e2 − k(9c− k)]2 > 0 (A10)
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∂D˜N
∂e
= −(3c− 2k)[e
2 + k(9c− k)]
2[e2 − k(9c− k)]2 < 0
∂Π˜N
∂e
= − [3c(e− 3k) + (e− k)
2][e5 + ke3(e− 21c) + k2(486c3 − 15ce2 + 4e3)]
18[e2 − k(9c− k)]3
− [3c(e− 3k) + (e− k)
2][9ck3(5e− 36c) + k4(39c− 5e)− k5]
18[e2 − k(9c− k)]3 < 0
∂Π˜T
∂e
=
[(e+ k)2 − 3c(e+ 3k)][e5 − e4k − e3k(21c− 4k) + 15ce2k2 + 5ek3(k − 9c)]
18[e2 − k(9c− k)]3
+
[(e+ k)2 − 3c(e+ 3k)][k2(9c− k)(54c2 − 30ck + k2)]
18[e2 − k(9c− k)]3 > 0 (A11)
From ∂D˜N
∂e
< 0 follows that ∂D˜T
∂e
> 0, as the consumer market is always covered.

A5: Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating the equilibrium of the model with the unilateral shift in consumers’
distance costs (Eq. 8 and 9) where k ∈ (0, 1] and c ≥ 1 with respect to e yields:
∂θˆN
∂e
=
k[2k2(e− k)− 27c2k + 3c(e2 − 6ek + 7k2)]
3c[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]2 < 0
∂θˆT
∂e
=
(9c− k)[ek(e− 2k) + 3c(e2 − 4ek + 5k2)]
3c[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]2 > 0
∂pˆN
∂e
= −−54c
2(e− 2k)2 − (e− k)[e3 − 3e2k + 6ek2 − 6k3]
[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]2
− +3c[27e
2k − 6e3 − 44ek2 + 26k3]
[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]2 < 0 (A12)
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∂pˆT
∂e
=
k2(e2 − 4ek + 2k2)− 27c2(e− 2k)2 − 3ck(3e2 − 8ek + 2k2)
[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]2 < 0
∂DˆN
∂e
= −27c
2k − 2k2(e− k)− 3c(e2 − 6ek + 7k2)
[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]2 < 0
∂ΠˆN
∂e
= − [c(6e− 9k) + (e− k)
2][243c3(2e− 5k)(e− 2k) + 189c2(e− 2k)(e2 − 3ek + 3k2)]
9c[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]3
− [c(6e− 9k) + (e− k)
2][3c(3e4 − 12e3k + 35e2k2 − 66ek3 + 44k4) + 4k4(e− k)]
9c[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]3 < 0
∂ΠˆT
∂e
= − [3c(e− 3k) + k
2][27c2e2(9c+ e)− 3cek(27c− 4e)(9c+ e)− 4k4(6c+ e)]
9c[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]3
− [3c(e− 3k) + k
2][k2(3c− 2e)(9c+ e)(18c+ e) + 6k3(3c+ e)(9c+ e)]
9c[(e− 2k)(9c+ e) + 2k2]3 < 0 (A13)
From ∂D˜N
∂e
< 0 follows that ∂D˜T
∂e
> 0, as the consumer market is always covered.

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Chapter 3
How effective are advertising bans?
On the demand for quality in
two-sided media markets
3.1 Introduction
The advertising industry has a long-standing history of regulatory intervention, which
are primarily targeted towards advertisements on television.1 Advertisements for some
products may be restricted (product restrictions),2 the restrictions may be binding
within a special time period during the day (time restrictions), or may apply to special
types of media (type restrictions). The latter are often imposed simultaneously such
that public service broadcasters in many countries are not allowed to carry ads during
a certain time of the day.3 In this chapter, we investigate the effects of an advertising
ban on the broadcaster who provides high quality content which corresponds best to
public service broadcasters. In particular, we analyze how an advertising ban affects
market shares on the viewer and advertising market.
1See Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1 for an overview on EU advertising regulation.
2Since the 1980s, many OECD countries imposed advertising bans for instance on tobacco as
well as on (some or all) alcoholic beverages, or even on junk food (UK, South Korea). The aim of
this policy instrument is to reduce consumption of unhealthy goods, but its effectiveness is discussed
controversially in the literature. While some authors find little or no negative effects of advertising
bans on consumption (Frank, 2008; Nelson, 1999; Seldon et al., 2000; Stewart, 1993), other authors
find that there are circumstances under which an advertisement ban may reduce consumption (Saffer
and Chaloupka, 2000; Blecher, 2008).
3See Anderson (2007) and Motta and Polo (1997) for a comprehensive overview of advertising
regulation in different countries.
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A combination of time and type restrictions is currently in place for instance in Ger-
many. German public service prime-time television is ad-free from 8pm. In January
2009, France adapted the German way of advertising regulation which resulted in a
drop in advertising revenues of 187.6 million Euro in 2009.4 A day and night advertis-
ing ban is currently under debate in France, and the parliament is expected to decide
on this issue after the general elections in 2012. This would turn the French system
into a pure type restriction regime.
The purpose of public service broadcasting is to establish quality standards in audio-
visual media by providing high-profile information and quality entertainment.5 For
policy makers, it is desirable to increase market shares of the public service broadcast-
ers in order to expose as many citizens as possible to supposedly well-balanced and
informative media contents.6 Hence, from the policy makers’ perspective, the rationale
behind imposing an advertising ban on the public service broadcaster seems to be as
follows: (Temporarily) eliminating the nuisance from advertisements makes the recep-
tion of quality contents more attractive for consumers, and the market shares of the
public service broadcaster goes up.
However, the model developed in this chapter shows that an advertising ban does not
increase the market shares of the quality television channel in a pay-TV regime where
a high-quality (public service) and a low-quality (commercial) broadcaster compete for
viewers and for advertisers. In a two-sided market, broadcasters have two incentives
to attract viewers: the direct one via the market shares on the consumer market, and
the indirect one via the spillover effects between the two sides of the market. Since the
number of viewers exerts a positive externality on advertisers’ revenues, competition
for advertisers intensifies competition for viewers. An advertising ban on one type of
broadcaster asymmetrically eliminates this type’s indirect incentive to attract viewers.
In equilibrium, the advertising ban leads to a reduction of the restricted type’s share
in the viewer market. Consequently, if the type restriction applies to the high quality
platform, the ban reduces the reception of high quality content.
Besides analyzing the effectiveness of advertising bans which may contribute to eval-
uating political actions, the model offers the following methodological contribution:
4see France Te´le´visions (2010).
5See for instance the German Interstate Broadcasting Agreement (ARD, 2010), or the Royal
Charter of the BBC (BBC, 2011), that clarify the objective of public service broadcasters.
6See Hargreaves-Heap (2005) for an overview of the positive externalities induced by quality
standards in public service broadcasting. He argues that quality broadcasts have positive effects on
individuals’ behavior, or provide ”horizon stretching” contents. Apart from the impact on individuals,
providing quality information also affects the quality of political outcomes, as shown for instance by
Besley and Burgess (2002) and Stro¨mberg (2004).
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Considering a product characteristic – like the quality of content in our model – which
is perceived as a feature of vertical differentiation on one side and a feature of hori-
zontal differentiation on the other side of a two-sided market is new to the literature.7
The combination of horizontal and vertical competition allows to capture an additional
form of strategic interdependence between the two sides of the market that goes beyond
purely quantitative network effects.
We assume that viewers differ in their valuation for the quality of content, but they
ceteris paribus prefer high over low quality content which implies vertical competition
on the viewer market. The latter assumption is quite strong, but it enables us to show
that an advertising ban would lead to a reduced reception of high quality contents,
even if consumers strictly preferred high over low quality. If tastes for quality were
differentiated horizontally, the high quality medium would be less attractive to con-
sumers, and the results of the model would be even stronger.8
On the advertising side of the market, competition is horizontal. The advertised prod-
ucts differ in quality such that there is a correlation with the viewers’ preferences for
the quality of content. Consumers’ preferences for the quality of consumption goods
are sorted by their preferences for broadcasting quality. Advertisers’ benefit from ad-
vertising is maximized when reaching consumers whose preference for broadcasting
quality exactly meets the quality of the good the advertiser is selling.
We analyze the market equilibrium for two types of scenarios: symmetric ones in which
both broadcasters are allowed to sell advertising space, and an asymmetric scenario
with an advertising ban on the high quality medium. In the first symmetric regime, all
advertisers enter the market, and in the second symmetric regime, market abstention
of advertisers is allowed for. We find that selling high quality content is an advantage
that allows for higher prices on both markets and leads to higher profits. This result is
stable across all scenarios, and holds in a pay-TV as well as in a free-to-air broadcasting
system. Introducing an advertising ban for public service broadcasters in the pay-TV
system turns out to be detrimental to the goal of increasing the reception of quality
contents.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 describes the model setup and the
underlying assumptions. In Section 3.3, we analyze the equilibria that arise under the
three different regimes. Since the number of viewers exerts a positive externality on
advertisers’ profits, and the number of advertisements exerts a negative externality on
7An exception is Kotsogiannis and Serfes (2010) who combine vertical and horizontal differentia-
tion in a tax competition framework.
8In Section 3.5, we discuss how relaxing this assumption affects the results.
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consumers’ utility, it is essential to analyze the effects of an increase of the network
effects, which is what we do in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we analyze the effectiveness
of an advertising ban in the light of reaching the policy goals of making the quality
broadcast more attractive to consumers. The robustness of the model in a free-to-air
system is discussed in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
Literature overview
This chapter builds on the two-sided market literature initially addressed by Rochet
and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Anderson and Coate (2005),
Evans and Schmalensee (2007), and Armstrong (2006), who analyze network externali-
ties and pricing in different contexts. Applying a general two-sided markets framework
to the competition between two media outlets yields a tradeoff between audience and
advertising which is well documented in the literature (see for instance Anderson and
Gabszewicz, 2006; Dukes and Gal-Or, 2003). On the television market, broadcasters
can either sell more advertisement slots and thus increase their revenues from adver-
tising, or reduce the amount of advertisements, which attracts more consumers. In our
model as well as in most theoretical contributions, consumers are assumed to consider
advertisements as a nuisance (see for instance Zhou, 2004; Anderson and Coate, 2005).9
This assumption is widely agreed upon when it comes to television advertising. Em-
pirical evidence has for instance been provided by Wilbur (2008) or in an experimental
study by Brown and Rothschild (1993).
In the Anderson and Coate (2005) framework, horizontally differentiated media plat-
forms can be accessed for free, but consumers incur nuisance costs from advertisements,
and costs from not receiving the preferred program. Reisinger (2011) analyzes a model
in which platforms are differentiated from the viewpoint of consumers, but are ho-
mogenous for advertisers. He shows that the profits of media outlets may increase, if
consumers become more ad-averse, which we also find in our model. Our framework de-
viates from the above contributions in two main respects: Platforms are heterogeneous
not only for consumers but for advertisers as well, which implies that each advertiser
has a specific target group among the viewers. Furthermore, in the benchmark case
of our model, media outlets are in a pay-TV regime, i.e. they charge positive prices
to consumers which can be interpreted as monthly subscription fees for watching the
9There are some theoretical contributions that deviate from the assumption of ad-averse consumers
and explore the role of consumers’ attitude towards advertisements by accounting for ad-loving and
ad-neutral individuals (see for instance Sonnac, 2000; Kind and Sta¨hler, 2010; Ferrando et al., 2008).
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respective channel. Our modelling of the price setting behavior of media outlets in
the pay-TV regime is similar to Peitz and Valletti (2008), who differentiate between
pay-TV and free-to-air stations and analyze the advertising intensity as well as the
content choice of platforms. They find that there is more advertising in the free-to-air
regime, which is in line with the findings of our model.
In contrast to the models endogenizing content quality (as for instance Kind et al.,
2007, who analyze the welfare effects of media quality), we assume broadcasting qual-
ity to be exogenously fixed. This enables us to obtain robust results that hold even if
the quality of the medium without advertisements is maximal. Since consumer utility
is strictly increasing in quality, demand for the quality medium without advertisements
would be even lower, if the quality was lower.
The way how an advertising ban on a specific type of broadcaster affects the media
market has not yet been studied in a theoretical model. Contributions on advertising
ban are restricted to analyzing what happens if all broadcasters are subject to regu-
lation. Kind et al. (2011) show in a framework where advertisements on a monopoly
platform are being taxed that ad-averse consumers do not benefit from this policy,
because consumer prices increase. Their result points in a similar direction as our
findings. Anderson (2007) is the first to evaluate the effects of advertising caps (time
restrictions on the length of advertising breaks) on broadcasting quality in a theoret-
ical model. He assumes viewer utility to strictly increase in broadcasting quality, and
shows that advertising caps reduce the broadcasters’ incentive to provide high quality
contents. In line with our model of a duopoly media market, Anderson (2007) finds
that the profits of a monopolist broadcaster are reduced by the advertising cap. The
difference to our model is that the advertising caps affecting all broadcasters do not
create an asymmetry between the two broadcasters on the market. Our contribution
to the literature on the effectiveness of advertising bans is to evaluate the effects of
asymmetric advertising restrictions. Since the advertising ban in our model only ap-
plies to the high quality broadcaster, the interplay between low quality (commercial)
and high quality (public service) broadcasting is accounted for.
3.2 Model setup
We consider a duopoly model of a two-sided media market. Two competing broad-
casters (or, more generally, platforms) offer content of a certain quality to viewers
(consumers) and advertising space to advertisers (producers). In this section, we spec-
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ify the decision problems for the three types of agents as well as the structure of the
underlying market game.
Broadcasters
Two broadcasters j ∈ {A,B} compete for market shares in the advertising market by
offering advertising space, and for market shares in the viewer market by providing
contents of quality xj ∈ [0, 1]. We treat the quality levels as exogenously given and
discuss this assumption in detail below and in Section 3.5. The broadcasters’ strategic
variables are the viewer prices pj, and the advertising prices τj.
To simplify the exposition, the broadcasters’ costs are assumed to be zero. With the
quality of content being exogenously fixed, quality costs would enter the profit function
of the media outlets as fixed costs and thus have no impact on the optimal pricing
decision on the submarkets.10 Marginal costs of additional viewers or advertisers are
negligible. Hence, the profit of broadcaster j consists of the revenues generated on the
advertising market and on the viewer market:
Πj = n
ad
j τj + n
v
jpj, (1)
where nadj denotes the number of advertisers who place their advertisement on platform
j, and nvj the number of viewers who choose platform j. Both, the total number of
advertisers and the total number of viewers are normalized to unity.
In the free-to-air financing scheme discussed in Section 3.6, the viewer prices pj are
zero. In this section, viewer prices are positive, and can be interpreted in two ways:
Viewer prices can either represent monthly subscription fees (for non-public channels),
or broadcasting fees (for public service broadcasters), or can be interpreted as pay-per-
view access prices per broadcast, as in Peitz and Valletti (2008). Peitz and Valletti
(2008) argue that that pay-per-view will become the major way of generating revenues
on the consumer side (rather than levying a lump sum fee), as new technologies enable
the broadcaster to grant or prevent access to their content conditional on consumers
paying a positive price. An additional argument in favor of modeling the consumer side
as pay-TV is that it fully internalizes inter-group externalities: If revenues on the viewer
side of the quality (public service) broadcaster were generated by fixed broadcasting
subsidies, the broadcaster would not have to worry about his performance on the viewer
10See Chapter 2 for a model with endogenous quality choice of media outlets in a framework where
competition for consumers is horizontal, and advertisers regard platforms as homogenous.
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market and thus set advertising prices too low.11
Viewers
There is a continuum of viewers who differ with respect to their individual valuation
ϑ for the quality of media content, which is uniformly distributed on the unit interval
ϑ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that viewers single-home, i.e. that they are watching no more
than one channel in the time period under consideration. The utility uϑ,j of viewer ϑ
when watching channel j is additively separable in advertising and content provision,
and is denoted by
uϑ,j = u¯+ ϑxj − βnadj − pj. (2)
Gross utility u¯ is assumed to be sufficiently large such that, in equilibrium, each con-
sumer has a positive net utility from watching television. For simplicity, we assume
that u¯ > 1 which implies that the viewer market is always covered. The price con-
sumers have to pay to access the services of platform j is denoted by pj. The utility of
each consumer is strictly increasing in the broadcasting quality xj.
12 As viewers differ
with respect to their valuation ϑ of quality, content of differentiated quality is a source
of vertical product differentiation on the viewer market.
The number of advertisements nadj in medium j exerts a negative externality on its
viewers, which is supposed to be linear in our model. The strength of this externality
is expressed by the parameter β ∈ (0, 1] capturing the marginal nuisance from adver-
tising.13 We assume that the degree of ad-aversion is the same for all consumers. In
the comparative statics part in Section 3.4.1, we analyze how the degree of ad-aversion
affects the equilibrium outcomes. The utility consumers receive from consuming an
advertised good is assumed to be zero (see the following section for a discussion of the
market transactions between consumers and producers).
11Assuming that broadcasters receive financing irrespective of their performance on the viewer
market does not represent the situation in countries with public service broadcasting, either, since
quotas are subject to a strict monitoring process. If the market shares of public service broadcasters
dip too low, it becomes questionable whether there still is a case for public financing. Hence, public
service broadcasters do seek to maximize their viewer market shares.
12The assumption that consumers’ utility increases in broadcasting quality is used in a number of
contributions, see for instance Anderson (2007).
13For empirical evidence for consumers’ ad aversion, see for instance Wilbur (2008) who finds that
a 10 % increase in advertising time induces an audience loss by 25 %. There are few instances in which
viewers are ad-lovers, e.g. in the case of superbowl commercials. Overall, the negative externality
clearly dominates such that the restriction to a negative ad externality on consumer utility is uncritical.
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Advertisers
There is a continuum of advertisers who differ with respect to the type of the good they
produce, γ ∈ [0, 1], which is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. We assume
that advertisers are single-homing as well, i.e. that they face a discrete choice between
either placing an advertisement on platform A or B, or not entering the advertising
market. The profit of advertiser γ when advertising on channel j is
piγ,j = a¯+ δn
v
j − |γ − xj| − τj, (3)
and piγ = 0 when abstaining from the advertising market. The parameter a¯ accounts for
the fact that advertisers may derive a reputational gain from advertising per se, which
is not directly reflected in the profits from selling the advertised product. In Section
3.3.1, we consider a situation in which a¯ is sufficiently high such that, in equilibrium,
entering the advertising market is always profitable for every advertiser. We then
allow for market abstention by setting a¯ = 0 (Section 3.3.2). The price for placing an
advertisement on platform j is denoted by τj.
The strength of the externality the number of consumers nvj exerts on the revenues of
advertisers on platform j is expressed by the ad effectiveness parameter δ ∈ (0, 1]. It
may be interpreted as the fraction of viewers who buy the advertised products. The
stronger this externality, i.e. the higher δ, the more valuable is an advertisement to
the advertisers, as it represents the receptiveness of consumers towards advertisements
in general. This formulation may serve as a shortcut for an explicit model of the
market transactions between consumers and producers: Advertisers are monopolists
for the variety γ of the good they produce at zero marginal costs. Via advertising,
a producer informs viewers (i.e. prospective consumers) about the existence of this
product. Consumers’ expected willingness to pay, which is denoted by k, for each
producers’ good is assumed to equal 1.14 It can be fully extracted by the producer,
if the respective consumer becomes aware of the existence of the product. In this
context, δ may be understood as the probability that a consumer becomes aware of
the existence of a product, if he is exposed to the respective advertisement (for an
14This is a simplifying assumption in order to keep the analysis tractable. In reality, one might
expect a user’s expected willingness to pay k for a certain product to increase in both γ (if interpreted
as a signal for the quality of the product) and ϑ (if interpreted as a signal for the individual’s general
valuation of quality). However, this effect is mitigated by the fact that, due to income effects, in
reality the distribution of the users’ valuation ϑ follows some left skewed income distribution rather
than the uniform distribution used in the model.
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analytical outline of the market transactions between consumers and producers, see
also Reisinger, 2011).
The advertiser’s profits are negatively related to the distance |γ − xj| between the
quality level that is optimal for a successful marketing of his type of product γ, and
the broadcasting quality xj offered by the respective broadcaster. In other words,
content of differing quality is a source of horizontal product differentiation on the
advertiser market. There are at least two possible economic interpretations of how the
advertisers’ type of product γ can be used for modeling a targeted advertising motive.
First, the type γ of the product can be interpreted as the advertisers’ intended or
perceived image of his product. When placing his advertisement on a certain platform,
the advertiser suffers from the discrepancy between his preferred image and the image
conveyed by the medium which is closely related to the quality of content it offers.
Second, γ can represent the quality of the advertiser’s product. If there is a positive
correlation between the consumers’ tastes for quality when choosing a media platform
and when consuming other goods, the advertiser’s type will determine his target group:
For example, a high quality advertiser tries to make use of the fact that consumers with
a high willingness to pay for high quality broadcasts also have a higher willingness to
pay for his good than consumers who watch the low quality broadcast. Hence, the type
of an advertiser translates directly into his preferred broadcasting quality.
For the German market, there is evidence suggesting that potential buyers of high
quality goods prefer high quality over low quality television channels. Public service
broadcasters (ARD and ZDF ) who provide high quality broadcasts, have a significantly
larger share in the viewer market of highly educated and high-income individuals than
the largest competing commercial channels. Figure 3.1 illustrates the market shares
of the two German public service broadcasters ARD and ZDF compared to the three
largest commercial channels RTL, SAT1 and PRO7 in the target groups of decision
makers, households with a monthly net income higher than 3000 EUR, and the group
of highly-educated individuals for the time slot of 5pm through 8pm.15
15We chose this time slot over the 8pm-11pm slot in order to avoid distortions induced by the
public service broadcasters not carrying advertisements.
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Figure 3.1: Market shares per target group
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Note: Decision makers are individuals who run intermediate to large businesses, higher officials,
or managers. Individuals qualify as highly educated when having passed the German A-levels
(Abitur). The data is based on a 2007 survey of the AGF/GfK Fernsehforschung, available
through ZDF Werbefernsehen (2008).
Modeling targeted advertising as a source of horizontal product differentiation on the
advertiser market in the sense that each advertiser intends to achieve the closest pos-
sible match between the quality of the media broadcast and the type of his product,
captures the fact that advertisers value not only the size of the group of viewers who
are exposed to their advertisement, but also the profile of this group.16
Game structure and further assumptions
In our model, the broadcasting quality is exogenous. More specifically, we assume that
when broadcasters decide on their program quality (in an early stage of the game not
modeled here), they choose maximum differentiation with one broadcaster offering the
lowest possible quality (xA = 0) and the other broadcaster offering the highest possi-
ble quality (xB = 1). The reason for fixing the quality levels at the extremes is the
following: One aim of the chapter is to analyze the effects of an advertising ban on
the high quality medium B on the viewers’ demand. Since consumers ceteris paribus
prefer high quality over low quality, and no advertisements over any positive amount of
16For empirical evidence on advertisers’ preference for reaching members of their target group, see
Chandra and Kaiser (2011). They find that advertising prices in magazines with a homogenous group
of consumers are higher than in magazines with heterogeneous readers, as advertisers have a higher
willingness to pay for reaching their target group than for reaching any other consumers.
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advertisements, the combination of the highest possible quality and no advertising (as
in medium B when the advertising ban is in place) is the most appealing of all quality-
advertising combinations. This guarantees that any eventual decrease in viewer market
shares of the quality medium induced by the advertising ban is not due to (changes in)
the quality settings.
The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, both media outlets simulta-
neously choose prices on the viewer market, and in the second stage, media outlets
simultaneously choose prices on the advertising market. This sequential setting ac-
counts for the fact that advertising prices are changed more frequently than viewer
prices.17 In stage three, viewers and advertisers simultaneously choose a platform.
The game is solved via backward induction.
For the structure of the market equilibrium, the relation of the externality parame-
ters β and δ is crucial. We assume that the effectiveness δ of an advertisement is
always larger than the nuisance β induced by the advertisement, which makes sure
that there is always some producer who finds it profitable to advertise in equilibrium.
Put differently, this assumption rules out equilibria without advertising activities.18
3.3 Equilibria in pay-TV systems with and without
an advertising ban
In this section, we derive the market equilibria that evolve under three different regimes
denoted by sym1, sym2 and asym. Under the symmetric advertising regimes sym1 and
sym2, we analyze situations in which both broadcasters are allowed to sell advertising
slots without any restrictions.
In the first case of symmetric advertising (sym1 ), we assume that the reputational gain
from advertising a¯ is sufficiently high to ensure market coverage. In this situation, all
producers decide to advertise either on channel A or B, which implies that the broad-
casters’ shares on the advertising market are determined by some marginal advertiser
γˆ who is indifferent between placing his advertisement on channel A or B.
In the second case of symmetric advertising (sym2 ), we allow for abstention in the
17Note that advertising prices are often determined with respect to market shares on the viewer
market which are subject to fluctuations.
18For δ < β, the net effect of advertising is negative for media outlets, as the negative externality of
an additional advertisement on viewer utility is larger than the positive effect on advertisers’ profits.
Hence, media outlets set prices such that, for the difference between β and δ being sufficiently large,
no advertiser buys an advertising slot in equilibrium.
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advertising market by setting a¯ = 0. Given the horizontal structure of the advertis-
ing market with maximum differentiation, the extreme types of producers advertise
whereas the intermediate types abstain from the market. As advertiser γˆj is indifferent
between advertising on channel j ∈ {A,B} and not entering the advertising market,
there are two marginal advertisers who define the market shares of the broadcasters.
Under regime asym, only the low quality medium A is allowed to enter the advertising
market, as an advertising ban on the high quality medium B is in place. We refer to
this case as asymmetric advertising. In this situation, the advertising market share of
broadcaster B is zero, and A’s market shares are derived according to the marginal
advertiser γˆA who is indifferent between advertising on channel A and not placing an
advertisement.
As mentioned above, we assume in all scenarios that the market for viewers is covered.
Therefore, under all regimes, the broadcasters’ shares on the viewer market are deter-
mined by the marginal consumer ϑˆ who is indifferent between watching broadcast A
or B. The demand structure of the two market sides under the different regimes is
summarized in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Demand structures under the different regimes
viewer market advertising market regime
xB = 1
xA = 0
ϑˆ
nvA = ϑˆ
nvB = 1− ϑˆ
sym1
xB = 1xA = 0 γˆ
nadA = γˆ n
ad
B = 1− γˆ
sym2
xB = 1xA = 0 γˆA
nadA = γˆA
γˆB
nadB = 1− γˆB
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1xA = 0 γˆA
nadA = γˆA
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As the derivation of the equilibrium is similar for the three regimes, we present it in
more detail only for sym1, and then just sketch it for regime asym. The derivation of
the sym2 -equilibrium can be found in Section A1 of the Appendix.
3.3.1 Symmetric advertising without market abstention
(sym1 )
In the third stage of the game, viewers and advertisers simultaneously choose a plat-
form. Advertiser γˆ is indifferent between placing his ad on platform A or B if the
following condition holds:
piA = piB ⇔ δ(nvA − nvB) + (xB − γˆ)− (γˆ − xA) = τA − τB. (4)
Since all types of advertisers with γ ≤ γˆ prefer to advertise on channel A, and all types
of advertisers with γ > γˆ prefer channel B, the demand for advertisements in medium
j is
nadA (n
v
A, n
v
B) = γˆ =
δ (nvA − nvB)− τA + τB + (xA + xB)
2
,
nadB (n
v
A, n
v
B) = 1− γˆ =
2− δ (nvA − nvB) + τA − τB − (xA + xB)
2
. (5)
Viewer ϑˆ is indifferent between watching channel A and B, if the following condition
holds:
uA = uB ⇔ ϑˆ(xB − xA) + β(nadA − nadB ) = pB − pA. (6)
Consumers choose medium A, if their marginal willingness to pay for quality is lower
than that of the marginal consumer, i.e. if ϑ ≤ ϑˆ, and choose medium B otherwise:
nvA(n
ad
A , n
ad
B ) = ϑˆ =
pB − pA − β(nadA − nadB )
xB − xA ,
nvB(n
ad
A , n
ad
B ) = 1− ϑˆ =
xB − xA − pB + pA + β(nadA − nadB )
xB − xA . (7)
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Substituting (5) in (7), and solving for the viewers’ and advertisers’ demand for medium
j, with xA = 0 and xB = 1, we obtain:
nvA (pA, pB, τA, τB) =
pB − pA + β (δ + τA − τB)
1 + 2βδ
,
nvB (pA, pB, τA, τB) =
1 + pA − pB + β (δ − τA + τB)
1 + 2βδ
,
nadA (pA, pB, τA, τB) =
1 + 2δ(β − pA + pB)− δ − τA + τB
2(1 + 2βδ)
,
nadB (pA, pB, τA, τB) =
1 + 2δ(β + pA − pB) + δ + τA − τB
2(1 + 2βδ)
. (8)
In the second stage of the game, both broadcasters simultaneously set their prices on
the advertising market. We take the results from Eq. (8), and substitute them into
the profit function of broadcaster j as given by Eq. (1). Maximizing the broadcasters’
profits with respect to the advertising prices τj yields the following optimal prices:
τA (pA, pB) = 1− 2βδ + 2 [pA (2β − δ) + pB (β + δ)]− δ
3
,
τB (pA, pB) = 1− 2βδ + 2 [pB (2β − δ) + pA (β + δ)]− δ
3
. (9)
In the first stage, the broadcasters simultaneously set their prices on the viewer market.
We substitute Eq. (9) into the profit function (1) which then is maximized with respect
to pj. This yields the following viewer prices:
19
psym1A =
1
4
+
β − 2δ
3
+
9− 8β2 + 10βδ
4∆sym1
,
psym1B =
3
4
+
β − 2δ
3
− 9− 8β
2 + 10βδ
4∆sym1
, (10)
where ∆sym1 ≡ 27− 8β2 + 38βδ − 8δ2 > 0.
19Note that the second order conditions are fulfilled as ∂
2ΠA
∂p2A
|psym1A = −
18+4(7βδ−β2δ2)
9(1+2βδ) < 0 and
∂2ΠB
∂p2B
|psym1B = −
18+4(7βδ−β2δ2)
9(1+2βδ) < 0.
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The advertising prices are obtained by substituting these viewer prices into Eq.
(9) which yields:
τ sym1A = 1 +
5β
4
+
2β (β + δ)
3
− 12δ + β (39− 8β
2 + 46βδ)
4∆sym1
,
τ sym1B = 1 +
3β
4
+
2β (β + δ)
3
+
12δ + β (39− 8β2 + 46βδ)
4∆sym1
. (11)
Substituting the viewer and advertising prices into the viewer market shares as well as
into the advertising market shares (Eq. 8), we find that
nv,sym1A =
1
2
− 9 + 4β (β + δ)
2∆sym1
, nv,sym1B =
1
2
+
9 + 4β (β + δ)
2∆sym1
,
nad,sym1A =
1
2
+
3 (2β − δ)
2∆sym1
, nad,sym1B =
1
2
− 3 (2β − δ)
2∆sym1
. (12)
We substitute the equilibrium prices and quantities on both markets into Eq. (1), and
obtain the following profits:
Πsym1A =
5
8
+
β(9 + 4β)
12
+
δ(β − 1)
3
− Φsym1,
Πsym1B =
7
8
+
β(7 + 4β)
12
+
δ(β − 1)
3
− Φsym1, (13)
where Φsym1 ≡ 1
32
[
9[8β4−18−43β2−10βδ(4+7β2)]
(∆sym1)2
+ 18+36β(2+δ)+β
2(80δ−23−64β)
∆sym1
]
.
The qualitative characteristics of this equilibrium is discussed in Section 3.3.4 in order
to account for similarities and differences across the regimes derived in the following
sections.
3.3.2 Symmetric advertising with market abstention (sym2 )
Regime sym2 represents the case in which a¯ = 0, which implies that there are no
profit-increasing reputational effects from advertising per se. In this case, advertisers
from the center of the distribution who have to incur high transportation costs due to
the media outlets being located at either xA = 0 or xB = 1, prefer not to enter the
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market. Put differently, regime sym2 describes a situation in which market abstention
of advertisers arises in equilibrium. The results provide an equal ground for comparing
the symmetric case to the asymmetric case of the following subsection, where market
abstention of advertisers arises because of an advertising ban.
The derivation of the equilibrium is along the line of the previous section. As the
results do not vary qualitatively from those obtained above, the mathematical solution
can be found in Section A1 of the Appendix.
3.3.3 Asymmetric advertising with an advertising ban on
broadcaster B (asym)
Under regime asym, only the low quality medium is allowed to enter the advertising
market. In the first stage of the game, both broadcasters set prices on the viewer
market, and in the second stage, broadcaster A chooses his advertising price. The
third stage is similar to the sym2 -regime where advertisers decide whether to enter the
advertising market by placing their advertisement in broadcast A, or to abstain from
advertising, and viewers decide which channel to watch. Again, there is no additional
gain from advertisement, i.e. a¯ = 0.
Analogically to the sym1 -scenario, there is the possibility of setting a¯ sufficiently high
such that the advertising market is always covered. This scenario will arise, if the
advertiser whose distance costs are minimized at the highest broadcasting quality γ = 1
prefers advertising on platform A over abstaining from the market.20 If this is the case,
broadcaster A’s profits are strictly increasing in τA, and consumers’ platform choice
is determined exclusively by the prices and the quality of contents. We consider the
assumption of full market coverage on the advertising market to be quite artificial in
a scenario with only one platform to advertise on, as there is always an outside option
for advertisers, such as billboards, or display advertising. We therefore exclude it from
the analysis in this section, but nevertheless provide the derivation of the equilibrium
in Section A2 of the Appendix.
In the situation where market abstention of advertisers is allowed (a¯ = 0), the marginal
advertiser γˆA is indifferent between advertising on channel A and abstaining from
advertising, if
piA = 0 ⇔ δnvA − τA − (γˆA − xA) = 0, (14)
with xA = 0.
20From Eq. (3) follows that a¯ ≥ 1− δnvA + τA for all advertisers to be located on platform A.
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Accordingly, the fraction of of advertisers placing their advertisement on platform A is
given by
nadA = γˆA = δn
v
A − τA. (15)
Inserting (15) and nadB = 0 into Eq. (6), and solving for the the market share of medium
A on the viewer market, we obtain
nvA (pA, pB, τA) = ϑˆ =
βτA − pA + pB
1 + βδ
,
nvB (pA, pB, τA) = 1− nvA =
1 + β (δ − τA) + pA − pB
1 + βδ
. (16)
With an advertising ban on broadcaster B, the profit functions are now:
ΠasymA = n
ad
A τA + n
v
ApA, Π
asym
B = n
v
BpB. (17)
Plugging the demand functions of Eq. (15) and (16) into the profit function (17)
of broadcaster A and maximizing it with respect to the optimal advertising price τA
yields:
τA (pA, pB) =
(β − δ) pA + δpB
2
. (18)
We insert (18) in the profit function (17), and maximize it with respect to the prices:21
pasymA =
2 (1 + βδ) [2− (δ − β) δ]
∆asym
, pasymB =
2(1 + βδ) [4− (β − δ)2]
∆asym
,
τasymA =
2 (1 + βδ) (β + δ)
∆asym
, (19)
where ∆asym ≡ 12− βδ (12− β2 − δ2)− 2 [δ2 − β2 (δ2 − 1)].
21Note that the second order conditions are fulfilled as ∂
2ΠA
∂p2A
|pasymA = −
4−(β−δ)2
2(1+βδ) < 0 and
∂2ΠB
∂p2B
|pasymB = −1− 11+βδ < 0.
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This yields the following market shares:
nv,asymA =
4 (1 + βδ)
∆asym
, nv,asymB = 1−
4 (1 + βδ)
∆asym
, nad,asymA =
2 (1 + βδ) (δ − β)
∆asym
.
(20)
With these results, we are able to compute the profits of the broadcasters:
ΠasymA =
4
[
4− (β − δ)2] (1 + βδ)2
(∆asym)2
,
ΠasymB =
2
[
(β − δ)2 − 4]2 (1 + βδ) (2 + βδ)
(∆asym)2
. (21)
3.3.4 Characterization of the equilibria
We now use the results derived so far to compare the equilibrium values for broadcasters
A and B within the three regimes.
Proposition 4 For all β ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1] with δ > β, in equilibrium,
• the high quality broadcaster B has higher profits, sets higher prices on the viewer
market, and serves a larger part of the viewer market than broadcaster A in all
regimes.
• the high quality broadcaster B sets higher prices on the advertising market than
broadcaster A in the symmetric regimes.
• the high quality broadcaster B has larger advertising market shares than broad-
caster A under regime sym2, but may have lower advertising market shares than
under regime sym1.
Proof. See Section A3 of the Appendix.
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The results of Proposition 4 are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Comparison within regimes
Regime: Sym1 Sym2 Asym
Viewer prices pA < pB pA < pB pA < pB
Advertising prices τA < τB τA < τB (τA > 0)
Viewer market shares nvA < n
v
B n
v
A < n
v
B n
v
A < n
v
B
Advertising market shares nadA R nadB nadA < nadB (nadA > 0)
Profits ΠA < ΠB ΠA < ΠB ΠA < ΠB
Note: In this table, we compare equilibrium values of both broadcasters in each regime. The symmetric model without
market abstention (regime sym1 ) is shown in the first column, the symmetric model with market abstention (regime
sym2 ) in the second column, and the asymmetric model (regime asym) in the third column.
As known from textbook models of vertical product differentiation in one-sided mar-
kets, selling the high quality product is an advantage that allows for setting higher
prices and leads to higher profits.22 In the symmetric regimes, the advantage of medium
B offering high quality content to consumers is carried over from the viewer market to
the advertising market. Since all consumers ceteris paribus prefer high over low quality,
the high quality medium B attracts more viewers and thereby more advertisers, too.
Consequently, B is able to set higher prices than the low quality medium A on both
markets and earns higher profits.23 The negative effect on B’s viewer demand due to
charging higher viewer prices than A is of second order.
If there is no market abstention on the advertising market (regime sym1 ), and the
potential gains from advertising as expressed by the ad effectiveness δ are small, adver-
tisers switch from the more expensive platform B to A (see Figure 3.3). In this case,
22Hence, in a model with endogenous choice of quality, a Nash equilibrium with maximum vertical
differentiation emerges as the solution of a coordination game similar to the famous Battle of the
Sexes.
23Note that the results with respect to the broadcaster’ profits are partly driven by the assumption
that there are no quality costs in our framework.
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A serves the larger part of the advertising market than B despite its disadvantage in
the quality dimension.
Figure 3.3: Ad demand in regime sym1
Note: This figure illustrates the demand for advertising space in the equilibrium of the sym-
metric model without market abstention (regime sym1 ).
3.4 The role of the externalities
In this section, we conduct a comparative statics analysis with respect to the strength
of the externalities. In Section 3.4.1, we analyze the impact of an increase in the
negative externality of advertisements on viewer utility. The effects of an increase in
the positive externality of the number of viewers on advertisers’ profits is discussed in
Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Effects of an increase in the negative externality β
Proposition 5 As the size of the negative externality β increases, the equilibrium
values evolve as follows:
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• Prices and profits
In all three regimes, both broadcasters set higher prices on both markets (where
possible), and earn higher profits.
• Advertising market shares
sym1: The low quality broadcaster A gains market shares at the expense of broad-
caster B.
sym2: The high quality broadcaster B loses market shares while the effects are
ambiguous for broadcaster A.
asym: The low quality broadcaster A loses market shares.
• Viewer market shares
sym1: For any given δ ∈ (0, 1], the low quality broadcaster A gains market shares
at the expense of broadcaster B if and only if β < βˆsym1. The threshold level
βˆsym1 is increasing in δ.
sym2: The low quality broadcaster A gains market shares at the expense of the
broadcaster B on the whole parameter range.
asym: For any given δ ∈ (0, 1], the low quality broadcaster A gains market shares
at the expense of broadcaster B if and only if β > βˆasym. The threshold level
βˆasym is increasing in δ.
Proof. See Section A4 of the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 5 are summarized in Table 3.2.
An increase in the nuisance cost β alters the platform decision of viewers such that
the relative importance of (ad-free) contents increases, and the relative importance of
low viewer prices decreases. When competing for viewers, broadcasters now have a
stronger incentive to reduce the number of advertisements but a weaker incentive to
set low viewer prices. Put differently, since by assumption viewers do not abstain from
the market, higher nuisance costs relax price competition on both sides of the market.
On the advertising side of the market, broadcasters increase their prices in order to
reduce the number of advertisements, whereas on the viewer side of the market, the
fact that low prices are less important for consumers’ decision allows for higher prices.
Due to the relaxed price competition (on both sides of the market), the profits of both
broadcasters increase.
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Table 3.2: Increase in the negative externality
Partial derivative with respect to β
Regime: Sym1 Sym2 Asym
Broadcaster: A B A B A B
Viewer prices ∂pA
∂β
> 0 ∂pB
∂β
> 0 ∂pA
∂β
> 0 ∂pB
∂β
> 0 ∂pA
∂β
> 0 ∂pB
∂β
> 0
Ad prices ∂τA
∂β
> 0 ∂τB
∂β
> 0 ∂τA
∂β
> 0 ∂τB
∂β
> 0 ∂τA
∂β
> 0 —
Viewer market shares
∂nvA
∂β
R 0 ∂n
v
B
∂β
R 0 ∂n
v
A
∂β
R 0 ∂n
v
B
∂β
R 0 ∂n
v
A
∂β
R 0 ∂n
v
B
∂β
R 0
Ad market shares
∂nadA
∂β
> 0
∂nadB
∂β
< 0
∂nadA
∂β
R 0 ∂n
ad
B
∂β
< 0
∂nadA
∂β
< 0 —
Profits ∂ΠA
∂β
> 0 ∂ΠB
∂β
> 0 ∂ΠA
∂β
> 0 ∂ΠB
∂β
> 0 ∂ΠA
∂β
> 0 ∂ΠB
∂β
> 0
Note: This table illustrates the effects of an increase in the size of the negative externality on consumer utility, β. We
compare the effects on equilibrium values of each broadcaster in each regime. The symmetric model without market
abstention (regime sym1 ) is shown in the first column, the symmetric model with market abstention (regime sym2 ) in
the second column, and the asymmetric model (regime asym) in the third column.
The price increase on the advertising market induces a shift in the identity of the piv-
otal advertiser such that the previous pivotal advertiser either switches to the cheaper
platform A (regime sym1 ), or exits the market (sym2 and asym). In the regimes with
market abstention, both broadcasters lose advertising market shares on virtually the
whole parameter range under regime sym2, and the advertising market shares of A
decrease under regime asym.24
Starting from equilibrium, the previous marginal viewer in all scenarios ceteris paribus
switches to the channel with the smaller number of advertisements, once β is raised.
The scenarios vary, however, with respect to the platform containing the smaller num-
ber of advertisements. As we have seen in the previous section (see Table 3.1), broad-
caster A provides the platform with the smaller number of advertisements under regime
sym2. Under regime sym1, B contains less advertisements than A, if and only if β is
24The small parameter range in which advertising market shares of broadcaster A increase in β
under regime sym2 arises due to an increase of A’s viewer market share countervailing the rising
advertising price.
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sufficiently large compared to δ.25 Due to the advertising ban, A is the platform car-
rying more advertisements in the asymmetric scenario. In the cases where B is the
platform containing less advertisements than A, there is, from the consumers’ perspec-
tive, a trade-off between the lower number of advertisements and the higher price than
on platform A.26 This leads to ambiguous effects of an increase in β on viewer market
shares, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. The intensity of this trade-off, however, changes as
β increases. In the sym1 -regime, for instance, B’s consumer price increases in β, but
the number of advertisements decreases. For a given δ, such a reduction of advertising
volume attracts the more viewers the higher the nuisance parameter β (see the right
panel of Figure 3.4). This effect is likely to dominate the evolution of viewer market
shares if β is sufficiently large compared to δ.
Figure 3.4: Ambiguous effects of an increase in β
sym1 : viewer market shares asym : viewer market shares
Note: This figure illustrates the effects of an increase in β on viewer market shares in regime
sym1 (left panel), and in regime asym (right panel). The area denoting combinations of β and
δ for which nv,ri is increasing (decreasing) in β is indicated by n
v,r
i ↑ (nv,ri ↓) with i ∈ {A,B}
and r ∈ {sym1, asym}.
25Figure 3.3 captures the exact movement of viewer market shares in this case.
26Note that B’s price is not only higher than the price of platforms A, but also increasing in β.
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3.4.2 Effects of an increase in the positive externality δ
An increase in the ad effectiveness δ can for instance be triggered by choosing popular
instead of unknown testimonials for advertisements, by an increase in the screen size
of the average TV set, by improving on the timing of advertisement slots (for instance
by airing them at the same time as the advertisement slots of the competing channels),
or by interactive forms of advertising (lottery games). In the following, we discuss how
such an increase affects equilibrium values.
Proposition 6 As the size of the positive externality δ increases, the equilibrium values
evolve as follows:
• Prices and profits
Under all regimes, both broadcasters set higher prices on the advertising market
(where possible). The effects on viewer prices and profits are often ambiguous as
depicted in Table 1.3.
• Advertising market shares
sym1: The market shares of the low quality broadcaster A decrease while B’s
market shares increase.
sym2 and asym: The market shares of both broadcasters increase.
• Viewer market shares
sym1 and sym2: For any given δ ∈ (0, 1], the high quality broadcaster B gains
market shares at the expense of A if and only if β < β˜sym1, or β < β˜sym2,
respectively. Both threshold levels are increasing in δ.
asym: Broadcaster A gains market shares at the expense of broadcaster B on the
whole parameter range.
Proof. See Section A5 of the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 6 are summarized in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Increase in the positive externality
Partial derivative with respect to δ
Regime: Sym1 Sym2 Asym
Broadcaster: A B A B A B
Viewer prices ∂pA
∂δ
< 0 ∂pB
∂δ
< 0 ∂pA
∂δ
R 0 ∂pB
∂δ
< 0 ∂pA
∂δ
< 0 ∂pB
∂δ
R 0
Ad prices ∂τA
∂δ
> 0 ∂τB
∂δ
> 0 ∂τA
∂δ
> 0 ∂τB
∂δ
> 0 ∂τA
∂δ
> 0 —
Viewer market shares
∂nvA
∂δ
R 0 ∂n
v
B
∂δ
R 0 ∂n
v
A
∂δ
R 0 ∂n
v
B
∂δ
R 0 ∂n
v
A
∂δ
> 0
∂nvB
∂δ
< 0
Ad market shares
∂nadA
∂δ
< 0
∂nadB
∂δ
> 0
∂nadA
∂δ
> 0
∂nadB
∂δ
> 0
∂nadA
∂δ
> 0 —
Profits ∂ΠA
∂δ
< 0 ∂ΠB
∂δ
R 0 ∂ΠA
∂δ
R 0 ∂ΠB
∂δ
R 0 ∂ΠA
∂δ
> 0 ∂ΠB
∂δ
R 0
Note: This table illustrates the effects of an increase in the size of the size of positive externality the number of viewers
exerts on advertisers’ profits, δ. We compare the effects on equilibrium values of each broadcaster in each regime. The
symmetric model without market abstention (regime sym1 ) is shown in the first column, the symmetric model with
market abstention (regime sym2 ) in the second column, and the asymmetric model (regime asym) in the third column.
An increase in the intensity of the positive externality δ affects the relative weights of
the components in the profit function of advertisers such that the relative importance
of the number of viewers increases whereas the relative importance of low ad prices
decreases. For the broadcasters, this shift intensifies price competition in the viewer
market, and weakens price competition in the advertising market. This affects the
evolution of advertising and viewer prices as follows: Relaxed price competition in the
market for advertisements and the incentive to attract more consumers leads to higher
advertising prices. The latter also exerts downward pressure on viewer prices of the
platform(s) carrying advertisements. Hence, in the asymmetric regime, the viewer price
of medium B increases under regime asym, if β is sufficiently large relative to δ (see
Figure 3.5). As A carries advertisements, and B does not, choosing A over B becomes
more costly for consumers, since the number of advertisements on A is increasing in
δ. This allows for B increasing his viewer price, if the nuisance from advertisements
is sufficiently large. On all platforms that sell advertising space, however, the viewer
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prices decrease in δ.27
Due to the number of viewers becoming more important for advertisers, the identity
of the pivotal advertiser changes as δ increases. The previous marginal advertiser
ceteris paribus switches to the channel that provides him with the larger number of
consumer contacts (sym1 ), or enters the advertising market (sym2 and asym), as the
marginal return per advertisement has increased in δ. Since platform B hosts the
larger number of consumers under regime sym1 (see the first column of Table 3.1), the
high quality broadcaster B gains shares in the ad market at the expense of channel A.
Under the regimes with market abstention, the previous marginal advertisers now finds
it profitable to advertise, which implies that all respective advertising market shares
increase.
As there is no direct effect of an increase in δ on consumers’ utility, the changes in their
decision which channel to watch are determined by (i) the viewer prices, and (ii) the
number of advertisements. In the asymmetric regime, the distribution of viewer market
shares is unambiguous: The decrease in the viewer price of platform A overcompensates
for A carrying advertisements such that B loses market shares on the viewer market as
δ increases. This leads to A having higher profits whereas the effect on the profits of
B are ambiguous. Under regime sym1, with both viewer prices decreasing, the number
of advertisements becomes relatively more important for consumers than choosing the
platform with the lowest price. The previous marginal viewer now switches to the
channel with the lower number of advertisements. As known from the first column of
Table 3.1, the channel with the smaller number of advertisements is broadcaster A, if
and only if β is sufficiently small compared to δ. The exact relationship is shown in
Figure 3.5. The figure also shows that the effects of an increase in δ on the viewer
market shares under regime sym2 are similar.
27Technically spoken, there is a very small parameter range in which A’s viewer price under the
sym2 -regime increases. This is true for intermediate values of δ-β-combinations, as illustrated in
Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Ambiguous effects of an increase in δ
sym1 : viewer market shares sym2 : viewer price of A
sym2 : viewer market shares asym : viewer price of B
Note: This figure illustrates the effects of an increase in δ on viewer market shares in regime
sym1 (upper left panel) and in regime sym2 (lower left panel) as well as the effects on viewer
prices of A in regime sym2 (upper right panel), and on viewer prices of B in regime asym (lower
left panel). The area denoting combinations of β and δ for which y is increasing (decreasing)
in β is indicated by y ↑ (y ↓) with y ∈ {nv,ri , pri }, i ∈ {A,B} and r ∈ {sym1, sym2, asym}.
The effects of an increase in δ on broadcasters’ profits is ambiguous with the exceptions
of A’s profits increasing under regime asym (see discussion above), and the loss in A’s
profits under sym1. Under the sym1 -regime, for the low quality broadcaster A, lowering
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the viewer prices and losing advertising market shares always dominate the increase
in the advertising price as well as an eventual gain in viewer market shares. For the
high quality broadcaster B, there are gains on the advertising market due to higher
prices and a higher market share on the one hand, but potential losses on the viewer
market on the other hand, as prices decrease and the viewer market shares may fall
as well. If and only if the negative externality β is sufficiently small, the gains from
advertisements outweigh the losses on the viewer market, and B’s profits increase in δ.
A similar reasoning applies to the profits of B under the sym2 -regime.
3.5 Effectiveness of an advertising ban
This section is devoted to evaluating the effectiveness of an advertising ban in the
light of its main objective: making quality broadcasts more attractive to consumers by
lowering the amount of advertisements and thus increasing the market shares of the
quality medium.
There are three possible ways to restrict advertising: imposing a ban on advertise-
ments in the high quality medium (which is what we analyze in this chapter), or on
advertisements in the low quality medium.28 Alternatively, one could impose a gen-
eral advertising ban that applies to all broadcasters. The latter is not very realistic
and would result in purely vertical competition for viewers, which yields the standard
results of the high quality medium setting higher prices on the viewer market, serving
the larger part of the market, and having higher profits.
In the following, we compare the equilibrium values of the regimes sym2 and asym. For
the comparison with asym, we choose sym2 over sym1, because, under both regimes,
market abstention of advertisers is allowed for, i.e. a¯ = 0.29
Proposition 7 For all δ > β, in equilibrium, an advertising ban on the high quality
broadcaster B
• increases the viewer market shares of A at the expense of B.
28Since this case is less realistic, it is not presented here in detail. Nevertheless, it yields some
interesting results. If only the high quality medium is allowed to carry advertisements, in our model
the advertising market will break down, i.e. in equilibrium, there will be no (positive demand for)
advertising at all.
29Comparing the asymmetric regime to the sym1 -regime would distort the results, see Section
3.3.3.
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• decreases the overall amount of advertisements.
Proof. See Section A6 of the Appendix.
The effects of an advertising ban on all remaining equilibrium values are depicted in
Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Comparison across regimes (sym2 vs. asym)
Broadcaster A B
Viewer prices psym2A R p
asym
A p
sym2
B R p
asym
B
Advertising prices τ sym2A < τ
asym
A —
Viewer market shares nv,sym2A < n
v,asym
A n
v,sym2
B > n
v,asym
B
Advertising market shares nad,sym2A + n
ad,sym2
B > n
ad,asym
A —
Profits Πsym2A R Π
asym
A Π
sym2
B > Π
asym
B
Note: This table illustrates the effects of broadcaster B not being allowed to enter the advertising market by comparing
the equilibria of the symmetric model with abstention (regime sym2 ) and the asymmetric model (regime asym).
While the result concerning the reduction of the overall amount of advertising is in-
tuitive, it may be surprising that medium B loses viewers by reducing its advertising
level to zero. The latter result is due to the twofold nature of broadcasters’ incen-
tives to attract viewers by low viewer prices: First, lowering viewer prices has a direct
(positive) effect on viewer market shares. Second, there is an indirect (positive) effect
on advertising market shares due to the positive externality the number of viewers
exerts on the demand for advertising slots. Being prevented from advertising, the high
quality medium B loses this second motive while the incentives of medium A remain
unchanged. Hence, in the case of asymmetric advertising, the relative incentives to
set low viewer prices are stronger for channel A than for channel B. Accordingly, in
equilibrium, broadcaster A serves the larger part of the viewer market than B, which
allows him to increase the advertising price.
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Both broadcasters’ price setting behavior on the viewer market is subject to two oppos-
ing effects. There is a negative effect on A’s viewer prices due to the ad-free platform B
becoming ceteris paribus more attractive to consumers, which leads to increased price
competition that also puts downward pressure on B’s viewer prices. The positive effect
on B’s viewer prices comes from B losing part of his incentives to attract viewers, which
reduces price competition and thus enables both broadcasters to increase their prices.
Whether the positive or the negative effect dominates the evolution of viewer prices
depends on the relative strength of the externalities between the two sides of the mar-
ket. As shown in Figure 3.6, we can distinguish between three cases: If, for any given
level of the viewer externality δ, the nuisance cost of advertisement β is sufficiently
low (high), both channels set a higher (lower) viewer price in the case of asymmetric
advertising compared to the case of symmetric advertising; for an intermediate range
of β, channel A lowers its viewer price while channel B raises it.
Figure 3.6: Comparison of both regimes (sym2 vs. asym)
Note: This figure illustrates the effects of an advertising ban for broadcaster B on equilibrium
viewer prices by comparing the equilibria of the symmetric model with market abstention
(regime sym2 ) and the asymmetric model (regime asym).
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For broadcaster B, being prevented from entering the advertising market obviously is
a disadvantage that lowers his profits. The analysis shows that for any given value of δ,
the advertising ban on B is beneficial for broadcaster A if and only if the nuisance cost
β is sufficiently small. If the nuisance β is high, the intensified price competition on the
viewer market dominates from broadcaster A’s perspective, and his profits decrease as
well.
In our analysis, the levels of quality are exogenously fixed at maximum differentiation.
Though analytically hardly tractable, the framework at hand also allows for modeling
an endogenous decision on quality levels. The results with exogenous levels of quality
may already give a hint on how these levels would react to an advertising ban on
broadcaster B, if the decision on quality was endogenous. As we have emphasized
above, broadcaster B loses a part of his incentives to attract viewers. The choice of an
endogenous quality level is, besides viewer prices, a second instrument for attracting
viewers. Hence, one might expect quality levels to evolve analogically to viewer prices:
On the one hand, channel A has an incentive to raise its quality level in order to
regain shares in the viewer market. This is due to the direct effect of no advertising
at channel B making B ceteris paribus more attractive to viewers. An increase in
A’s quality levels intensifies competition in the quality dimension and exerts upward
pressure on channel B’s quality level. On the other hand, the indirect effect of not
being obliged to please any customers on the advertising market lowers channel B’s
incentive to attract viewers by offering high quality. This mitigates quality competition
in the viewer market and gives room for decreasing quality levels, even to channel A.
Whether the direct or indirect effect dominates is again determined by the relative
strength of the externalities between the two sides of the market.
3.6 Equilibria in free-to-air systems with and with-
out an advertising ban
In this section, we discuss how accounting for free-to-air broadcasting affects equilib-
rium results, if television channels can be accessed by all consumers without any price
or fee. If the platforms offer their services for free, the game is reduced to two stages:
Advertisers and viewers simultaneously choose a platform in the second stage, and me-
dia outlets set advertising prices in the first stage. The profit function of media outlet
j is given by
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Π˜j = n
ad
j τj, (22)
where tilde variables ∼ denote the free-to-air regime. As consumer prices are zero, media
outlets have no direct incentive to attract consumers, but only an indirect incentive
via the positive externality of the number of consumers on the demand for advertising
space.
3.6.1 Symmetric advertising without market abstention
(sym1 )
If both channels are offered free-to-air, the condition of the pivotal advertiser being
indifferent between placing the advertisement on platform A or B does not vary from
the third stage of the game in Section 3.3.1 (see Eq. 5). In the second stage of the
game with free-to-air television, viewer ϑˆ is indifferent between watching channel A
and B if the following condition holds:
uA = uB ⇔ ϑˆ(xB − xA) = β(nadB − nadA ). (23)
As viewer prices are zero, only the quality of coverage and the number of advertisements
is decisive for consumers’ decisions. Consumers with ϑ ≤ ϑˆ choose platform A, and
the remaining consumers choose platform B. Solving Eq. (23) for ϑˆ yields
nvA(n
ad
A , n
ad
B ) = ϑˆ =
β(nadB − nadA )
xB − xA , n
ad
B (n
ad
A , n
ad
B ) = 1− ϑˆ =
xB − xA − β(nadB − nadA )
xB − xA .
(24)
Substituting Eq. (24) into Eq. (5), and solving for the viewer and advertising demands,
we obtain the following results on the second stage of the game:30
nvA (τA, τB) =
β (δ + τA − τB)
1 + 2βδ
, nvB (τA, τB) =
1 + β (δ − τA + τB)
1 + 2βδ
,
nadA (τA, τB) =
1 + 2δβ − δ − τA + τB
2(1 + 2βδ)
, nadB (τA, τB) =
1 + 2δβ + δ + τA − τB
2(1 + 2βδ)
. (25)
30Note that xA = 0 and xB = 1.
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Maximizing Eq. (22) with respect to τj and substituting the results into Eq. (25) and
(22) yields the following equilibrium:31
τ˜ sym1A = 1 +
δ(6β − 1)
3
, τ˜ sym1B = 1 +
δ(6β + 1)
3
,
n˜v,sym1A =
βδ
3(1 + 2βδ)
, n˜v,sym1B =
3 + 5βδ
3(1 + 2βδ)
,
n˜ad,sym1A =
1
2
− δ
6(1 + 2βδ)
, n˜ad,sym1B =
1
2
+
δ
6(1 + 2βδ)
,
Π˜sym1A =
[δ − 3(1 + 2βδ)]2
18(1 + 2βδ)
, Π˜sym1B =
[δ + 3(1 + 2βδ)]2
18(1 + 2βδ)
. (26)
3.6.2 Symmetric advertising with market abstention (sym2 )
In the scenario where market abstention on the advertising market can arise, i.e. where
the fixed benefit from advertising a¯ is zero, the demand for advertisement space in
media outlet j is as in Eq. (A2) (see Section A1 of the Appendix). On the viewer side
of the market, the demand for media outlet j is the same as in the previous section,
such that Eq. (24) is substituted in Eq. (A2). Hence, the viewer and advertising
market shares are:
nvA (τA, τB) =
β (δ + τA − τB)
1 + 2βδ
, nvB (τA, τB) =
1 + β (δ − τA + τB)
1 + 2βδ
,
nadA (τA, τB) =
βδ(δ − τA − τB)− τA
2(1 + 2βδ)
, nadB (τA, τB) =
δ(1− β(τA + τB − δ)− τB
2(1 + 2βδ)
.
(27)
Substituting this result into the profit function Eq. (22), and maximizing it with
respect to τj yields the following equilibrium:
32
31Note that the second order conditions are fulfilled as ∂
2ΠA
∂τ2A
|τ˜sym1A = −
1
1+2βδ < 0 and
∂2ΠB
∂τ2B
|τ˜sym1B = −
1
1+2βδ < 0.
32Note that the second order conditions are fulfilled as ∂
2ΠA
∂τ2A
|τ˜sym2A = −1 −
1
1+2βδ < 0 and
∂2ΠB
∂τ2B
|τ˜sym2B = −1−
1
1+2βδ < 0.
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τ˜ sym2A =
βδ2(1 + βδ)
(2 + βδ)(2 + 3βδ)
, τ˜ sym1B = 1 +
δ(2 + βδ(4 + βδ))
(2 + βδ)(2 + 3βδ)
,
n˜v,sym2A =
βδ(1 + βδ)
(2 + βδ)(1 + 2βδ)
, n˜v,sym2B =
2 + βδ(4 + βδ)
(2 + βδ)(1 + 2βδ)
,
n˜ad,sym2A =
βδ2(1 + βδ)2
(2 + βδ)(2 + 3βδ)(1 + 2βδ)
, n˜ad,sym2B =
δ(1 + βδ)(2 + βδ(4 + βδ))
(2 + βδ)(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)
,
Π˜sym2A =
β2δ4(1 + βδ)3
(2 + βδ)2(2 + 3βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)
, Π˜sym2B =
δ2(1 + βδ)(2 + βδ(4 + βδ))2
(2 + βδ)2(2 + 3βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)
.
(28)
Comparing equilibrium values of broadcaster A and B within a given regime (sym1 or
sym2 ) and financing scheme (free-to-air or pay-TV) shows that both of the symmetric
equilibria derived in a free-to-air system have almost the same qualitative characteris-
tics as their counterparts in the pay-TV regime: Broadcaster B sets higher advertising
prices, serves the larger part of both markets, and consequently has higher profits than
broadcaster A. The only variation from the pay-TV regime is that under the sym1 -
regime in a pay-TV system, broadcaster A may serve the larger part of the advertising
market if consumers’ ad aversion is sufficiently low, and the ad effectiveness is suf-
ficiently high. This is never the case under free-to-air, as the distribution of viewer
market shares is sufficiently unequal for B to be always more attractive to advertisers
than A.
3.6.3 Comparison to pay-TV system
In the following, we analyze the effects of introducing free-to-air broadcasting instead
of the pay-TV financing scheme of Section 3.3 by comparing their equilibrium values
across financing schemes for a given regime. The section is structured such that first,
the equilibria under pay-TV and free-to-air are compared for a given regime (sym1
or sym2 ). In order to account for changes in the way how the network effects affect
equilibrium outcomes, we then compare the comparative statics results with respect to
the ad effectiveness δ and the nuisance parameter β across the two financing schemes
for a given regime.
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Comparison of sym1 -equilibria under pay-TV and free-to-air
A free-to-air system leads to more consumers choosing the quality medium B than in a
pay-TV regime. As the desired high quality is available at no costs besides the nuisance
from advertisements, only the number of advertisements and the quality of the program
are decisive for consumers’ decisions. In a free-to-air system, consumer market shares
of the high quality medium B are larger than under pay-TV, as consumers with a low
valuation for quality who choose the cheaper medium A in the pay-per-view regime,
now switch to medium B. This implies that B has an advantage over A by being able to
provide more consumer contacts to advertisers. The monetary value of this advantage
increases in the strength of the positive externality δ. B is able to capitalize on this
advantage by increasing the advertising price compared to the pay-TV system if the
ad effectiveness parameter δ is sufficiently large, or the nuisance from advertisements,
β, is sufficiently small.33
In order to compensate for providing less consumer contacts to advertisers than in a
pay-TV system, media outlet A lowers its advertising prices. Providing a larger num-
ber of consumer contacts to advertisers compared to the pay-TV system dominates the
evolution of advertising market shares irrespective of the price-setting behavior of B,
such that, in a free-to-air system, B always sells more advertising space than under
pay-TV. As the advertising market is fully covered under regime sym1, A serves a
smaller part of the advertising market than in a pay-TV system.
Broadcaster A faces a reduction in profits, because he serves a smaller part of both
submarkets, and sets lower advertising prices than in a pay-TV regime. If δ is suf-
ficiently large, B’s profits are larger under free-to-air than under pay-TV despite the
fact that there are no revenues from the consumer market. This is due to the difference
in market shares of A and B being quite substantial and significantly larger than in
the pay-TV system, which is driven by the assumption that advertisers cannot abstain
from the market.
The comparative statics results are mainly driven by the number of advertisements
playing a relatively bigger role for consumers’ decision under free-to-air than under
pay-TV. An increase in β has qualitatively the same implications as in the pay-TV
system, since consumers’ nuisance from advertisements becomes more important for
their platform choice. Hence, in a regime where the advertising side of the market is
33Put differently, increasing B’s advertising price may eventually lead to advertisers switching to
platform A (sym1 -regime) or abstain from the market (as in the sym2 -regime discussed below) despite
the smaller number of viewers. This is especially the case if the ad effectiveness δ is low, which implies
that the positive externality has little effects on advertisers’ profits.
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inelastic (for instance due to a high reservation gain from advertising), the comparative
statics results with respect to β do not change qualitatively across financing schemes.
Some of the comparative statics results of an increase in the ad effectiveness parameter
δ vary with respect to the financing scheme. If δ increases, the effects on viewer market
shares are, in contrast to the pay-TV system, unambiguous: An increase in δ leads to
A gaining shares in the viewer market at the expense of B which is due to the fact
that B carries more ads when δ becomes larger, and the number of advertisements has
become relatively more important to consumers in a system where there are no direct
costs of media use. In the free-to-air system, an increase in δ may lead to higher profits
of A, if the gain in shares on the advertising market is sufficiently large.
Comparison of sym2 -equilibria under pay-TV and free-to-air
Comparing the equilibrium values of the sym2 -regime under free-to-air to the equilib-
rium that arises in a pay-TV system yields qualitatively similar results to the com-
parison of the sym1 -equilibria. Since the key characteristic of the sym2 -regime is the
increase in advertisers’ demand elasticity, A’s advertising market shares evolve differ-
ently compared to the sym1 -regime. The price cuts compared to the pay-TV system
tend to increase A’s advertising shares, but the decrease in consumer market shares
lowers A’s shares on the ad market. In contrast to the pay-TV system, the latter effect
dominates not for the whole parameter range, but only if δ is sufficiently large, i.e.
if the positive externality of the number of consumers on the advertisers’ revenues is
sufficiently important. Otherwise, A’s advertising shares are higher than in a pay-TV
system. As the distribution of market shares on the advertising market is more similar
for A and B, broadcaster B also makes lower profits than in a pay-TV system.
For the equilibrium advertising price, viewer market shares and profits of B, an in-
crease in β yields qualitatively different results under free-to-air compared to pay-TV,
if market abstention on the advertising market is allowed for. If advertisers can ab-
stain from the market, attracting advertisers will gain importance relative to attracting
consumers (who cannot abstain from the market). An increase in β under free-to-air
induces B to decrease his advertising prices, which reduces his share on the viewer
market, if β is sufficiently high. In this case, A’s market shares increase in β. Still, the
profits of B decrease in β due to the losses on the advertising submarket.
Most of the effects of an increase in δ are qualitatively the same as in the pay-TV
regime. The only deviations from the effects in the pay-TV regime are that A gains
market shares on the viewer market, if δ increases (which leads to a loss in market
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shares for B), and that A’s profits unambiguously increase.34 The reason for δ to
affect equilibrium values similarly in both financing systems is the following: In a free-
to-air system, competition for advertisers is larger than in a pay-TV system, because
advertisements are the only source of revenues for advertisers. If this is met by a
system ins which advertisers can abstain from the market (which intensifies competi-
tion for advertisers compared to the scenario discussed above), an increase in the ad
effectiveness δ goes in the same direction as introducing a free-to-air regime. In the
sym1 -regime of the free-to-air system, this effect is mitigated by the fact that market
abstention on the advertising market is not allowed for, which weakens competition for
advertisers, and leads to deviating results in the effects of an increase in δ.
3.6.4 Asymmetric advertising with an advertising ban on
broadcaster B (asym)
The scenario with asymmetric advertising describes a situation in which the high qual-
ity broadcaster is financed exclusively via a lump sum transfer that is independent of
his performance on the viewer market. The low quality medium is financed via adver-
tisements such that the profit functions are Π˜asymA = n
ad
A τA and Π˜
asym
B = T , with T
indicating the transfer for media outlet B.
The implications of the scenario with an advertising ban on the high quality medium
are straightforward. With both platforms being offered free-to-air, all consumers choose
the high-quality platform, which does not carry any advertisements. Advertisers can
decide between placing an advertisement on platform A, or abstaining from the mar-
ket, and do the latter since there is no exogenous benefit from advertising (a¯ = 0), and
no positive spillovers from the consumer side of the market, as all consumers choose
platform B. Hence, platform B serves the whole viewer market, but has zero revenues
on the viewer market, as viewers cannot be charged for accessing the services. Broad-
caster A makes no profits, as well, due to his viewer market share being zero.
This result hinges on a main assumption of the model: consumers’ vertical quality
preferences. If consumers’ quality preferences were horizontal such that the notion of
quality differs among consumers, it would be possible that some consumers with a suf-
ficiently low preferred quality choose platform A despite the advertisements. Platform
A has a positive market share, if the pivotal consumer’s disutility from choosing plat-
form B with the higher quality is larger than his nuisance induced by advertisements
34In the pay-TV regime, these effects were ambiguous.
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on platform A. If this is the case, platform A is able to charge positive prices for ad-
vertisements, and makes profits. If consumers were ad-neutral rather than ad-averse,
and quality preferences were horizontal, only the distance costs to the platforms would
be decisive for consumers’ decision, and platform A would serve an even larger part of
the consumer market than in the case with ad-aversion.
Assuming horizontal instead of vertical product differentiation on the consumer market
generates an interior solution on the consumer market even if an advertising ban on
the quality platform is in place. The result that an advertising ban on platform B re-
duces demand for quality, as derived in the previous sections of this chapter, however,
cannot be restored. We believe that the pay-TV regime is better suited to capture
the effects of an advertising ban, as in most media markets, some price is levied from
the consumers for instance in the form of a monthly license fee, or via technical access
barriers that prevent viewers from accessing the services for free.35 We follow Peitz
and Valletti (2008), and argue that pay-per-view will become the dominant mode in
broadcasting financing on the viewer side. Furthermore, the incentive structure of the
high quality medium is captured more adequately if the performance on the viewer
market has an effect on the profits of broadcaster B.
3.7 Concluding remarks
We have examined a two-sided markets model of two competing media outlets with
maximum quality differentiation that offer content to ad-averse consumers and adver-
tising space to advertisers. Content quality is a feature of vertical differentiation on
the viewer market and a feature of horizontal differentiation on the advertising market.
Our main result is that in pay-TV regimes, the high quality medium loses viewer mar-
ket shares due to the introduction of an advertising ban. This result is valid under
a set of strong assumptions: We assume that all consumers prefer high quality over
low quality, and that all consumers are ad-averse. We show that even under such
strict assumptions, an advertising ban that generates a high quality - no advertisement
platform is not capable of increasing the demand for quality in the media.
This model primarily addresses regulation of public service broadcasters in television
markets that are dominated by forms of pay-TV or television license fees (see also
35See Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1 for an overview on the share of pay-TV and free-TV channels in EU
countries, as well as Figure 3.7 in Section 3.7 for the financing schemes of the three largest broadcasters
in each of the countries.
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Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1). Figure 3.7 illustrates the aggregate market shares of the
three largest television channels on the country level sorted according to their ownership
structure and way of financing.
Figure 3.7: Market concentration and ownership structures on EU tele-
vision markets
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Note: This figure illustrates the aggregate market shares of the three largest television channels
of each country in 2009. Data source: MAVISE database, provided by the DG Communication
of the European Commission, see European Audiovisual Observatory (2011), and Werben &
Verkaufen (2009) (based on 1st and 2nd quarter of 2009) for the market share of RTL, Germany’s
largest private free-to-air channel, as well as Sweney (2010) for BBC1, the U.K’s second largest
public service broadcaster’s market share.
Judging the relevance of this model by the market shares of the broadcasters subject
to the advertising ban, Figure 3.7 indicates that the implications of an advertising
ban on public service broadcasters as derived in the pay-TV regime of our model
apply to all countries with the exception of Spain, where the market is dominated
by free-TV providers.36 The U.K., Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden already
discriminate against public service broadcasters in their way of advertising regulation,
and in France, a full advertising ban on the public service broadcaster is the subject
36In the Netherlands, there is little market concentration, and many public broadcasters offer
pay-TV services.
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of a controversial discussion (see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). Given our results, imposing
a ban for advertisements on the public service broadcaster should be reconsidered
because it gives rise to the following three issues: reduced competition on the market
for advertising slots, a loss in the advertising rent of high quality producers, and the
question of how to reimburse the restricted broadcaster for his loss on the advertising
market.
The first issue is that advertising prices rise if an advertising ban is in place. Anecdotal
evidence from comparing advertising prices of German commercial broadcasters in the
time slot with and without an advertising ban confirms this suggestion (see Figure 3.8).
The costs of reaching 1000 consumers with an advertisements (CPM) is significantly
higher in the time slot from 8pm through 11pm than from 5pm through 8pm.37
Figure 3.8: Commercial broadcasters’ CPM with and without an adver-
tising ban
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Note: The columns denote the average cost per mille (CPM) of an advertisement on the plat-
forms of the three largest German commercial broadcasters, RTL, SAT1, and PRO7, in the
respective time slots. GPS premium buyers represent a subset of individuals who primarily
buy goods that are 5% more expensive than the good provided by the market leader. Decision
makers are individuals who run intermediate to large businesses, higher officials, or managers.
Data source: ZDF Werbefernsehen (2008).
37The effectiveness of advertisements in the 5pm to 8pm time slot is estimated to be higher than
the ad effectiveness in the prime time slot from 8pm to 11pm. For evidence of the German television
market, see ZDF Werbefernsehen (2005).
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Advertisements on low quality platforms seem to be systematically cheaper when there
is no advertising ban on the high quality broadcaster in place. This implies that reduc-
ing competition on the market for advertising space by imposing an advertising ban
increases advertising prices which may be passed on to consumers via higher prices for
the advertised good. However, an often quoted counterargument is that advertising
prices before 8pm have been distorted in the first place: As advertising prices of com-
mercial channels are higher than those of public service broadcasters in the same time
segment as well, it may be possible that public service broadcasters use public funding
to pursue a predatory pricing strategy on the advertising market (see Hargreaves-Heap,
2005, for an overview of complaints to the European Commission about price distor-
tions induced by public service broadcasters).
The second issue is that some advertisers do not enter the market if there is no longer
the chance to place their advertisement in a high-profile environment of quality broad-
casting. This result has two implications: On the one hand, there is a loss in surplus
on the advertising side of the market, since advertisers with a positive willingness to
pay for advertisements cannot enter the market, which is also a result of our model.
On the other hand, the quality broadcast becomes more attractive to consumers due
to the lack of advertisements. As the latter does not lead to higher market shares of
the quality channel in a pay-TV regime, the reduction of advertising volume only leads
to the loss in advertisers’ surplus.
The last and probably most problematic issue is that public service broadcasters have
to be reimbursed for their revenue loss. In order to compensate for the loss in ad-
vertising revenues, per capita broadcasting fees in Germany, for instance, would have
to increase by 1.42 EUR per month as estimated by the commission responsible for
determining the broadcasting fees for public service broadcasters.38 In France, tax-
ing advertisements on commercial television more heavily to finance the revenue loss
in public service broadcasting is currently under debate. This, however, will lead to
additional distortions. A trend that is observable in all of the countries illustrated in
Figure 3.7 is that public broadcasters seem to face a steady decline in market shares
compared to private broadcasters.39 Given that an advertising ban on the public ser-
vice broadcaster in most countries does not yield the desired results of increasing the
market shares of the quality broadcaster, the appropriate way of advertising regulation
is an issue in need of further deliberation.
38see Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten (2009)
39For country level data see European Audiovisual Observatory (2011).
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Appendix
A1: Equilibrium values under regime sym2
The derivation of the equilibrium is analogue to regime sym1. We define
Ωsym2A ≡ β[δ(12 + 8βδ − 2β2 − 3δ2)− β] + 4,
Ωsym2B ≡ 8− 2β2 + βδ(26− 5β2)− 2δ2(1− 13β3 + β4) + βδ3(8β2 − 5)− 3β2δ4,
∆sym2 ≡ [βδ(β2 − 6βδ − 10)− 4][4β4δ2 + β3δ(9− 16δ2) + 4(δ2 − 3)]
+ [βδ(β2 − 6βδ − 10)− 4][2βδ(5δ2 − 21) + β2(4− 46δ2 + 6δ4)],
Φsym2 ≡ 4 + δ[β(10 + 5βδ − 3δ2)− 2δ],
χsym2 ≡ 2δ + β[2 + δ(5δ + 4β + δβ2 + 3βδ2)],
Λsym2 ≡ 16− 4β2 − 16βδ(β2 − 5)− 4δ2(1− 36β2 + 5β4)
+ βδ3(110β2 − 7β4 − 16) + 3β2δ4(10β2 − 7)− 9β3δ5 (A1)
There are two pivotal advertisers: The advertiser with a preferred broadcasting quality
of γˆA is indifferent between placing his advertisement on platform A and abstaining
from the market, and the advertiser with a preference of γˆB is indifferent between no
advertising and advertising on platform B. Hence, the conditions in the third stage of
the game are
ΠA = 0 ⇔ γˆA = xA + δnvA − τA
ΠB = 0 ⇔ γˆB = xB − δnvB + τB, (A2)
with nadA (n
v
A, n
v
B) = γˆA and n
ad
B (n
v
A, n
v
B) = 1− γˆB. As the decision problem of viewers is
unaffected, nadj is substituted in Eq. (7) which yields the following demand functions:
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nadA (pA, pB, τA, τB) =
pB − pA + β(δ + τA − τB)
1 + 2βδ
,
nadB (pA, pB, τA, τB) =
1 + pA − pB + β(δ − τA + τB)
1 + 2βδ
,
nadA (pA, pB, τA, τB) =
δ(pB − pA + β(δ − τA − τB))− τA
1 + 2βδ
,
nadB (pA, pB, τA, τB) =
δ(1 + pA − pB + β(δ − τA − τB))− τB
1 + 2βδ
. (A3)
Substituting Eq. (A3) into the profit function of media outlet j and maximizing the
profit function (1) with respect to the advertising price τj yields:
∂ΠA
∂τA
=
pA(β − δ) + pBδ − 2τA + βδ(δ − 2τA − τB)
1 + 2βδ
∂ΠB
∂τB
=
pB(β − δ)− 2τB + δ(1 + pA + β(δ − τA − 2τB))
1 + 2βδ
. (A4)
Setting Eq. (A4) equal to zero and solving for τj yields:
τA(pA, pB) =
δ[βδ(1 + βδ) + pB(2− β2 + 3βδ)] + pA[β(2 + 2βδ − 3βδ)− 2δ]
(2 + βδ)(2 + 3βδ)
,
τB(pA, pB) =
δ[2 + βδ(4 + βδ) + pA(2− β2 + 3βδ)]
(2 + βδ)(2 + 3βδ)
+
pB[β(2 + 2βδ − 3βδ)− 2δ]
(2 + βδ)(2 + 3βδ)
. (A5)
Substituting Eq. (A5) into the profit function (1) and maximizing it with respect to
the viewer prices pj, we obtain:
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∂ΠA
∂pA
=
2pA[4(β
2 − 4) + 16βδ(β2 − 5) + 4δ2(1− 36β2 + 5β4)
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
+
2pA[βδ
3(16− 110β2 + 7β4) + 3β2δ4(7− 10β2) + 9β3δ5]
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
+
2pA(1 + βδ)[βδ(1 + βδ) + pB(2− β2 + 3βδ)][4 + δ(β(10 + 5βδ − 3δ2)− 2δ)]
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
,
∂ΠB
∂pB
=
2pB[4(β
2 − 4) + 16βδ(β2 − 5) + 4δ2(1− 36β2 + 5β4)
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
+
2pB[βδ
3(16− 110β2 + 7β4) + 3β2δ4(7− 10β2) + 9β3δ5]
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
− 2pBpA(1 + βδ)(β
2 − 2− 3βδ)[4 + δ(β(10 + 5βδ − 3δ2)− 2δ)]
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
+
2pB(1 + βδ)(2 + βδ(4 + βδ))[4 + δ(β(10 + 5βδ − 3δ2)− 2δ)]
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
. (A6)
Solving Eq. (A6) for pj, we obtain the following equilibrium prices:
psym2A =
(1 + βδ)2Ωsym2A Φ
sym2
∆sym2
, psym2B =
(1 + βδ)Ωsym2B Φ
sym2
∆sym2
,
τ sym2A =
(1 + βδ)Ωsym2A χ
sym2
∆sym2
, τ sym2B =
Ωsym2B χ
sym2
∆sym2
. (A7)
The corresponding market shares are:
nv,sym2A =
1
2
− (βδ(β
2 − 6βδ − 10)− 4)2
2∆sym2
,
nv,sym2B =
1
2
+
(βδ(β2 − 6βδ − 10)− 4)2
2∆sym2
,
nad,sym2A =
(1 + βδ)2(2δ − β(2 + 2βδ − 3δ2))Ωsym2A
∆sym2
,
nad,sym2B =
(1 + βδ)(2δ − β(2 + 2βδ − 3δ2))Ωsym2B
∆sym2
. (A8)
By substituting the above results into the profit function of the broadcasters (Eq. 1),
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we obtain:
Πsym2A =
(1 + βδ)3(Ωsym2A )
2Λsym2
(∆sym2)2
, Πsym2B =
(1 + βδ)(Ωsym2B )
2Λsym2
(∆sym2)2
. (A9)
The second order conditions are fulfilled as:
∂2ΠA
∂τ 2A
|psym2A =
2[4(β2 − 4) + 16βδ(β2 − 5) + 4δ2(1− 36β2 + 5β4)
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
+
2[βδ3(16− 110β2 + 7β4) + 3β2δ4(7− 10β2) + 9β3δ5]
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
< 0,
∂2ΠB
∂τ 2B
|psym2B =
2[4(β2 − 4) + 16βδ(β2 − 5) + 4δ2(1− 36β2 + 5β4)
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
+
2[βδ3(16− 110β2 + 7β4) + 3β2δ4(7− 10β2) + 9β3δ5]
(2 + βδ)2(1 + 2βδ)(2 + 3βδ)2
< 0.(A10)
A2: Equilibrium values in a regime with an advertis-
ing ban on B and no market abstention of advertisers
From Eq. (3) follows that a¯ ≥ 1 − δnvA + τA. This yields nadA = 1 and nadB = 0 due
to the advertising ban on B. Substituting the advertising demands into the demand
functions of the viewers from Eq. (7) with xA = 0 and xB = 1 yields:
nvA = pB − pA − β, nvB = 1− pB + pA + β. (A11)
Substituting the demand functions into the profit function of broadcaster A (Eq. 17)
and maximizing it with respect to τA shows that the profits are strictly increasing in
τA:
∂ΠasymA
∂τA
= 1 > 0. (A12)
Maximizing Eq. (17) with respect to pj and substituting the results into the above
demand functions yields the following viewer prices and demands in equilibrium:
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pasym1A =
1
3
+ β, pasym1B =
2
3
+ β,
nv,asym1A =
1
3
, pasym1B =
2
3
. (A13)
Substituting Eq. (A13) into the condition derived above shows that advertisers’ de-
mand for advertising space is perfectly inelastic if
a¯ ≥ 2− δ
3
. (A14)
A3: Proof of Proposition 4
Comparing equilibrium values in the sym1 -regime with
∆sym1 = 27 + 38βδ − 8(β2 + δ2) > 0 (A15)
yields:
psym1B − psym1A > 0 ⇔
9 + 14βδ − 4δ2
∆sym1
> 0,
τ sym1B − τ sym1A > 0 ⇔
2(β + δ)(3 + 2βδ)
∆sym1
> 0,
nv,sym1B − nv,sym1A > 0 ⇔
9 + 4β(β + δ)
∆sym1
> 0,
Πsym1B − Πsym1A > 0 ⇔
27− 4β2(3 + δ + 2β)− 6δ2 + 4βδ(9 + δ)
3∆sym1
> 0.
(A16)
For the sign of nad,sym1B − nad,sym1A , see Figure 3.3, where the results are simulated for
any given combination of β and δ for the full parameter range of the model, i.e. for
δ ∈ (0, 1] ∧ β ∈ (0, 1].
Analogically, for the sym2 -regime, the following inequalities hold:
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psym2B − psym2A > 0 ⇔
(1 + βδ)[4 + δ(β(10 + 5βδ − 3δ2)− 2δ)]
Σsym2
> 0,
τ sym2B − τ sym2A > 0 ⇔
2δ + β[2 + δ(5δ + 4β + βδ(β + 3δ))]
Σsym2
> 0,
nv,sym2B − nv,sym2A > 0 ⇔
4 + βδ(10− β2 + 6βδ)
Σsym2
> 0,
nad,sym2B − nad,sym2A > 0 ⇔
(1 + βδ)[2δ − β(2 + 2βδ − 3δ2)]
Σsym2
> 0,
Πsym2B − Πsym2A > 0 ⇔
1
4
(
1 +
β3δ
4 + βδ(10 + 6βδ − β2) +
2(1 + βδ)(2 + βδ)(1 + 2βδ)
Σsym2
)
> 0, (A17)
where
Σsym2 ≡ 12+2βδ(21−5δ2)+β2[βδ(16δ2−9)+46δ2−6δ4−4]−4δ2(1+β4) > 0. (A18)
Finally, for the asym-regime, the comparison of the equilibrium values yields:
pasymB − pasymA > 0 ⇔
2(2− β2 + βδ)(1 + βδ)
∆asym
> 0,
nv,asymB − nv,asymA > 0 ⇔ 1−
8(1 + βδ)
∆asym
> 0,
ΠasymB − ΠasymA > 0 ⇔
2(4− (δ − β)2)(1 + βδ)[6(1 + βδ)− βδ(β2 + δ2)− 2(δ2 − β2(δ2 − 1))]
(∆asym)2
> 0, (A19)
with
∆asym = 12 + βδ(12− β2 − δ2)− 2(β2(1− δ2) + δ2). (A20)
All of the above inequalities hold for the full parameter range of the model, i.e. for
δ ∈ (0, 1] ∧ β ∈ (0, 1].

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A4: Proof of Proposition 5
Follows from simulating the first derivatives of the equilibrium values of all regimes
with respect to β for any given combination of β and δ for the full parameter range
of the model, i.e. for δ ∈ (0, 1] ∧ β ∈ (0, 1]. The results are valid as there is a unique
solution for each combination of β and δ.

A5: Proof of Proposition 6
Follows from simulating the first derivatives of the equilibrium values of all regimes
with respect to δ for any given combination of β and δ for the full parameter range
of the model, i.e. for δ ∈ (0, 1] ∧ β ∈ (0, 1]. The results are valid as there is a unique
solution for each combination of β and δ.

A6: Proof of Proposition 7
Comparing equilibrium values in the sym2 -regime to the asym-regime with
Σcomp ≡ 4(3 + δ2) + 2βδ(21− 5δ2)
− β2[4(1 + β2δ2)− 2δ2(23− 3δ2) + βδ(9− 16δ2)] > 0,
Λcomp ≡ 4 + βδ(10− β2 + 6βδ) > 0,
Ξcomp ≡ βδ(12− β2 − δ2) + 2(6− δ2)− 2β2(1− δ2) > 0, (A21)
yields:
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nv,asymA − nv,sym2A > 0 ⇔
1
2
[
8(1 + βδ)
Ξcomp
− Λ
comp
Σcomp
− 1
]
> 0,
nad,sym2A + n
ad,sym2
B − nad,asymA > 0 ⇔
1
4
[
2δ − β − β[4 + βδ(6 + β
2)]
Λcomp
− 8(1 + βδ)(δ − β)
Ξcomp
]
> 0. (A22)
The results from Table 3.4 are derived as follows:
τ v,asymA − τ v,sym2A > 0 ⇔
(1 + βδ)
[
2(β + δ)
Ξcomp
+
[2(β3δ + δ2 − 2)][2δ + β(2 + 5δ2 + βδ(4 + βδ + 3δ2))]
Λcomp(Σcomp − 4β4δ2)
]
+ (1 + βδ)
[
[β2(2− 8δ2) + 3βδ(δ2 − 4)][2δ + β(2 + 5δ2 + βδ(4 + βδ + 3δ2))]
Λcomp(Σcomp − 4β4δ2)
]
> 0.
(A23)
All of the above inequalities hold for the full parameter range of the model, δ ∈
(0, 1] ∧ β ∈ (0, 1].
For the sign of Πsym2A −ΠasymA , see the following figure, where the results are simulated
for any given combination of β and δ for the full parameter range of the model.
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of both regimes (sym2 vs. asym)
Note: This figure illustrates the effects of an advertising ban on the profits of broadcaster A
by comparing the equilibria of the symmetric model with market abstention (regime sym2 ) to
the asymmetric model (regime asym).

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Chapter 4
The role of online platforms for
media markets - multidimensional
spatial competition in a two-sided
market
4.1 Introduction
The advent of online media platforms has initiated a controversy on the implications
for traditional oﬄine platforms. While some media experts argue that ”newspapers ...
are not dying, they are committing suicide”1 by providing their contents online, others
expect online platforms to pick up the slack of their oﬄine counterparts’ dwindling prof-
its. The increase in internet penetration undoubtedly has affected media consumption
habits, since individuals are exposed to a variety of online sources that provide highly
specialized contents.2 The question I investigate in this chapter is why media outlets
offer contents online although there seems to be mixed evidence on the profitability of
online platforms.3 I study in a multidimensional two-sided market framework how the
introduction of online media has affected consumers, advertisers, and media outlets
1Samir A. Husni, professor at The Meek School of Journalism and New Media, University of
Mississippi. See Glaser (2007) for full interview.
2The worldwide internet penetration is 28.7 % (based on an estimated world population of
6,845,906,960 people) with 77.4% (58.4%) of the total population in North America (Europe) having
access to the internet. See Internet World Stats (2011).
3Roughly 80% of U.S. newspapers’ revenues come from advertising, and only 10% of ad revenues
are generated online (see Kirchhoff, 2010).
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and I show that entering the online market is the result of a prisoner’s dilemma game
for media outlets.
Contributing to the literature on two-sided markets and spatial competition, this chap-
ter combines two types of models: a multi-dimensional spatial competition model, and a
two-sided market framework. So far, there exists literature either on multi-dimensional
spatial competition, or on two-sided markets, but not on a combination of the two.
Combining these two elements is crucial to studying online platforms: The distinction
between content of different style (e.g. information and entertainment) can be observed
online as well as oﬄine and is not surprising, as the specialization into content of dif-
ferent style is a standard result of product differentiation models. However, for a given
style of coverage, consumers may switch between online and oﬄine platforms, depend-
ing on their preferred way of consuming a certain content. Capturing this switching
behavior requires adding an additional dimension of horizontal product differentiation
to the mix. Hence, in a duopolistic market with both media outlets being active on the
online as well as the oﬄine market, consumers differ with respect to their preferences
for style of coverage (as in traditional models), as well as in their preferences for the
type of medium, and they can choose from four different options: the online or the
oﬄine version of either of the two styles, entertainment or information.
Textbook reasoning would suggest the following: As products are differentiated in n
horizontal dimensions (here: style of coverage and type of medium), firms cater to the
preferences of consumers more specifically and are able to charge higher prices than in
the case with differentiation in (n − 1) horizontal dimensions.4 This leads to higher
revenues. The results of this model, however, are different. Although consumer prices
may be higher than in the one-dimensional case, which confirms the initial suggestion,
the firms cannot capitalize (i.e. take advantage of their market power on the consumer
market due to consumers’ distance costs) on the additional dimension such that the net
effect on revenues is zero. The advertising market plays a decisive role for this finding,
as it intensifies media outlets’ competition for consumer market shares. As entry to
the online market causes positive fixed costs, profits are even lower. Entrance to the
online market is due to a prisoner’s dilemma situation, since an equilibrium in which
no firm enters the online market is not stable. Hence, media outlets enter although
they would have been better off if they could coordinate themselves such that both
players make binding commitments not to enter.
4For a comprehensive overview of spatial competition models a` la Hotelling, see for instance Tirole
(1988), Martin (2002), or Carlton and Perloff (2000).
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Related literature
This chapter relates to two strands of literature: the advertising and two-sided markets
literature on the one hand, and the literature on multi-dimensional spatial competition
on the other hand. In addition, there is some work on online platforms that is helpful
for evaluating the results of this model.
The interaction of two sides of a market is analyzed in a number of studies such
as Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006); Dukes and Gal-Or (2003).5 Caillaud and Jullien
(2001, 2003) study competition between two platforms with the platforms being
homogenous for the players on both sides of the market, and and the two sides of
the market exerting positive spillover effects. Anderson and Coate (2005) set up a
model of broadcasters competing on the consumer as well as the advertising market,
and they introduce negative spillover effects from advertisers to consumers. There are
various modifications and extensions to this model, as for instance Armstrong (2006)
who analyzes competition between two pay-per-view broadcasters.
The analysis of multi-dimensional spatial competition equilibria started with Tabuchi
(1994) who set up a model in which consumer preferences are uniformly distributed
across two horizontal dimensions. Gabszewicz and Resende (2008) analyze how un-
certainty about product quality affects equilibrium outcomes in a two-dimensional
framework with preferences regarding one product characteristic being vertically
differentiated (quality), and the other one being a horizontal component. Larralde
et al. (2009) endogenize the location decision of firms in a two-dimensional spatial
competition framework with quadratic transportation costs, and provide a numerical
simulation to a game of n dimensions in which they show that the maximum dif-
ferentiation result does not necessarily hold in all of the dimensions. In the model
developed below, it is not necessary to endogenize the location stage in which the style
of contents is being chosen as long as the equilibrium locations evolve symmetrically.
In Section 4.5, I provide reasoning on why this is always the case.
The number of theoretical contributions on online platforms is still quite limited, and
contributions mostly have a clear focus on the advertising side of the market. An
exception is Gentzkow (2007) who analyzes both theoretically and empirically how
the emergence of a new product (online newspapers) has affected existing products.
He finds that online and oﬄine platforms are substitutes, which is in line with the
5For a survey summarizing recent work on two-sided markets, see Anderson and Gabszewicz
(2006).
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findings of this chapter. Bergemann and Bonatti (2010) build a model of informative
advertising with heterogeneous consumers where the targeting ability is subject to
the media type. They show that an online platform decreases the revenues of the
competitor’s oﬄine platform more than an additional oﬄine platform would. These
findings trace out two relevant ingredients of my model: An online platform affects
competition between media outlets in a different way than an oﬄine platform, and the
targeting ability, which is just another interpretation of ad effectiveness, plays a crucial
role for model outcomes. In contrast to the above papers, this chapter’s analysis is
mainly concerned with media outlets as providers of content and advertising space,
rather than with advertisers.
There are a number of recent empirical studies on how online platforms have affected
traditional oﬄine media with contributions focussing either on the effect of online
media on the consumer market of oﬄine media, or on the advertising market of oﬄine
media. Filistrucci (2005) offers an explanation for online platforms starting to charge
consumers for accessing their content, and he shows for the Italian media market that
providing an online platform has negative effects on both the profits of the platform
that went online but also on the profits of the competitor who did not. These empirical
results are in line with the predictions derived in the following sections of this chapter.
George (2008) analyzes how internet penetration has changed the composition of the
audience of traditional media, and provides evidence for online platforms drawing
consumers away from traditional newspapers. Her findings are in line with Simon
and Kadiyali (2007) who estimate that a magazine’s print circulation drops by about
3% when offering an online platform. Analyzing how the online advertising market
affects oﬄine advertising, Goldfarb and Tucker (2011c) compare the ad effectiveness
of different media types and find that oﬄine advertisements can to a certain degree
be substituted by online ads conditional on the audience they intend to reach. These
results are reinforced by a previous study of the same authors (Goldfarb and Tucker,
2011a) that shows that a ban on oﬄine advertisements for cigarettes results in a higher
ad effectiveness online. In this model, I also explore the asymmetry between the ad
effectiveness across media types, and I show that it is an important determinant for
the price setting behavior of media outlets. Seamans and Zhu (2011) show in a recent
study that the circulation as well as the advertising price of local newspapers in the
U.S. fall when ”Craigslist”(an online provider of classified advertisements) enters the
market. Seamans and Zhu (2011) study a special kind of advertisements, as it may
be possible that consumers choose an oﬄine platform because it provides classified
advertisements, which may explain the drop in circulation rates due to the market
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entry of Craigslist. In the model developed in this chapter, on the contrary, consumers
are ad-neutral, which describes best a situation where platforms carry any other form
of advertisements than classified ads.
The chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, I outline the assump-
tions and the setup of the benchmark model in which both media outlets offer an
online as well as an oﬄine platform. The equilibrium of the benchmark model is
described in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, I discuss (i) the equilibrium without online
platform, and (ii) the equilibrium that arises if there is only one provider of an online
platform. Possible extensions to the model, and the robustness of the results are
discussed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Model setup
Usually, competition for consumers is one-dimensional (firms compete in prices and
one horizontal dimension). Modeling the media market, a common characteristic
to distinguish consumer preferences for different media is the style of coverage with
respect to political slant or the distinction between ”hard” and ”soft” content.6 I
keep the style of content as a dimension of platform differentiation, as it determines
the recognition value of a media outlet.7 Apart from the style dimension, I introduce
another dimension that has become increasingly important in recent years: the type
of medium, as platforms may offer an online as well as an oﬄine issue of their given
content. Having a variety of different media platforms to choose from, consumers’
choices are subject to their style and type preferences. These two traits of product
differentiation interact as follows: Platforms of the same type (online or oﬄine) are
maximally differentiated in the style dimension which decreases their substitutability
compared to a situation in which both firms offer content of the same style.
A second dimension of horizontal product differentiation does not only capture the
features of media platforms observed on the market, but contributes also to analyzing
a theoretical question: As the degree of horizontal product differentiation increases
due to firms offering two platforms that are differentiated in an additional dimension,
this setup provides an adequate framework for analyzing whether this enables firms
6Entertainment is typically referred to as ”soft” content in contrast to political or economic news
coverage which is ”hard” content. See for instance Lehman-Wilzig and Seletzky (2010).
7The underlying assumption is that the online and the oﬄine edition of the same media outlet
typically does not vary much across styles.
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to exert higher levels of monopoly power over consumers than in the situation where
they offer less specialized goods.
There are three types of agents interacting on four (sub-)markets: the consumers,
the advertisers, and two media outlets. Consumers enter the media market which is
divided into submarkets for online and for oﬄine media. The advertising market is
subject to the same structure with advertisers not being restricted to either the online
or the oﬄine market which implies that they place an advertisement on a platform if
the net benefit from advertising is positive. In contrast to consumers, advertisers have
no direct preferences with respect to type and style of the platform they place their
advertisements on, but they aim at maximizing their consumer contacts.
The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, media outlets A and B
simultaneously set consumer prices. In the second stage, consumers decide between
the four possible media platforms with the decision on the style of coverage they intend
to consume (entertainment vs. information), and on the type of medium (online vs.
oﬄine) being simultaneous.8
Media outlets
In the benchmark model, two media outlets derive profits from advertising as well
as from selling copies (or charging fees) to consumers. Each medium i ∈ A,B pro-
vides contents of their respective style (xi ∈ xA, xB) on platforms of different types
(θt ∈ θON , θOFF ).
The strategic variables of the two media outlets are the consumer prices they set on
each market. Advertising prices are indirectly determined by the number of consumers
the respective platform attracts. An alternative way of modeling the strategic behav-
ior of the firms would be to introduce ad-aversion as additional costs for consumers
as for instance in Anderson and Coate (2005), and Dukes and Gal-Or (2003). This
would account for the fact that some media platforms such as television are free-to-air
but charge consumers indirectly by exposing them to utility-reducing advertisements.
However, there are two major drawbacks of this strategy. First, there is mixed evidence
on consumers’ ad-aversion.9 Second, it would reduce the general applicability of this
8Any sequence in the second stage (style of coverage is selected before or after the type of medium)
yields the same results as the simultaneous game. See Section 4.5 for a discussion of different sequences.
9See for instance Kaiser and Song (2009); Sonnac (2000) who find that consumers may even like
advertisements.
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model, as it would only be valid for free-to-air television stations. Allowing the firms to
set positive prices as in Gabszewicz et al. (2006), Ambrus and Reisinger (2006), Kind
et al. (2010), and Peitz and Valletti (2008) avoids these issues.10 Peitz and Valletti
(2008) argue that introducing positive prices for broadcasting services is essential as
modern tracking techniques make it possible for media outlets to charge consumers for
accessing their services and will be the predominating form of television financing on
the viewer side in the years to come.11
I assume maximum differentiation in the style dimension such that A offers entertain-
ment, and B offers information, which implies that xA = 0 and xB = 1, given that xi
captures the degree of information.12 The type of medium θt (online or oﬄine) is also
maximally differentiated with θON = 0 and θOFF = 1. The parameter θt stands for
the characteristics that an oﬄine medium has in contrast to an online medium, as for
example accuracy and more detailed coverage.
On the advertising side of the market, media outlets charge for advertising space pro-
portionally to the consumer contacts they provide the advertisers with.13 Hence, in-
verse advertising demand is a function of consumer demand as in Anderson and Coate
(2005), and Bergemann and Bonatti (2010).
The supply of advertising space per platform is exogenously fixed and normalized to
unity (nai,t = 1). This assumption accounts for the fact that media outlets face tech-
nological and/or legal restrictions that result in capacity constraints with respect to
the amount of advertising space they can offer.14 This yields for the profit function of
media outlet i:
Πi =
consumer revenues︷ ︸︸ ︷
nci,ONp
c
i,ON +
ad revenues︷ ︸︸ ︷
nai,ONp
a
i,ON −CON︸ ︷︷ ︸
profits in online market
+
consumer revenues︷ ︸︸ ︷
nci,OFFp
c
i,OFF +
ad revenues︷ ︸︸ ︷
nai,OFFp
a
i,OFF −COFF︸ ︷︷ ︸
profits in oﬄine market
. (1)
10See also Crampes et al. (2009) for a circular-city model a` la Salop where n firms compete for
ad-averse consumers and advertisers.
11See the annual report by the Pew Research Center (2011) for a detailed analysis of pricing tools
available to and used by online platforms. For best practice of U.S. newspapers, see Seidenberg (2009).
12This assumption is used in a broad range of publications. See for instance Laffont et al. (1998a,b);
Anderson and Coate (2005); Armstrong (2006); Gabszewicz et al. (2004). As long as both firms are
symmetric, this assumption is without loss of generality.
13This corresponds to the Cost Per Mille (CPM). The price for advertising space is calculated by
dividing the number of consumers reached by this platform by 1,000, and multiplying it by the market
value of an ad impression.
14In Germany, for instance, advertising slots are limited to 12 minutes per hour. Alternatively,
think of the page size or the number of pages being binding restrictions. For online media, the screen
size (or the resolution of the screen) limit the number of ads.
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The consumer (advertiser) demand for medium i, t is expressed by nci,t (n
a
i,t), and the
associated price is pci,t (p
a
i,t). In order to simplify the model, I assume that unit costs are
zero.15 Both media types, however, have fixed costs for staff and technical equipment
when taking up their service. This is accounted for by Ct > 0 which is the same
for media outlets A and B but varies with respect to the type of medium. I assume
that online platforms can only be provided if the same media outlet already runs an
oﬄine platform. Entering the online market requires investments in servers and some
additional staff which adds to the fixed costs of operating the oﬄine platform which
consist of running (television) studios or printing facilities (newspapers).
Consumers
On the consumer market, preferences for style of coverage and type of medium are uni-
formly distributed in a two-dimensional space as in Tabuchi (1994). A continuum of m
consumers is uniformly distributed on the unit interval with each consumer choosing
exactly one of the four platforms on the market. Consumers vary in two dimensions:
First, they have differentiated tastes for the style of contents (entertainment vs. infor-
mation) which is captured by the uniformly distributed taste parameter xm ∈ [0, 1].
Second, consumers are of different media use types, since some consumers prefer oﬄine
over online media, and vice versa. This is modeled by a taste parameter θmi ∈ [0, 1]
which is again uniformly distributed among the mass of consumers. The subscript i in-
dicates that the taste for media types may differ across the style of coverage. However,
in this setup this is never the case in equilibrium. The style parameter xm is assumed
to remain constant across media types. I discuss the latter assumption in more detail
in Section 4.5. For instance, if a consumer prefers information over entertainment,
xm will be large. If this consumer is interested in being informed immediately rather
than waiting for news to be aired or in the papers, he chooses online over oﬄine cov-
erage which is associated with a low value of θmi . Hence, the utility function of a
representative consumer m when consuming an i, t-platform is16
Umi,t = u¯− pci,t − k(xm − xi)2 − `(θmi − θt)2. (2)
15This assumption is a common feature of media economics models as it is valid for virtually all
audiovisual media since an additional user of an online platform or an additional television viewer
does not cause higher costs.
16This utility function is as in Tabuchi (1994), where consumers also face a three-dimensional
decision problem (two product characteristics, and the price) in a one-sided market.
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The reservation utility u¯ is assumed to be sufficiently large, such that, in equilibrium,
each individual consumes one medium at a price pci,t. The importance of obtaining the
”right” media product is captured by the weight of the disutility parameters k, ` ∈
[0, 1].17 The above equation shows that consumers face three different kinds of costs:
disutility from not obtaining the right style of coverage as well as disutility from not
obtaining the right type of medium, and the price they have to pay to the media outlet.
Advertisers
There is a mass of n producers each of which produces exactly one good. For simplicity,
I normalize the number of producers to unity (n = 1). In order to get the attention of
consumers, the producers place advertisements. In this setting, advertisers are price
takers on the advertising market.18 They receive a benefit of G if a consumer buys the
product. Of all consumers who are exposed to an advertisement in the online medium,
a fixed proportion of βON ∈ [0, 1] consumers decides to buy the advertised product.19
For the oﬄine medium, the fraction of buyers is βOFF ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Hence, the
return per advertisement on platform i is Gβtn
c
i,t.
An alternative interpretation of βt is that it expresses the value of an ad impression
20
which represents the probability of consumers buying the advertised good. The assump-
tion of βt being type-specific implies that advertising is targeted only with respect to
the type of medium, i.e. that each consumer of type-t-platform has the same effects on
advertisers’ profits. Advertisers have some expectation (βt) about the sales initiated
by an advertisement in a medium of a certain type, but they are not able to correctly
predict whether an ad in medium A or B triggers more sales. So they adapt their will-
ingness to pay for advertisements only with respect to media types. This assumption
is in line with the empirical findings of Goldfarb and Tucker (2011c,a). Relaxing this
assumption is discussed in Section 4.5.
For simplicity, I assume that G = 1 such that the marginal benefit from an advertise-
ment simply is βtn
c
i,t. The price per advertisement is p
a
i,t. Hence, the inverse demand
function for advertisements is
pai,t = βtn
c
i,t. (3)
17Both k(xm−xi)2 and `(θmi −θt)2 correspond to the distance costs in a standard spatial competition
model that arise from consumers not being able to purchase at a store closest to their respective
location.
18Gabszewicz et al. (2002, 2004) also assume advertisers to be price takers, and model the demand
for advertising space analogically.
19I only consider sales triggered by advertisements. Producers may as well sell goods without them
being advertised for, but this part of total sales is of no interest to the question I intend to analyze.
20Ad impression is the term for a single advertisement being displayed to exactly one consumer.
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4.3 Equilibrium of the game
The game is solved by backward induction beginning with the second stage in which
consumers choose their preferred medium. To determine equilibrium market shares,
the following four conditions must hold for the pivotal consumer:
• indifference between platforms of A: UpivA,ON = UpivA,OFF
• indifference between platforms of B : UpivB,ON = UpivB,OFF
• indifference between online platforms: UpivA,ON = UpivB,ON
• indifference between oﬄine platforms: UpivA,OFF = UpivB,OFF
The preferred mix of style and type of the pivotal consumer is illustrated in Figure
4.1, where the intersection of the two lines indicates the preferred style-type-mix of the
pivotal consumer, and the four quadrants reflect the market shares of each platform.
Consumers are indifferent between the online or oﬄine platform of medium i, if
Upivi,ON = U
piv
i,OFF
⇔ pci,ON − pci,OFF = `(θpivi − θOFF )2 − `(θpivi − θON)2. (4)
The consumer who is indifferent between online and oﬄine media use for given medium
i ∈ A,B is denoted by θpivi . Deciding between the online and the oﬄine platform of
a given style, the distance costs with respect to the style are equal for both choices.
Hence, only the prices and the distance costs with respect to the type of medium are
decisive for the decision of consumers. Solving for the preferred type of medium of the
pivotal consumer yields
θpivi =

1, if 0 < ` ≤ −∆i ∧ ∆i < 0,
1
2
− ∆i
2`
, if |∆i| < ` < 1,
0, if 0 < ` ≤ ∆i ∧ ∆i > 0,
(5)
with ∆i ≡ pci,ON − pci,OFF . This implies for the interior solution that consumers with
θmi < θ
piv
i choose the online issue of media outlet i, and the remaining consumers
choose the oﬄine option.
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There are three possible outcomes in the type dimension: (i), online platforms set
higher prices than oﬄine platforms, and distance costs in the type dimension ` are
sufficiently small; (ii), oﬄine platforms set higher prices than online platforms, and `
is sufficiently small; and (iii), the distance cost parameter ` is larger than the price
difference between online and oﬄine platforms. Scenarios (i) and (ii) yield corner
solutions in which either only oﬄine or only online platforms are on the market. This
may be the case if type preferences have little influence on consumers’ utility (small
`), or if media outlets set a large price difference between their online and oﬄine
platforms (large |∆i|). I focus on scenario (iii) where some consumers choose an oﬄine
platforms, and others choose an online platform. This represents situations where ` is
sufficiently large such that, in equilibrium, the disutility from consuming the wrong me-
dia type is larger than the savings from switching to the other media type (` ∈ (|∆i|, 1]).
The style preference of the consumer who is indifferent between media outlet A
and B for given type t is denoted by xpiv. The pivotal style preference can be derived
from the following condition:
UpivA,t = U
piv
B,t
⇔ pcB,t − pcA,t = k(xpiv − xA)2 − k(xpiv − xB)2 + `(θpivA − θt)2 − `(θpivB − θt)2. (6)
Note that distance costs with respect to the type of medium are relevant here as well
since I allow type preferences to vary across styles.21 Style preferences, on the contrary,
do not vary with the type of platform. Solving for the preferred style of coverage xpiv
of the pivotal consumer and inserting θpivi from Eq. (5) yields:
xpiv =

1, if 0 < k ≤ −Ω
4`
∧ Ω < 0,
1
2
− Ω
8kj
, if | Ω
4`
| < k < 1,
0, if 0 < k ≤ Ω
4`
∧ Ω > 0.
(7)
with Ω ≡ (pcA,ON−pcA,OFF )2−(pcB,ON−pcB,OFF )2−2`(pcA,ON +pcA,OFF−pcB,ON−pcB,OFF ).
Again, there are three possible scenarios that follow a similar logic as discussed above:
(i), the weight factor k of style preferences is sufficiently small, and the prices of
the platforms of A are systematically lower than the prices of B (Ω < 0), (ii), k is
21A possible interpretation of this assumption could be that consumers may have a higher prefer-
ences for online media when consuming information contents, as news are transmitted faster.
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sufficiently small, and B sets systematically lower prices than A (i.e. Ω > 0), and (iii),
k is sufficiently large such that it determines consumers’ platform choice. Scenarios (i)
and (ii) describe corner solutions in which only A or B offers a media platform.22 Only
in Scenario (iii), both firms are active and an interior solution in the style dimension
exists. This requires that price differences Ω may not be too large, and that the
importance of obtaining the right style of coverage k may not be too small.
For the parameter range in which there are interior solutions in both dimensions(|∆i| < ` < 1 ∧ | Ω4` | < k < 1), consumer demands are illustrated in Figure 4.1:
Figure 4.1: Consumer market shares
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Note: This figure illustrates the consumer demand for a medium of type t ∈ ON,OFF of media
outlet i ∈ A,B.
The interpretation is as follows: Consumers with low values of θm choose online media
(i.e. their preferred type-style mixes are located in one of the lower two quadrants).
If, for instance, the preferred style xm of a consumer out of this group takes a larger
value than the preferred style of the pivotal consumer, he is located in the lower right
quadrant and will choose the online platform of media outlet B. Hence, the mass of
all consumers choosing an i, t-platform is reflected by the respective quadrant in the
22Note that the threshold value | Ω4` | of k is a function of the prices only rather than a function of θpivi
and the prices because Eq. (5) has already been substituted into the reaction function xpiv(θpivi ) =
1
2 −
pcA,t−pcB,t+`[(θpivA )2−(θpivB )2−2θt(θpivA −θpivB )]
2k .
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figure. This yields for the demand functions:
ncA,ON = θ
piv
A x
piv ncB,ON = θ
piv
B (1− xpiv), (8)
ncA,OFF = (1− θpivA )xpiv ncB,OFF = (1− θpivB )(1− xpiv).
Facing the demands as expressed in Eq. (8), media outlets choose the profit maximizing
prices according to their profit function (Eq. 1). This yields:
pci,ON = k︸︷︷︸
market power
− 2βON + βOFF
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
advertising externality
− ∆
2
β
9`︸︷︷︸
asymmetry
,
pci,OFF = k︸︷︷︸
market power
− βON + 2βOFF
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
advertising externality
− ∆
2
β
9`︸︷︷︸
asymmetry
, (9)
with ∆β ≡ βOFF − βON .
Equilibrium market shares and advertising prices are obtained by substituting Eq. (9)
into (5), (7)-(8) and (3):
nci,ON =
1
4
− ∆β
12`
, nci,OFF =
1
4
+
∆β
12`
, (10)
pai,ON =
βON
4
− βON∆β
12`
, pai,OFF =
βOFF
4
+
βOFF∆β
12`
.
Substituting the above results into Eq. (1) yields the following profits:
Πi = n
c
i,ON(p
c
i,ON + βON) + n
c
i,OFF (p
c
i,OFF + βOFF )− CON − COFF
=
(
1
4
− ∆β
12`
)(
k − ∆
2
β
9`
− ∆β
3
)
+
(
1
4
+
∆β
12`
)(
k − ∆
2
β
9`
+
∆β
3
)
− CON − COFF
=
1
2
k − CON − COFF . (11)
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The equilibrium of the benchmark model has the following characteristics:
Proposition 1 If oﬄine advertisements are more effective than online advertise-
ments, i.e. ∆β > 0, and the importance of type preferences is sufficiently large(
|∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1
)
,23
• oﬄine media serve a larger part of the consumer market than online media.
• oﬄine consumer prices are lower than online consumer prices.
• the advertising prices and revenues are higher in the oﬄine market.
These relations are reversed if ∆β < 0.
Proof. See Section A1 of the Appendix. From ∂2Πi,t/∂(p
c
i,t)
2 < 0 follows that the
profit function is locally concave at the equilibrium.
4.3.1 The impact of the type-dimension
The consumer prices can be structured into three distinct effects: a market power
effect, an advertising externality, and an asymmetry effect. The market power effect
increases consumer prices and represents the incentive of media outlets to capitalize
on consumers’ distance costs. The advertising externality and the asymmetry effect
reduce consumer prices and are related to the two-sided nature of the market.
The first term of the consumer prices (Eq. 9) expresses the standard result of spatial
competition models where consumers incur a disutility from not obtaining the right
product: The larger the importance k of obtaining the right style of coverage (the
higher the costs of not obtaining the right style), the higher the price. Even though k
may be sufficiently high such that, in equilibrium, consumer prices are positive, media
outlets may still have losses in the consumer sector when accounting for fixed costs.24
For the spatial competition effect, only the distance cost parameter k with respect to
23Note that the restriction on k for an interior solution to exist is always fulfilled, as, in equilibrium,
| Ω4` |= 0.
24Technically, negative consumer prices (1 ≥ βt ≥ k ≥ 0) can still be an equilibrium as long as the
revenues in the advertising market compensate for the losses in the consumer market. For instance,
some media outlets provide free services to consumers and base their profits solely on advertising
revenues. An example for this business model are free newspapers or commercial television.
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the style (which varies between A and B) is relevant. The distance cost parameter `
with respect to the type does not increase prices.
The effect of the advertising externality is represented by the second term of Eq. (9)
and comes from the positive externality of consumer demand on the revenues from the
advertising side of the market. This effect is a special trait of two-sided markets and
reduces consumer prices. A novel feature of this model is that media outlets can shift
revenues from the less profitable to the more profitable advertising market by setting
consumer prices such that more consumers are allocated in the market with the higher
ad effectiveness (which is subject to the sign of ∆β). The negative ad externality effect
is a weighted average of the ad effectiveness parameters: Regarding online prices, for
instance, the influence of βON on the advertising externality effect is twice as large
as the influence of βOFF . Therefore, the online price is lower than the oﬄine price if
βON > βOFF .
The third term of Eq. (9) represents the ad asymmetry effect that has equal effects
on online and oﬄine prices. Since advertising prices are a linear function of consumer
demand, and advertising space is normalized to 1, the advertising market in the oﬄine
medium is more (less) profitable for media outlets than the advertising market in the
online medium, if ∆β > 0 (∆β < 0). If advertisements were equally effective, the
incentive to attract consumers would be equally strong for both platforms, and the
marginal return from attracting a consumer is equal for both platforms of media outlet
i. Starting from a situation in which the ad effectiveness is equal for both types of
platforms, media outlets do not care which platform specifically to attract consumers
to. If, however, there is an asymmetry in the ad effectiveness, both media outlets
compete harder for a subset of consumers with high θmi , if oﬄine advertisements are
more effective, or with low θmi , otherwise. The larger the difference ∆β in the ad
effectiveness, the larger is both media outlets’ incentive to attract consumers to the
more profitable platform, which results in lower prices. As the consumer price of the
platform with the higher ad effectiveness is reduced, the platform of the other type
becomes relatively less attractive to consumers. Hence, media outlets have to decrease
consumer prices on their online as well as their oﬄine platform to prevent consumers
from switching to a platform of the competing media outlet. This result may already
be a pointer that media outlets might not be able to capitalize on the additional media
types dimension.
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4.3.2 Comparative statics
In this section, I analyze how an increase in the ad effectiveness βt, or an increase in the
importance ` of type preferences affect equilibrium outcomes. An increase in βt reflects
the effects of the advertising market becoming more important to media outlets:
Proposition 2 Starting from the interior equilibrium where |∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1, a marginal
increase in the ad effectiveness βt yields the following effects:
• Consumer prices of a given type decrease in their own type’s ad effectiveness. The
effect of an increase in the other type’s ad effectiveness is ambiguous for ∆β ≷ 0,
and depends on the sign of ∆β, as well as on the intensity of type preferences, `.
• Consumer market shares and advertising prices increase in their own type’s ad
effectiveness, and decrease in the ad effectiveness of the other type.
Proof. See Section A2 of the Appendix.
In a two-sided markets setup where a firm provides two platforms with one being more
valuable to consumers from one side of the market than the other platform, one would
expect firms to shift consumer demand from the less profitable to the more profitable
platform by unilaterally lowering consumer prices. In this model, however, this is not
the case. The first derivatives of consumer prices with respect to the ad effectiveness
βt show that consumer prices do not only decrease in their own type’s ad effectiveness,
but may also decrease in the other type’s ad effectiveness.25 More specifically, for the
case of oﬄine platforms yielding the higher return on the advertising market than
online platforms (∆β > 0), online consumer prices decrease in βOFF , if and only if
` >
2∆β
3
, i.e. if consumers’ utility from obtaining their preferred type is sufficiently
large. If the online ad effectiveness is larger than the oﬄine ad effectiveness (∆β < 0),
online consumer prices decrease in βOFF on the whole parameter range.
26
This is due to the evolution of consumer prices being determined by a direct and two
indirect effects. In the following, I briefly sketch the mechanism for the example of
∆β > 0.
27 If βOFF increases, oﬄine prices go down due to the direct effect of consumer
25For ∆β = 0, consumer prices of a platform of a given type unambiguously decrease in the ad
effectiveness of the other type.
26Analogically, if ∆β > 0, oﬄine consumer prices decrease in βON on the whole parameter range.
If ∆β < 0, prices decrease in βON , if and only if ` >
2∆β
3 .
27Note that oﬄine prices are always lower than online prices, if ∆β > 0.
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contacts selling at a higher price to advertisers than consumer contacts on the platform
with the lower ad effectiveness. Furthermore, ∆β becomes larger, which implies that
the average return per consumer increases. This leads to the online prices decreasing
as well, which is captured by the negative indirect effect. If, however, βON increases,
there is again a negative direct effect on online prices, but two indirect effects on
oﬄine prices, that work in different directions. An increase in βON implies (i) that the
average return per consumer increases, which is the negative indirect effect on oﬄine
prices, and (ii) ∆β becomes smaller such that it is less important for media outlets
which platform to attract consumers to. This results in a positive indirect effect
of an increase in βON on oﬄine prices. The positive indirect effect only dominates
the evolution of oﬄine prices, if consumers’ type preferences ` are sufficiently small.
However, for the largest part of the parameter range, an increase in the ad effectiveness
of any media type has negative effects on consumer prices.28
The reaction of consumer market shares to an increase in βt is such that online market
shares increase in βON , and decrease in βOFF , and vice versa for oﬄine market shares.
This is due to the direct (negative) effect dominating the indirect (negative) effect on
consumer prices: The incentive to lower consumer prices consists of two components,
out of which only one remains if the ad effectiveness of the other media type increases.
Hence, given that βOFF increases, the incentive to lower prices in the oﬄine market
is twofold, as the marginal return of advertisements increases, and price competition
increases. For the online platform, in contrast, only the competition effect plays a
role. This leads to oﬄine platforms making larger price cuts than online platforms,
and thus becoming ceteris paribus more attractive to consumers.
With respect to the profits, conventional wisdom would suggest that overall revenues
of media outlets increase if advertising space can be sold at a higher price (due to an
increase in βt). This, however, is not the case. The reason is that revenues are shifted
between the advertising and the consumer market such that the net effect of an in-
crease in the profitability of the advertising sector is zero. If advertisers are completely
inelastic, media outlets can extract the maximum surplus from them. Therefore, the
incentive to attract consumers is sufficiently strong such that, in equilibrium, the gains
from advertising revenues are mitigated by the price cuts and the resulting loss on the
consumer market.
28This is due to the losses from reducing the price for the intra-marginal units being lower than
the losses due to a reduction of the market shares if prices remained higher.
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After having analyzed the effects of the advertising market of a type-t-platform
becoming more important to media outlets, the following part is devoted to analyzing
an increase in the importance ` of type preferences. The higher `, the higher the
costs consumers have to bear when switching to their less preferred media type.
One-dimensional models would predict the following: If consumers’ distance costs
increase, firms capitalize on these distance costs, and will thus increase prices, which,
in turn, will lead to higher profits. Again, this is not the case, because this framework
accounts for additional effects that cannot be captured in one-dimensional models.
Proposition 3 Starting from the interior equilibrium where |∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1 and
∆β ≷ 0, a marginal increase in the importance ` of type preferences for consumer
utility (increase in distance costs) yields the following effects:
• Consumer prices increase.
• Market shares as well as advertising prices of the oﬄine platforms increase (de-
crease), if ∆β < 0 (∆β > 0). For online platforms, these relations are the
reverse.
If ∆β = 0, an increase in ` does not affect the equilibrium results.
Proof. See Section A3 of the Appendix.
As ` increases, the relative importance of low prices for consumers’ decision which
platform to choose, diminishes. This allows media outlets to increase the prices on all
of their platforms.29 The increase in the importance of type preferences weakens the
effect of media outlet i setting different prices on their platforms of a given style. If,
for instance, ∆β > 0, the ad effectiveness of oﬄine platforms is higher than the ad
effectiveness of online platforms, which implies that media outlet i sets lower consumer
prices in the oﬄine market than in the online market. Since the lower price of the oﬄine
platform attracts less consumers as ` increases, the oﬄine market shares decrease, if
∆β > 0. Following a similar logic, the market shares of online platforms decrease in `,
if ∆β < 0. The main reason for the effects of an increase in ` to deviate from standard
models is that any reaction to an increase in ` is subject to the ad effectiveness deviating
across media types.
29This argument is similar to one-dimensional spatial competition models where firms increase their
prices, if consumers’ demand elasticity decreases.
118
The role of online platforms for media markets
As profits only depend on the intensity k of style preferences, any effects induced by a
change in type preferences or ad effectiveness only lead to redistribution between the
online and oﬄine profits, or between the profits from advertising or from consumers,
respectively. This, however, is profit-neutral for media outlets. An increase in the
distance cost parameter in the style dimension, k, induces the same effect as in standard
models: An increase in k leads to higher prices of both firms, as well as to higher
profits.30 Hence, a key result of this section is that adding an additional dimension to
a spatial competition framework does not lead to higher profits, which contradicts the
intuition gained from one-dimensional models.
4.4 Why do firms offer online platforms?
This section is devoted to analyzing why firms enter the online market by deriving (i)
the equilibrium in which there are only oﬄine platforms, and (ii) the equilibrium in
which only one firm provides an online platform in addition to the oﬄine platforms.
4.4.1 The world without online platforms
A first step is to derive the equilibrium without an online market where both media
outlets offer only an oﬄine platform to consumers and advertisers, which obviously
yields the standard result of one-dimensional two-sided market models.31
In this setting, consumers only have to decide between the oﬄine platforms of A and
B. Hence, the pivotal consumer is indifferent between the oﬄine platforms of both
media outlets if UpivA,OFF = U
piv
B,OFF .
32 In the following, the equilibrium values of the
scenario without online platforms are denoted by ∼. Solving for x˜piv yields
n˜cA,OFF = x˜
piv =
1
2
+
pc,nB,OFF − pc,nA,OFF
2k
, n˜cB,OFF = 1− x˜piv. (12)
30Note that the derivatives with respect to k are as follows:
∂pci,t
k = 1, and
∂Πi
k =
1
2 .
31Allowing for market abstention of individuals with a high preference for online media would yield
a different equilibrium. Since such an equilibrium would not provide equal grounds for a comparison
of the models, I maintain the assumption of each consumer buying exactly one medium.
32Note that the distance costs in the type dimension do not affect consumers’ decision which
platform to choose, as consumers are assumed to single-home.
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The profit function now simplifies to:33
Π˜i = p˜
c
i,OFF n˜
c
i,OFF + p˜
a
i,OFF . (13)
Deriving the equilibrium is as in Section 4.3 and yields the following results:
p˜ci,OFF = k − βOFF , n˜ci,OFF =
1
2
,
p˜ai,OFF =
βOFF
2
, Π˜i =
1
2
k − COFF . (14)
The equilibrium of the game without online entry reflects the standard result of spatial
competition in a two-sided market. The incentive to set prices above marginal costs is
reduced by the negative externality of consumer prices on advertising revenues. The
higher the ad-effectiveness, the lower are consumer prices. As prices and the disutility
from deviating from the preferred style of coverage are equal for both platforms, both
firms serve half of the market. Again, media profits are increasing in consumers’
disutility k from obtaining the wrong style of coverage. Comparing Eq. (11) to Eq.
(14) shows immediately that profits are at least as high as in a situation in which both
firms enter the online market. Hence, there is no obvious reason why media outlets
would choose to enter the online market in the first place.
Proposition 4 If and only if ∆β < 0, i.e. online advertisements are more effective
than oﬄine advertisements, and the condition |∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1 for an interior equilibrium
on the market with online and oﬄine platforms is fulfilled, all consumer prices decrease
compared to the situation without online platforms. As there are positive fixed costs of
entering the online market (CON > 0), coordinately committing to not entering the
online market yields higher profits than entering on the whole parameter range of the
interior equilibrium.
Proof. See Section A4 of the Appendix.
Comparing the equilibrium without online platforms to the equilibrium where both
firms enter the online market, the evolution of prices is more complex than the initial
suggestion of prices increasing if consumers’ preferences can be met more accurately
33Note that the demand for advertising space is again normalized to 1.
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through offering more specialized goods (online platforms). As discussed in the pre-
vious section, media outlet i sets prices such that more consumers are allocated on
the platform with the higher ad effectiveness. The size of this effect is subject to the
weighted average of the ad effectiveness parameters βt (see second term of Eq. 9).
34
I now analyze whether average consumer prices are higher or lower in a two-dimensional
market of online and oﬄine platforms compared to a one-dimensional market in which
there are only oﬄine platforms. The result critically depends on the size of the adver-
tising externality, which, in turn, is subject to the sign of ∆β. There are two cases:
First, online platforms have a higher ad effectiveness than oﬄine platforms (average
ad effectiveness increases), and second, online platform have a lower ad effectiveness
than oﬄine platforms (average ad effectiveness decreases).
In the first case where βON > βOFF (which implies ∆β < 0), the advertising effect
is stronger on the online platforms (follows from comparing the second terms of the
consumer prices in Eq. 9). Hence, if the advertising effect on the oﬄine platform
is stronger in a two-dimensional than in a one-dimensional market, oﬄine as well as
online consumer prices are lower in a two-dimensional market. This implies that av-
erage consumer prices decrease due to the introduction of online platforms. This is
illustrated by the following example: If βON = βOFF + , with 0 <  < 1 − βOFF , the
advertising externality on oﬄine prices in the two-dimensional case yields:
βOFF + + 2βOFF
3︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad effect if ∆β<0
= βOFF +

3
> βOFF︸ ︷︷ ︸
ad effect, no online
, ⇐⇒ pci,OFF < p˜ci,OFF . (15)
This equation shows that the negative effect of the advertising externality on consumer
prices is larger in the two-dimensional than in the one-dimensional case.
As pci,ON < p
c
i,OFF , if ∆β < 0, average prices decrease when online platforms are intro-
duced.35 In other words, competition for consumers has increased as advertisements
can on average be sold at a higher price. In the second case of ∆β > 0, however, the
average ad effectiveness has decreased which leads to an increase in consumer prices.36
Comparing equilibrium consumer prices with and without online platforms, there is
an upward shift in oﬄine consumer prices, as the negative effect of the advertising
34Note that consumer prices in the case of both firms entering the online market are
pci,ON = k − 2βON+βOFF3 −
∆2β
9` and p
c
i,OFF = k − βON+2βOFF3 −
∆2β
9` .
35Note that the ad asymmetry effect (third term of Eq. 9) always reduces prices in the two-
dimensional case.
36Note that online prices are higher than oﬄine prices if oﬄine advertisements are more effective
than online advertisements.
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externality is weaker than in the one-dimensional case without online platforms. The
(negative) effect of the advertising externality is dominated by the (positive) effect of
the advertising market taking less influence on the firms’ profits, and average consumer
prices increase. This illustrates two key findings of the model: (i) The average level
of the ad effectiveness is decisive for the pricing decision of media outlets, and (ii)
consumers may benefit from the introduction of online platforms as prices decrease.
The media outlets, however, cannot benefit if both firms enter the online market. When
comparing media profits in the regime without an online market to the profits where
both firms enter, it becomes obvious that they are again only a function of the distance
cost parameter k, and the fixed costs. This confirms the intuition of the benchmark
model that any gain in the advertising market is compensated for by a loss in the
consumer market, and vice versa. This shows unequivocally that the type dimension
is irrelevant for media profits. As CON > 0, profits are lower in the case of both media
outlets entering the online market.
4.4.2 The benefits of unilaterally deviating from the equilib-
rium without online platforms
Given that entry on the online market lowers media profits, a possible explanation
for market entry is that there are gains from unilaterally deviating from the no-entry
strategy. In this context, complying means that a media outlet offers only an oﬄine
platform, and deviating means that a media outlet enters the online market. The
profits of the deviating firm are denoted by Πdeviatei , if the other firm complies, and the
profits of the complying firm are denoted by Πcomplyi , if the other firm deviates. Recall
that the profits when both firms comply are Π˜ = k
2
− COFF , and the profits if both
firms deviate are Π = k
2
−CON −COFF . Figure 4.2 illustrates the payoff matrix of the
game:
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Figure 4.2: Payoff matrix
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Note: Media outlet A (B) is player 1 (2). Πdeviatei and Π
comply
i are as in Eq. (23) and (24).
For market entry on the online market to be the result of a prisoner’s dilemma, the
following three conditions must hold:
• Condition 1: Aggregate profits from both firms complying are larger than aggre-
gate profits if both firms deviate.
• Condition 2: The gains from deviating from the equilibrium where no firm offers
an online platform must be positive for the firms that enters the online market:
Πdeviatei > Π˜i (instability of equilibrium where no firm offers online platform).
• Condition 3: The profits from being the only firm not offering an online platform
must be lower than the profits when both firms are active on both markets:
Πcomplyi < Πi (stability of equilibrium where both firms offer online and oﬄine
platforms).
It is immediately obvious from comparing equilibrium profits in Eq. (11) to Eq. (14)
that Condition 1 is fulfilled for any positive level of fixed costs of online platforms:
k
2
− COFF > k
2
− CON − COFF ⇔ CON > 0. (16)
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The remaining conditions require some more deliberation. I now discuss the case where
media outlet A is the one to deviate from offering only an oﬄine platform. Any results
are identical if B was the deviating firm, since both firms are symmetric ex ante.
If media outlet A is the only provider of advertising space, consumers can only choose
between the oﬄine platform of B or any platform of A. This implies that consumers
with a high preference for both online media (low θm) and content of style (high xm)
have the highest costs. Following the logic of the previous sections, market abstention
of consumers is not allowed for. Consumer demands can be illustrated as in Figure 4.3:
Figure 4.3: Consumer market shares, unilateral deviation
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Note: This figure illustrates the consumer demand for a medium of type t ∈ ON,OFF of media
outlet i ∈ A,B.
In the second stage, consumers choose their preferred platform out of the three options.
For the pivotal consumer whose preferred style-type mix is at the intersection of the
functions in Figure 4.3, the following three conditions must hold:
• indifference between platforms of A: UpivA,ON = UpivA,OFF
• indifference between oﬄine platforms: UpivA,OFF = UpivB,OFF
• indifference between A′s online and B′s oﬄine platform: UpivA,ON = UpivB,OFF
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The cutoff-level of type preferences (first condition) is as in Section 4.3:
θˆpivA =

1, if 0 < ` ≤ −∆A ∧∆A < 0,
1
2
− ∆A
2`
, if |∆A| < ` < 1,
0, if 0 < ` ≤ ∆A ∧∆A > 0,
(17)
with ∆A = p
c
A,ON−pcA,OFF , and hat variablesˆindicating the equilibrium where only one
firm enters the online market. Again, the argument is as in Section 4.3: If the price
difference is decisive for consumers’ decision, they will choose the cheaper medium.
Hence, for an interior equilibrium to occur, type preferences must be sufficiently strong.
Again, the location of the preferences for style and type where the pivotal consumer is
indifferent between the three available platforms is denoted by the intersection of the
two lines in Figure 4.3. After having defined the horizontal line in Eq. (17), the vertical
line is defined as follows: The pivotal consumer is indifferent between any platform of
A and the oﬄine platform of B, if
UˆpivA = Uˆ
piv
B
⇔ θpivA
[
pcA,ON + k(x
piv − xA)2 + `(θpivA − θON)2
]
+ (1− θpivA )
[
pcA,OFF + k(x
piv − xA)2 + `(θpivA − θOFF )2
]
= pcB,OFF + k(x
piv − xB)2 + `(0.5− θOFF )2. (18)
For the pivotal consumers, the distance costs with respect to the type dimension when
choosing a platform of B is the mean of the standard uniform distribution underlying
consumers’ type preferences (θmi = 0.5). Solving for the cut-off level of style preferences
yields:
xˆpiv =

1, if 0 < k ≤ −Ψ
4`
∧Ψ < 0,
1
2
− (p
c
A,ON − pcA,OFF )2
8`k︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
2pcB,OFF − pcA,ON − pcA,OFF
4k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q0
, if |Ψ
4`
| < k < 1,
0, if 0 < k ≤ Ψ
4`
∧Ψ > 0,
(19)
with Ψ ≡ (pcA,ON − pcA,OFF )2 − 2`(2pcB,OFF − pcA,ON − pcA,OFF ).
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Again, the cut-off style preference (denoted by the preferred style of the pivotal
consumer) is such that consumers with xm < xˆpiv choose any of the platforms A has
to offer whereas consumers with xm > xˆpiv choose the oﬄine platform of B.
In contrast to the basic model, A and B do not necessarily share the market equally
(see Eq. 18). In fact, this is only the case if all media platforms set the same prices.
Following the argument from the previous section of how the advertising effectiveness
parameters affects pricing, one can expect prices to differ for ∆β 6= 0, which leads to
A and B no longer sharing the market equally.
For an interior solution in both the style as well as the type dimension as in Figure
4.3, consumer demands are calculated as follows:
nˆcA,ON = θˆ
piv
A xˆ
piv, nˆcA,OFF = (1− θˆpivA )xˆpiv, nˆcB,OFF = 1− xˆpiv. (20)
The first stage of the game where media outlets set prices is as in Section 4.3. The
profit functions are now:
ΠˆA = pˆ
c
A,ON nˆ
c
A,ON + pˆ
a
A,ON nˆ
a
A,ON + pˆ
c
A,OFF nˆ
c
A,OFF + pˆ
a
A,OFF nˆ
a
A,OFF − CON − COFF ,
ΠˆB = pˆ
c
B,OFF nˆ
c
B,OFF + pˆ
a
B,OFF nˆ
a
B,OFF − COFF . (21)
Maximizing Eq. (21) with respect to pˆi,t yields:
pˆcA,ON = k −
βON + βOFF
2
− ∆
2
β
12`
, pˆcA,OFF = k −
βON + 5βOFF
6
− ∆
2
β
12`
, (22)
pˆcB,OFF = k −
βON + 5βOFF
6
− ∆
2
β
36`
.
As in the basic model, the difference between the prices of the platforms of media
outlet A is pˆcA,ON − pˆcA,OFF = ∆β3 , which is also the minimum value of ` for an interior
solution to occur.37 The interpretation of the prices of the basic model applies also in
the unilateral deviation case and is therefore not replicated in this section.
Computing the profits is as in Section 4.3 and yields:
37Note that ∆β = βOFF − βON .
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ΠˆA = Π
deviate
i =
k
2
− COFF︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π˜i
+
Θ(72`k + Θ)
2592`2k
− CON︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from deviating
, (23)
ΠˆB = Π
comply
i =
k
2
− COFF︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π˜i
− Θ(72`k −Θ)
2592`2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss from complying
, (24)
with Θ ≡ ∆β(∆β − 6`).
Proposition 5 If the condition for an interior equilibrium in the market with online
and oﬄine platforms is fulfilled, i.e. if |∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1, and the ad effectiveness in the
online market is higher than in the oﬄine market (∆β < 0), there are two alternative
cases in which an equilibrium with no firm entering the online market is not stable, and
where there is no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium of both firms being active
on both markets:
• The fixed costs CON of entering the online market are sufficiently small, and k
is sufficiently small; or
• CON is sufficiently small, k is large, and ` is sufficiently large as well.
Proof. See Section A5 of the Appendix.
The argument why fixed costs of entry to the online market need to be small is
straightforward: If fixed costs of entry to the online market were prohibitively high,
there would be no incentive for any firm enter the online market (which implies that
the equilibrium where no firm enters would be a stable one). The restriction on CON
becomes stricter the smaller the ad effectiveness in the online market (the larger ∆β).
This result is very intuitive: If advertising revenues generated on the online market
are not very large, the gains from deviating are not very large as well, and fixed costs
need to be small for entry to the online market to be profitable. Similarly, fixed costs
of entry to the online market need to be small if the influence of type preferences
on consumer utility is low. For low `, consumers have a lower willingness to pay for
obtaining their preferred type of medium and are more easily swayed by price cuts in
the competing platforms. This implies that entering the online market is less profitable
for firms and only makes sense if fixed costs are small.
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Small k implies that consumers are not strongly attached to any style of coverage
which means that providing only one type of platform is a huge disadvantage for a
firm since the lack of an online platform cannot be compensated for by specifically
targeting the style preferences of consumers. As this is the case, there is an incentive
to deviate from the equilibrium where no firm offers an online platform. If k is large,
however, consumers care more about receiving the right style of coverage, and the type
of medium becomes relatively less important. This mitigates the incentive to deviate.
If, however, type preferences ` are also high, the incentive to deviate is sufficiently
strong for each of the firms to deviate.
The restriction on ∆β, however, confirms the results of the basic model: Any gains
generated on the online market are offset by the redistribution of revenues between
the online and the oﬄine platforms such that overall revenues are unaffected. If this is
the case, firms can only benefit from deviating, if the average return on advertising is
higher than the return on advertising on oﬄine platforms. Hence, the ad effectiveness
on the new online platform must be higher. As the advertising price is a function of
consumer demand, the only requirement for firms to achieve a high price is to lower
consumer prices in order to increase consumer demand. This only makes sense if
the gains from lowering consumer prices in the new medium are higher than in the
old medium. As the average ad effectiveness determines the size of the gains from
deviating, there is no incentive to enter the online market, if the return a consumer on
the online platform yields on the advertising market is ceteris paribus lower than the
return per consumer on the oﬄine platform.
Overall, however, the parameter range in which firms are in a prisoner’s dilemma
is quite substantial. This may explain why one can observe firms having entered the
online market although their total profits did not increase. I rule out equilibria in
which firms cooperatively commit to non-entry into the online market, as both firms
gain from deviating. As the content has already been generated oﬄine, it is plausible
to assume that the fixed costs of going online are not prohibitively high. Furthermore,
it may be the case that media outlets cannot correctly anticipate the gains from
deviating, and may overestimate them. As each firm may have different expectations
of the profitability of online platforms, cooperation between the platforms is difficult.
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4.5 Discussion
In this section, I discuss how relaxing some of the model’s underlying assumptions
affects the key results. One of the equilibrium outcomes that may strike as odd is that
the market size has not increased due to the introduction of the online market. If the
market had become larger, prices and profits would presumably have evolved differently,
and the entrance on the online market might not have been profit-reducing after all.
In order to capture the effects of alternative demand structures on the consumer side
of the market, I analyze multi-homing and market abstention of consumers. Without
analytically deriving the equilibrium for the market-abstention scenario, I give some
intuition on how market outcomes change. Furthermore, I discuss whether a change
in the sequence of moves in the first and second stage of the game leads to different
outcomes, and how introducing asymmetry between the media outlets A and B alters
the results.
Multi-homing consumers
Multi-homing of consumers implies that consumers may choose more than one platform
at a time. As the assumption that consumers do not consume content of the same
style twice still holds, multi-homing consumers can only choose the online or the oﬄine
platform of A combined with a platform of B. A consumer only decides to multi-
home, if consuming each of the two platforms yields a positive net utility.38 When
online platforms are introduced, consumers sort into online platforms according to
their type preferences, as illustrated in Figure 4.4.
38As the platforms are located at the margins of the style distribution, multi-homing only arises, if
the consumer with the median style preferences decides to multi-home, since for all other consumers,
the distance to the ”second-best” platform is larger.
129
The role of online platforms for media markets
Figure 4.4: Market shares with multi-homing consumers
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Note: This figure shows one possible distribution of market shares when online platforms are
introduced. x˜pivB,OFF indicates the preferred style of the consumer who, in the case without
online platforms, is indifferent between consuming both platforms and consuming only the
oﬄine platform of media outlet A (UpivA,OFF = U
piv
A,OFF +U
piv
B,OFF ). The same reasoning applies
to the other cutoff-levels of style preferences.
It may be the case that aggregate market shares (i.e. the market shares of media
outlets A and B of each of their platforms) do not change due to the introduction of
online platforms. For such a situation to occur, the number of multi-homing consumers
must not change compared to the situation without online platforms. In this case, the
net effect of online platforms on media outlets’ revenues is zero as in the benchmark
model of this chapter. When online platforms are introduced, consumers ceteris paribus
maintain their choice in the style dimension (platform A or B or both platforms), but
choose the type of the platforms such that their distance costs are minimized. As,
however, the introduction of online platforms not only alters the distance costs but
also the prices of the platforms, in equilibrium, the above condition may be violated,
such that the market size changes: If average consumer prices increase, the number of
multi-homing consumers becomes smaller, and vice versa for decreasing prices.
Figure 4.5 illustrates for different levels of the type dimension’s importance ` and for the
full range of βt how market size and aggregate profits of media outlets change when
online platforms are introduced. The mathematical derivation of the multi-homing
equilibria can be found in Section A6 of the Appendix.
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Figure 4.5: Market size and revenues under multi-homing
` ∈ (1/6, 1] ` = 0.1 ` = 0.01 
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Note: This figure illustrates the change in market size on the consumer market as well as the
change in media outlets’ revenues, if online platforms are introduced, for given level of style
preferences k = 1 and different levels of type preferences `. The parameter ranges in which
the market size as well as the revenues increase due to the introduction of online platforms are
denoted by the blue areas. The red areas indicate a drop in market size and revenues.
In the case where online markets exist, the market size consists of the aggregate market
shares of both media outlets on the online as well as the oﬄine market. The market
size in the case with (without) online platforms is denoted by ncMH (n˜
c
MH). Following
the same logic, aggregate media revenues in the case with (without) online platforms
are indicated by ΠMH (Π˜MH). Deriving the market size as well as the revenues before
and after the introduction of online platforms from numerical simulations confirms
two main features of the benchmark model with single-homing: (i), Revenues only
change if the market size changes, i.e. sign(∆n,MH) = sign(∆Π,MH), with ∆n,MH ≡
ncMH − n˜cMH and ∆Π,MH ≡ ΠcMH − Π˜cMH , and (ii), the level k of style preferences is
irrelevant for the change in revenues, i.e. the locus of parameter combinations where
the sign of ∆n,MH and ∆Π,MH changes is independent of k. It is important to note
that the simulation displays media outlets’ revenues rather than their profits (e.g.
CON = COFF = 0).
39 Hence, as CON > 0, the parameter range of the multi-homing
scenario yielding qualitatively the same results with respect to the profits of media
outlets as the single-homing scenario is larger than displayed in Figure 4.5.
39In the single-homing benchmark, the revenues do not change after introducing online platforms.
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There are two possible scenarios in which multi-homing of consumers leads to an in-
crease in market size and thus to an increase in media outlets’ revenues:
• The ad effectiveness in the online market is higher than in the oﬄine market, i.e.
∆β < 0.
40
• The importance ` of type preferences is small, and ∆β > 0 and sufficiently large.
The change in market size can be explained in two steps: First, I discuss how the iden-
tity of the pivotal consumer shifts for a given change in consumer prices, and second,
I provide reasoning for the plausibility of consumer prices evolving as suggested.
The evolution of the market size follows a simple mechanism: If average consumer
prices increase due to the introduction of online platforms, the market size decreases,
and the qualitative results with respect to the profitability of online platforms are as
in the benchmark model with single-homing. If, however, average prices decrease be-
cause online platforms are introduced, more consumers multi-home, which increases the
market size and leads to higher profits. For instance, in the case of increasing average
consumer prices, the two previous pivotal consumers with style preferences x˜pivA,OFF and
x˜pivB,OFF who could afford to multi-home before the introduction of online platforms,
now decide to single-home, which implies that xpivA,OFF < x˜
piv
A,OFF and x
piv
B,OFF > x˜
piv
B,OFF
(see Figure 4.4). Hence, each media outlet loses market shares (the dark blue area in
the right panel of Figure 4.4 becomes smaller than in the left panel), and the aggregate
market size decreases.
There is some reason to assume that consumer prices evolve analogically to the single-
homing scenario. If online advertisements are more effective than oﬄine advertise-
ments, average consumer prices decrease, as media outlets’ incentive to set low con-
sumer prices has become stronger.41 This explains the decrease in prices for ∆β < 0.
If ` is high, consumers can less easily switch between online and oﬄine platforms,
and media outlets are thus able to charge higher prices. Consequently, if ` is small,
consumers can more easily afford to multi-home, i.e. the benefit from consuming an
additional platform is larger than the costs which leads to an increase in market size
and revenues. Furthermore, if ∆β > 0 and sufficiently large, which is the case at the
40The parameter range in which ∆β < 0 is indicated by the area below the line through the origin
in each panel of Figure 4.5.
41This is due to the incentive to set low consumer prices consisting of two parts: the direct incentive
to attract more consumers, and the indirect incentive to generate higher revenues from advertising, as
the advertising price pai increases in the number of consumers. The latter incentive becomes stronger
if the average ad effectiveness increases, which is the case for ∆β < 0.
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upper left corners of each panel in Figure 4.5, media outlets compete harder for the
subset of consumers on the platform that yields higher advertising prices than in the
case of ∆β → 0. If this coincides with low levels of `, consumer prices decrease as
online platforms are introduced. The lower `, the less pronounced must the difference
in the level of ad effectiveness be for prices to decrease. Overall, for some parameter
combinations, it might be the case that allowing for multi-homing consumers alters
the results of the benchmark model with single-homing such that the introduction of
online platforms leads to higher profits.
When discussing a scenario with multi-homing, it is essential to account for the impli-
cations for the advertising market. Given the benchmark setup of one multi-homing
side (advertisers), and one single-homing side (consumers) as in Section 4.3, one might
expect the additional surplus media outlets extract from the advertisers to be partially
passed on to the consumers. Having multi-homing consumers and multi-homing ad-
vertisers is a scenario that is difficult to justify when modeling the interaction of media
outlets and advertisers. If a single advertisement was sufficient to reach all consumers,
there would be no competitive bottleneck allowing the provider of the platform to ex-
tract an additional surplus from the advertisers. Hence, there would be no network
effects between the sides of the market.42 As there is convincing empirical evidence
for the existence of these network effects, the simplifying assumption of single-homing
consumers as in Manduchi and Picard (2010) is introduced.43
Market abstention of consumers
In a market abstention-scenario, consumers with type preferences below a certain
threshold have not been on the market when there were only oﬄine platforms. Pro-
viding an analytical solution to this scenario is beyond the scope of this model, but
I give some intuition for the effects that may arise in equilibrium. The following fig-
ure illustrates how consumer market shares could evolve in equilibrium, if consumers
abstained from the market before online platforms were introduced.
42See for instance Armstrong (2006) for a discussion of the network effects between the market
sides, or Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) for a discussion of the effects of introducing multi-homing
viewers in a framework with ad-averse consumers.
43For empirical evidence on the spillover effects between the sides of the market, see for instance
Wilbur (2008).
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Figure 4.6: Market abstention of consumers
 
ߠ஺,ைிி௣௜௩  
ߠ஺,ைே௣௜௩  
ߠ஻,ைிி௣௜௩
ߠ஻,ைே௣௜௩
ݔ஺,ைிி௣௜௩ ݔ஻,ைிி௣௜௩  
ݔ஻,ைே௣௜௩  ݔ஺,ைே௣௜௩
ܣ, ܱܰ ܤ, ܱܰ
ܣ, ܱܨܨ ܤ, ܱܨܨ
ݔ஺ = 0 ݔ஻ = 1
ߠைிி = 1 
ߠைே = 0 
o f
f l i
n e
	 m
a r
k e
t 	
o n
l i n
e 	
m
a r
k e
t 	
Note: This figure illustrates the market shares of the online as well as the oﬄine platforms of A
and B if the reservation utility of consumers is sufficiently low for market abstention to occur in
equilibrium. The part of the figure above the dashed line represents the situation before online
markets are introduced, and the whole figure illustrates the equilibrium market shares for both
online and oﬄine platforms.
In the case where only oﬄine platforms are available (upper part of Figure 4.6), con-
sumers with a high preference for online media with θm < θ
piv
i,OFF do not enter the
market, and neither do individuals who have intermediate style preferences that lead
to large distance costs in the style dimension. The cutoff-levels in the style as well as the
type dimension for a type-t platform are calculated by setting Ui,t = 0 and solving for
xpivi,t and θ
piv
i,t , respectively. Hence, the cutoff-levels in the oﬄine market remain the same
when online platforms are introduced. For aggregate market shares to increase due to
the introduction of online platforms, it must either be the case that θpivA,ON , x
piv
A,ON ∈ (0, 1]
which implies that the market shares of A increase, or θpivB,ON , (1− xpivB,ON) ∈ (0, 1], for
B’s market shares to increase.
Given that one or both of these conditions are fulfilled, and the market size goes up due
to the introduction of online platforms, media outlets’ profits increase, if the gain on
the online platform of media outlet i is larger than the fixed costs CON . Under these
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circumstances, the results of the benchmark model that entry to the online market
lowers media outlets’ profits, cannot be restored.
Still, empirical evidence suggests that the central assumption of consumers abstaining
from the market is difficult to justify as it is highly unlikely for an individual not to
be exposed to any kind of media. George (2008), for instance, shows in an empirical
study of the newspaper market that consumers have switched from the oﬄine to the
online market, which strongly supports the framework of this model. For television,
the fraction of frequent viewers comprises almost the entire population. For instance,
a study by the European Interactive Advertising Association and Mediascope Europe
(2010) finds that 94% of the European population watches television in a given week.
The fraction of individuals claiming to read a newspaper is 62%, and 53% of the
individuals use an online platform.44
Given the empirical evidence, the most plausible assumption is that individuals who
choose online media have previously participated in the market, which implies that
the switching-scenario of the main model is valid where gains in market shares on the
online market are compensated for by losses on the oﬄine market. A recent study
of the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism for the American media market also
confirms the audience switch from oﬄine to online media: Online platforms’ audience
has increased by 17.1% from 2009 to 2010. In the same period, print media (newspapers
and magazines) have experienced a drop in audience of 13.9%, and audio-visual media
lost 24.6% of their audience.45 Figure 4.7 depicts a similar scenario for German media
markets:
44Data based on a survey among 12,554 individuals, > 16 years old. Data source: European
Interactive Advertising Association and Mediascope Europe (2010).
45See Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism (2011b).
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Figure 4.7: Percentage change in media use per day, Germany 2006-2011
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Note: This figure illustrates how media use per platforms in minutes per day has changed from
2006 to today. Data for 2011 are based on a forecast. Data source: eco - Verband der deutschen
Internetwirtschaft e.V. (2010).
The figure shows that, starting from a 100-% level in 2006, the minutes per day of
traditional oﬄine media use (television and print) has decreased steadily. It even is
the case that the sum of the losses of the oﬄine media roughly equals the gain of the
online media which clearly indicates that there has been some switching from oﬄine
to online media.46 This empirical observation is perfectly in line with the effects of
an increase in the importance of type preferences on the demand for online and oﬄine
platforms (Eq. 10), as denoted by `.
Relevance of Prisoner’s dilemma
The parameter range derived in Section 4.4 in which firms are in a prisoner’s dilemma
shows that the ad effectiveness needs to be higher in the online market. This result is
confirmed by a number of empirical studies that show that novel targeting technolo-
gies have in fact increased ad effectiveness above the level of traditional advertisements
(Ratliff and Rubinfeld, 2010; Evans, 2009; Chandra and Kaiser, 2011; Athey and Gans,
46See also Figure 1.4 of Chapter 1 for an illustration of the primary news source of individuals in
the U.S..
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2010; Athey et al., 2011). The reasoning is that in the online market, targeting tech-
nologies are far more accurate than in the oﬄine market, which guarantees that each
consumer is exposed to advertisements that are in line with his preferences deducted
from the contents he has previously consumed in the web.
However, targeting and tracking technologies run the risk of becoming regulated: Gold-
farb and Tucker (2011b) show that once targeting technologies are subject to regulation
due to breaching the privacy of media users, the ad effectiveness in the online markets
goes down. Regulation is currently in place in the EU, and chances are that more
countries are yet to follow. It may still be hard for the legislator to meet the pace
of technological progress, but online platform certainly may have to keep focussing on
other techniques to increase consumers’ awareness.
Asymmetry
Another thought experiment that might generate interesting insights is to allow for
A and B being asymmetric. So far, there has only been asymmetry between the on-
line and the oﬄine market which induced the media outlets to subsidize the platform
with the higher ad effectiveness by setting lower consumer prices. There are, however,
several other ways to introduce asymmetry between the two media outlets: They op-
erate with different cost functions, consumers’ distance costs vary with respect to the
platform, or the ad effectiveness is different across media styles instead of types. An
additional way of introducing asymmetry would be to change the location of platforms.
The scenario with asymmetric costs of content production is only relevant if there were
variable cost of media use. As an additional consumer causes essentially no costs online
or when watching television, and the costs of paper and ink are quite low, the assump-
tion of variable costs of zero has been established in the literature and is essentially
uncontested. So media outlets may only vary in the fixed costs of generating content
which are already accounted for in this model, and which do not affect equilibrium
prices and quantities.47 As long as media outlets have positive fixed costs of entry to
the online market, entering lowers their profits. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the
media outlet with the lower fixed costs of entry to the online market has the larger
incentive to deviate from the oﬄine-only equilibrium.
A scenario with asymmetric distance costs will lead to an equilibrium where one
medium sets higher prices on both platforms, serves the larger market and has higher
47See Chapter 2 for a model of endogenous choice of the style of coverage, with the media outlets
operating with different cost functions of content productions.
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profits.48 Still, the distribution of market shares between A and B remains unaffected
by the introduction of online platforms. As the analysis in Section 4.3 has shown, there
are no gains from offering two instead of one platforms of a given type. If both firms
are technically able to enter the online market and cannot be prevented from doing so,
the qualitative effect with respect to the profits will remain the same.
The only scenario that can affect the results is the one where each of the four plat-
forms has a different ad effectiveness. For some specific configuration there exists an
equilibrium where one media outlet benefits from both firms offering online platforms.
This can only be the case if the firm ex ante serving the larger part of the market
serves the smaller part of the market after introducing online platforms. If, for
instance, βA,OFF > βB,OFF , then p
c
A,OFF < p
c
B,OFF and nA,OFF > nB,OFF before the
introduction. If the ordering of the ad effectiveness parameters after the introduction
of online platforms is βB,ON > βA,OFF > βB,OFF > βA,ON , the relation of aggregate
market shares between A and B will be reversed. This holds only if the gain in the
online market overcompensates the loss in the oﬄine market, which leads to firm A
being the net beneficiary from introducing online media.
However, there are some severe reservations about the plausibility of this scenario.
For this scenario to hold, online advertisements must be more effective than oﬄine
ads but only for firm A. For B, oﬄine advertisements are more effective. There may
be some arguments in favor of advertisements in B being less effective than in A. One
might for instance expect users of B to be more consumption-critical than in A. Still,
it is hard to rationalize why the effectiveness of oﬄine and online advertisements is
conditional on the style of coverage. There may be some example that justify this way
of modeling but a consistent ranking of the ad effectiveness parameters (for instance,
βA,t > βB,t ∧ βi,OFF > βi,ON) seems way more plausible.
As long as the ranking of the ad effectiveness parameters is consistent, it is sufficient to
model asymmetry in only one dimension. An asymmetry such that medium i has an
advantage over his competitor (which implies that i’s online as well as oﬄine platform
has a higher ad effectiveness than the competitor’s platforms) would just lead to i
serving the larger part of the market in both of the scenarios, and the net effect of
online platforms being zero.
48See Chapter 2 for the analysis of a scenario where the distance costs to one of the two media
platforms changes. The media outlet with the lower distance costs charges higher prices in equilibrium,
and serves the larger part of the market which, in turn, leads to higher profits.
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In the scenario with βt varying only with respect to the type of platform as in
the benchmark model, there is one additional way of introducing asymmetry between
the media outlets, which has not yet been discussed: Media outlets may locate asym-
metrically on the Hotelling line when choosing their style of coverage. As discussed
previously, any deviation from maximum differentiation in the style dimension would
only affect the results, if this asymmetric equilibrium was stable. An asymmetric
equilibrium, however, cannot be stable in this setup, as the following thought ex-
periment illustrates: If, for instance, there was only maximum differentiation in the
type dimension (θON = 0 and θOFF = 1 as in this model), and some deviation from
maximum differentiation in the style dimension (say, for instance, xA = 0 + a and
xB = 1 − b), overall market shares would be equal if a = b. So there would be an
incentive for both media outlets to choose a style closer to the center of the distribution
than the competitor if a ≶ b, and thus to gain market shares which obviously increases
their profits. This eventually leads to minimum differentiation in the style dimension.
The model results, however, are exactly the same as the market is splitted evenly
between A and B. I assume maximum differentiation in the style dimension, since it is
unlikely for media outlets to offer identical platforms. Many models have shown that
maximum differentiation arises in a one-dimensional spatial competition model.49 As
there has obviously been a world before online media in which product differentiation
was one-dimensional, there is no reason to assume that platforms have substantially
changed in their style of coverage, since the style of coverage is the central recognition
value of a media platform. The model results are not at all affected by assuming
maximum differentiation in both dimensions, which is why I stick to the assumption of
maximum differentiation in the style dimension. Furthermore, it is way more realistic
than assuming a dramatic shift in the style of platforms after introducing the online
market.
Stackelberg game in the first stage and sequential consumer decisions in the
second stage
Taking a look at the timing of the game in the benchmark model, one might suppose
that model results change if there was a sequence of decisions in the second stage.
This, however, is not the case.
In this model, media outlets A and B are symmetric in a sense that none of them has
higher costs than the opponent, or provides a different amount of advertising space.
49See the strand of literature following (D’Aspremont et al., 1979).
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Due to this simplifying assumption, the following holds: Given that types are chosen
prior to styles, the consumer with pivotal type preferences will be located slightly
below (above) θpiv = 0.5, if ∆β > 0 (∆β < 0).
50 If the decision with respect to the
style of coverage is made in the second stage of the game for given type preferences,
the market will be split evenly between A and B. It is, however, important to note
that the sequence is only irrelevant if A and B do not differ systematically. The same
argument holds if styles were chosen prior to types.
Regarding the evolution of online platforms one might suggest that a simultane-
ous entry game is not realistic as some media outlets seem to have entered before their
competitors. Modeling a game in with sequential entry, however, yields qualitatively
the same results as the simultaneous move game. Furthermore, the standard result of
Bertrand Stackelberg games of the first-mover having lower profits than the second-
mover is still valid in a multi-dimensional two-sided market. The leader sets higher
prices and serves the smaller part of the market than the follower, and his profits are
lower, but still higher than in the case of simultaneous entry:
pc,sB,t > p
c,s
A,t > p
c
i,t, n
c,s
A,t > n
c
i,t > n
c,s
B,t, Π
s
A > Π
s
B > Πi, (25)
with superscript s denoting the sequential game. The revenues of both media outlets
do not change when introducing online platforms, but due to the fixed costs, the profits
are lower if firms enter the online market. This result is exactly the same as in the
simultaneous move game. The derivation of the sequential equilibrium is as in Section
4.3 and can be found in Section A7 of the Appendix.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter explains why media outlets enter the online market, despite the fact that
entering does not increase their profits. Although online platforms are better suited
than oﬄine platforms to meet the preferences of some consumers, they do not provide
grounds for reaping higher profits. Even in the case of consumers prices increasing due
to the introduction of online platforms, media outlets are unable to capitalize on this
50The intuition is as in Section 4.3: If for instance ∆β > 0, oﬄine advertising space can be sold at a
higher price, which leads to lower oﬄine consumer prices. Given that A and B are not systematically
different, consumers are biased towards the cheaper medium s.t. the pivotal consumer’s type preference
θpiv < 0.5, which implies a bias towards the cheaper medium.
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price increase. This key finding is robust to a variety of model modifications.
The model predicts that any gains in the online ad market are neutralized by price
cuts in the consumer markets. As consumers are not likely to consume two varieties
(online and oﬄine) of a medium of the same style at a given time, media outlets are
always reducing their share of the cake by providing two types of the same style. Still,
there is a way to circumvent consumers’ inclination to single-home: It may be possible
to offer access to the online platform conditional on choosing the oﬄine platform as
well. This works only if there is an additional type-specific benefit for consumers
from consuming both platforms.51 A possible example may be adding local services,
as weather forecasts, traffic alerts, or local news which are equally appreciated by
consumers of different style preferences. Recent estimations by the Pew Internet &
American Life Project suggest that already around 20% of the total population in the
U.S. uses mobile devices like e-readers (12%) and tablets (8%).52 Furthermore, 39%
of the total U.S. population is estimated to own a smartphone. Hence, there surely
is some potential for bundling strategies to increase the oﬄine platforms’ profits. The
requirements for profits to increase due to this instrument are that multi-homing of
content of the same style is allowed in combination with a binding commitment to
consume the oﬄine platform, and that prices are set such that consumers do not
switch to a platform of the competitor. Still, if distance costs or consumer prices are
sufficiently low, consumers may not only consume the bundle of media outlet i but also
a platform of the competitor. This may lead to a break-down of the advertising side of
the market as less advertisements are required to reach all consumers (no competitive
bottleneck as discussed in Section 4.5). Hence, the additional negative externality of
introducing a bundle of online and oﬄine platforms on revenues from advertising has
to be taken into account when media outlets choose their prices.
In theory, there are various instruments online platforms can use to compensate the
drop in oﬄine revenues:53 by offering online subscriptions, subscriptions on e-readers
as the iPad or Amazon’s Kindle, mobile phone apps,54 or by e-replica editions (offering
exactly the same content online, as studied in this chapter). Which one of these different
51Some oﬄine media already offer package deals for their users: Take for example the German
tabloid ”BILD Zeitung” which offers a tablet version of its oﬄine content to its subscribers. As
this instrument has been introduced only recently, the profitability could not yet be evaluated. An
example on the television market is the pay-TV-channel CNN who offers online live streams to oﬄine
subscribers.
52estimate based on a survey of 2277 individuals. See Purcell (2011).
53According to a recent study by the Pew Research center, newspaper ad revenues in the U.S. have
dropped by 25% from 2008 to 2009, and paid newspaper circulation has dropped by 10.6% (U.S.) and
5.6% (Europe) in the same time period. See Santhanam and Rosenstiel (2011) for full report.
54software application that allows mobile devices to access online contents
141
The role of online platforms for media markets
types of online platforms will eventually dominate the market, or whether there will
be several types coexisting will become clear in the years to come. It seems as if media
outlets, especially the major media holdings, are still experimenting with a variety of
different online platforms. Some larger news corporation as CNN and The Chicago
Tribune already offer several forms of online platforms: apps for the Apple app store,
Android apps for Google, and e-replica for their own websites.55 So it may finally be
the size of the corporation that determines who will dominate the online market as
some smaller media outlets simply lack the financial means to enter the competition
for market shares.
By choosing the appropriate form of making content accessible online, it is essential
to take into account how competition between and within media outlets is affected.
Once all the externalities are accounted for, the possibilities are limited but may lead
to online platforms eventually increasing media profits.
55See Olmstead et al. (2011) for a recent survey by the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism.
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Appendix
A1: Proof of Proposition 1
Comparing the equilibrium values from Eq. (9) - (10) yields
pci,OFF − pci,ON =
∆β
6`
, nci,OFF − nci,ON =
∆β
3
,
pai,OFF − pai,ON =
∆β(3`+ βON + βOFF )
12`
. (A1)
Note that revenues from the advertising market are a linear transformation of consumer
market shares. For ∆β > 0 (∆β < 0), Eq. A1 are positive (negative).

A2: Proof of Proposition 2
The first derivatives of the equilibrium values (Eq. 9 - 10) with respect to βt are:
∂pci,ON
∂βON
=
2∆β
9`
− 2
3
,
∂pci,OFF
∂βOFF
= −2∆β
9`
− 2
3
,
∂pci,ON
∂βOFF
= −2∆β
9`
− 1
3
,
∂pci,OFF
∂βON
=
2∆β
9`
− 1
3
,
∂nci,ON
∂βON
=
1
12`
,
∂nci,ON
∂βOFF
= − 1
12`
,
∂pai,ON
∂βON
=
1
4
− ∆β + βON
12`
,
∂pai,ON
∂βOFF
= −βON
12`
,
∂pai,OFF
∂βOFF
=
1
4
+
∆β + βOFF
12`
,
∂pai,OFF
∂βON
= −βOFF
12`
. (A2)
Note that |∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1.
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• If ∆β > 0,
∂pci,ON
∂βON
< 0,
∂pci,OFF
∂βOFF
< 0,
∂pci,ON
∂βOFF
< 0,
∂pci,OFF
∂βON
< 0 ∀ 2∆β
3
< ` ≤ 1 ∧ ∂p
c
i,OFF
∂βON
> 0 ∀ ∆β
3
< ` ≤ 2∆β
3
,
∂nci,ON
∂βON
> 0,
∂nci,ON
∂βOFF
< 0,
∂pai,ON
∂βON
> 0,
∂pai,OFF
∂βOFF
> 0,
∂pai,ON
∂βOFF
< 0,
∂pai,OFF
∂βON
< 0.
• If ∆β < 0,
∂pci,ON
∂βON
< 0,
∂pci,OFF
∂βOFF
< 0,
∂pci,ON
∂βOFF
< 0 ∀ − 2∆β
3
< ` ≤ 1 ∧ ∂p
c
i,ON
∂βOFF
> 0 ∀ − ∆β
3
< ` ≤ −2∆β
3
,
∂pci,OFF
∂βON
< 0,
∂nci,ON
∂βON
> 0,
∂nci,ON
∂βOFF
< 0,
∂pai,ON
∂βON
> 0,
∂pai,OFF
∂βOFF
> 0,
∂pai,ON
∂βOFF
< 0,
∂pai,OFF
∂βON
< 0.
Note that if the online (oﬄine) consumer market shares increase in βt, the oﬄine
(online) market shares decrease, as the consumer market is always covered.

A3: Proof of Proposition 3
The first derivatives of the equilibrium values (Eq. 9 - 10) with respect to βt are:
∂pci,ON
∂`
=
∆2β
9`2
,
∂pci,OFF
∂`
=
∆2β
9`2
,
∂nci,ON
∂`
=
∆β
12`2
,
∂nci,OFF
∂`
= − ∆β
12`2
,
∂pai,ON
∂`
=
∆ββON
12`2
,
∂pai,OFF
∂`
= −∆
2
ββOFF
12`2
. (A3)
Note that |∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1.
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• If ∆β > 0,
∂pci,ON
∂`
> 0,
∂pci,OFF
∂`
> 0,
∂nci,ON
∂`
> 0,
∂nci,OFF
∂`
< 0,
∂pai,ON
∂`
> 0,
∂pai,OFF
∂`
< 0.
• If ∆β < 0,
∂pci,ON
∂`
> 0,
∂pci,OFF
∂`
> 0,
∂nci,ON
∂`
< 0,
∂nci,OFF
∂`
> 0,
∂pai,ON
∂`
< 0,
∂pai,OFF
∂`
> 0.

A4: Proof of Proposition 4
Note that |∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1.
pci,ON − p˜ci,ON = k −
2βON + βOFF
3
− ∆
2
β
9`
− k + βON = −∆β(3`−∆β)
9`
,
pci,OFF − p˜ci,OFF = k −
βON + 2βOFF
3
− ∆
2
β
9`
− k + βOFF = −∆β(3`−∆β)
9`
,
Πi − Π˜i = 1
2
k − CON − COFF − 1
2
k + COFF = −CON . (A4)
As ∆β < 0 and CON > 0, Eq. A4 is negative.

A5: Proof of Proposition 5
This proof shows that there exists a well-defined parameter range in which firms face
a prisoner’s dilemma. The first step towards determining this parameter range is to
recall the necessary conditions as in Section 4.5:
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Condition II: Show that unilateral deviation from offering only oﬄine content is
profitable.
Πdeviatei = Π˜i
⇔ k
2
− COFF + Θ(72jk + Θ)
2592`2k
− CON > k
2
− COFF
⇔ CON < Θ(72jk + Θ)
2592`2k
. (A5)
Condition III: Show that unilateral deviation from an equilibrium where both firms
offer online as well as oﬄine platforms is not profitable.
Πcomply = Πi
⇔ k
2
− COFF − Θ(72jk −Θ)
2592`2k
<
k
2
− CON − COFF
⇔ CON < Θ(72jk −Θ)
2592`2k
. (A6)
Note that Θ ≡ ∆β(∆β − 6`), as well as ∆β ≡ βOFF − βON .
In the following, it has to be proven that these conditions are fulfilled, recalling that
there are some additional assumptions regarding the model parameters:
0 < k ≤ 1, ∆β
3
< ` ≤ 1, 0 < βON ≤ 1, 0 < βOFF ≤ 1.
Furthermore, fixed costs of market entry on online market are defined to be strictly
positive s.t.
Θ(72jk + Θ)
2592`2k
> 0 ∧ Θ(72jk −Θ)
2592`2k
> 0. (A7)
If Eqs. (A5), (A6), and (A7) hold, media firms are in a prisoner’s dilemma. In the
following, I show for which parameter range this is the case.
The denominators of Eqs. (A7) are always positive. Hence, the numerator of both
terms must also be positive for the whole term to be positive. The following two cases
show parameter ranges within which the nominators are positive.
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Case 1: Θ > 0 ∧ (72jk+ Θ) > 0 ∧ (72jk−Θ) > 0
For Θ = ∆β(∆β − 6`) > 0, one of the following conditions must hold:
• ∆β > 0 ∧ (∆β − 6`) > 0.
Positive ∆β requires that ` <
∆β
6`
. This condition is never fulfilled, as it is not in
the parameter range of an interior solution on Stage 3 of the game (see eq. 17:
` >
∆β
3
).
• ∆β < 0 ∧ (∆β − 6`) < 0.
Negative ∆β requires ` >
∆β
6
, which is always fulfilled in the relevant parameter
range.
Hence, Θ > 0, and it has to be shown that the two additional conditions also
hold. While this is immediately obvious for (72jk + Θ) > 0, the second part of
(72jk −Θ) > 0 can be rearranged as follows, with Θ = ∆β(∆β − 6`):
72jk > ∆β(∆β − 6`) ⇔ ` >
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆2β
6(12k + ∆β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≷0
(A8)
If the denominator is negative (k <
|∆β |
12
), this condition is always fulfilled, as the
interior equilibrium only exists if ` is sufficiently large (the lower bound of the
parameter range is
∆β
3
). This implies that, for small k, there is no restriction on
`. So the only critical case is when the denominator is positive, which implies
that k >
|∆β |
12
. For large k, ` must be sufficiently large.
The next step is to check how large this threshold is relative to the lower bound
of the parameter range for an interior solution:
∆2β
6(12k + ∆β)
<
∆β
3
⇔ ∆β
12k + ∆β
> 2 (A9)
As this condition is never fulfilled, there are two possible parameter ranges, for
which all of the necessary conditions for a prisoner’s dilemma are fulfilled:
1. ∆β < 0 ∧ CON < Θ(72jk−Θ)2592`2k ∧ k <
|∆β |
12
or
2. ∆β < 0 ∧ CON < Θ(72jk−Θ)2592`2k ∧ k >
|∆β |
12
∧ ` > ∆
2
β
6(12k+∆β)
.
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Case 2: Θ < 0 ∧ (72jk+ Θ) < 0 ∧ (72jk−Θ) < 0
For Θ = ∆β(∆β − 6`) < 0, one of the following conditions must hold:
• ∆β > 0 ∧ (∆β − 6`) < 0.
In the case of positive ∆β, the condition of ` >
∆β
6
is always fulfilled in the
relevant parameter range.
Since Θ < 0, for the nominator to be positive, (72jk+Θ) < 0 and (72jk−Θ) < 0
must also hold. The latter condition, however, can never be fulfilled:
72 jk︸︷︷︸
`,k∈(0,1]
< Θ︸︷︷︸
<0
. (A10)
• ∆β < 0 ∧ (∆β − 6`) > 0.
The last case has negative ∆β, which requires ` <
∆β
6
. As this is not in the
relevant parameter range, this cannot be a solution.
Hence, only for the parameter ranges under Case 1 fixed costs are positive, the equi-
librium where both firms comply is unstable, and there is no incentive to deviate from
the equilibrium where both firms offer an online as well as an oﬄine platform.

A6: Derivation of equilibrium with multi-homing
Equilibrium with online and oﬄine platforms
The derivation of the pivotal type-preferences is as in Section 4.3, where, for
|∆β
3
| < ` ≤ 1,
θpivi =
`+ pci,OFF − pci,ON
2`
. (A11)
From setting Upivi,t = 0 and solving for x
piv
i,t follows:
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ncA,ON = θ
piv
A x
piv
B,ON + θ
piv
A (x
piv
A,ON − xpivB,ON)
=
(`+ pcA,OFF − pcA,ON)
√
1− (`+p
c
A,OFF−pcA,ON )2
4`
− pcA,ON
2`
√
k
ncB,ON = θ
piv
B (1− xpivA,ON) + θpivB (xpivA,ON − xpivB,ON)
=
(`+ pcB,OFF − pcB,ON)
√
1− (`+p
c
B,OFF−pcB,ON )2
4`
− pcB,ON
2`
√
k
ncA,OFF = (1− θpivA )xpivB,OFF + (1− θpivA )(xpivA,OFF − xpivB,OFF )
=
(`− pcA,OFF + pcA,ON)
√
1− (`−p
c
A,OFF+p
c
A,ON )
2
4`
− pcA,OFF
2`
√
k
ncB,OFF = (1− θpivB )(1− xpivA,OFF ) + (1− θpivB )(xpivA,OFF − xpivB,OFF )
=
(`− pcB,OFF + pcB,ON)
√
1− (`−p
c
B,OFF+p
c
B,ON )
2
4`
− pcB,OFF
2`
√
k
. (A12)
Note that the demand functions for each media outlet are as illustrated in the right
panel of Figure 4.4. Substituting Eq. (A12) into the profit function Eq. (1) and
maximizing it with respect to pci,t yields the following equilibrium:
pc,MHi,ON =
2− βON
3
− 3`
2 + ∆β
18`
,
pc,MHi,OFF =
2− βOFF
3
− 3`
2 + ∆β
18`
,
nc,MHi,ON =
3`−∆β
36`k
√
k[∆2β + 6`(2 + βON + βOFF )− 3`2]
`
,
nc,MHi,OFF =
3`+ ∆β
36`k
√
k[∆2β + 6`(2 + βON + βOFF )− 3`2]
`
,
ΠMHi =
1
108k2
[
k[∆2β + 6`(2 + βON + βOFF )− 3`2]
`
]3/2
− CON − COFF ,(A13)
with superscript MH indicating the multi-homing scenario.
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The advertising prices are pai,t = βtn
c,MH
i,t as in Section 4.3. The aggregate consumer
demand (market size) is:
ncMH = n
c,MH
A,ON + n
c,MH
A,OFF + n
c,MH
B,ON + n
c,MH
B,OFF =
1
3k
√
k[∆2β + 6`(2 + βON + βOFF )− 3`2]
`
.
(A14)
Equilibrium without online platforms
In contrast to Section 4.4, the level of the disutility from obtaining the wrong type
of medium does affect the results. As the number of multi-homing consumers is de-
termined by the net utility from choosing a platform (reservation utility minus prices
and distance costs), less consumers decide to multi-home, if the distance costs from
the type dimension are large. Due to type preferences being uniformly distributed,
the pivotal consumer has the following utility from consuming the oﬄine platform of
media outlet i, with ∼ denoting the equilibrium without online platforms,
U˜piv,MHi,OFF = u¯− pci,OFF − k(xpiv − xi)2 − `(0.5− θOFF )2. (A15)
From setting U˜piv,MHi,OFF = 0 and solving for x˜
piv
i,OFF follows:
ncA,OFF = x
piv
B,OFF + (x
piv
A,OFF − xpivB,OFF ) =
√
4(1− pcA,OFF ) + `
2
√
k
,
ncB,OFF = (1− xpivA,OFF ) + (xpivA,OFF − xpivB,OFF ) =
√
4(1− pcB,OFF ) + `
2
√
k
. (A16)
Substituting Eq. (A16) into the profit function Π˜i = p˜
c
i,OFF n˜
c
i,OFF + p˜
a
i,OFF , and maxi-
mizing it with respect to pci,OFF yields:
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p˜c,MHi,OFF =
2− βOFF
3
− `
6
,
n˜c,MHi,OFF =
√
4(1 + βOFF )− `
2
√
3
√
k
,
Π˜MHi =
[4(1 + βOFF )− `]3/2
12
√
3
√
k
− COFF . (A17)
Again, the advertising prices are p˜ai,OFF = βOFF n˜
c,MH
i,OFF as in Section 4.3. The aggre-
gate consumer demand (market size) is:
n˜cMH = n˜
c,MH
A,OFF + n˜
c,MH
B,OFF =
√
4(1 + βOFF )− `√
3
√
k
. (A18)
The panels in Figure 4.5 are obtained by simulating ∆n,MH ≡ ncMH−n˜cMH and ∆Π,MH ≡
ΠcMH − Π˜cMH for different values of k and `, whereas the results do not change in k.
A7: Derivation of sequential game equilibrium
The timing of the game is similar to the simultaneous game with the exception of one
medium setting prices prior to the other one. I assume without loss of generality that
B is the Stackelberg leader. As the second stage remains unchanged, the disutility `
from consuming the wrong media type needs to be sufficiently high (
∆β
3
< ` ≤ 1) for
an interior solution to occur. I suppose that this is the case. The derivation of the
equilibrium is as in Section 4.3, and the equilibrium is characterized as follows:
pc,sA,ON = p
c
A,ON +
1
4
k, pc,sA,OFF = p
c
A,OFF +
1
4
k,
pc,sB,ON = p
c
B,ON +
1
2
k, pc,sB,OFF = p
c
B,OFF +
1
2
k,
nc,sA,ON =
5
16
− 5∆β
48`
, nc,sA,OFF =
5
16
+
5∆β
48`
, (A19)
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nc,sB,ON =
3
16
− 3∆β
48`
, nc,sB,OFF =
3
16
+
3∆β
48`
,
ΠsA = ΠA +
9
32
k, ΠsB = ΠB +
1
9
k, (A20)
with Πi =
k
2
− CON − COFF . In this setting, the Stackelberg follower (media outlet
A) has a second-mover advantage as in Gal-Or (1985). Medium A is able to attract
consumers from both submarkets of medium B such that the overall market shares
are no longer divided equally, but in favor of medium A: nc,sA,ON + n
c,s
A,OFF =
5
8
and
nc,sB,ON + n
c,s
B,OFF =
3
8
.
Deriving the equilibrium without online platforms is as in Section 4.4 and yields:
p˜c,sA,OFF = p˜
c
A,OFF +
1
4
k, p˜c,sB,OFF = p˜
c
B,OFF +
1
2
k,
n˜c,sA,OFF =
5
16
+
5∆β
48`
, n˜c,sB,OFF =
3
16
+
3∆β
48`
,
Π˜sA = Π˜A +
9
32
k, Π˜sB = Π˜B +
1
9
k. (A21)
with Π˜i =
k
2
−COFF . If aggregate market shares as well as the revenues do not change
compared to a situation without an online market, the predictions of the baseline model
hold also in a sequential game. These conditions are fulfilled as aggregate market shares
are nA =
5
8
and nB =
3
8
.
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Chapter 5
Outlook
This dissertation has analyzed three major trends on the media market. In the follow-
ing, I will give some intuition on how these trends reinforce one another, and how they
will continue to shape the media markets.
Chapter 2 has illustrated how media outlets change their style of coverage, if con-
sumers’ preferences are biased towards audio-visual media platforms. In the case of a
bilateral shift in preferences, newspapers as well as television channels include more
”soft” news to their news coverage. Especially for newspapers, one of the main chal-
lenges in the years to come is to balance hard and soft news. Providing entertaining
contents is essential for keeping the consumers on board, but if contents become too
shallow, newspapers run the risk of being replaced by free services.1 Shifts in the style
of coverage may be one way how newspapers try to hold on to their audience, while
they are experimenting with ways of extracting revenues from consumers with a high
preference for online contents. Hence, the trend towards tabloidization in news cover-
age is closely connected to the rise of online platforms as discussed in Chapter 4.
The analysis of advertising regulation in Chapter 3 has illustrated how prone to failure
unilateral advertising bans are, if the financing structure the regulated broadcaster
operates with is not taken into account. Especially in the light of many countries’
attempts to re-adjust their advertising regulation, it may be worthwhile to dive deeper
into the economic consequences of a unilateral advertising ban. The problem of inef-
1A study of the Center for Digital Future suggests that it is about time for newspapers and
television channels to improve their quality and integrity of coverage. When asked to rank internet
sources, television and newspapers with respect to reaching key goals associated with quality coverage,
the majority of the survey participants preferred the internet over the other platforms in eight out of
twelve categories. Data source: Random and representative sample of American households, N=2,000.
See Center for the Digital Future (2011).
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fective regulation on television markets will become more severe in the years to come,
as some indicators suggest that the importance of pay-TV for television markets will
continue to increase steadily. As digital technology has lowered the access barriers to
all kinds of media types, and has allowed consumers to access the services when and
where they want, on-demand services will eventually become the primary source of
media financing on the consumer side. Furthermore, in the wake of the recent eco-
nomic downturn, consumers’ willingness to pay for home entertainment has increased,
and paid broadcasting services will gain importance.2 Advertising regulation has to
account for these changes in order to yield the desired outcomes.
The trend towards paid broadcasting services can partly be attributed to the rise of
online platforms, which bridges the gap to Chapter 4 of this dissertation: As the ad-
vertising budget allocated to oﬄine television platforms decreases, broadcasters have
to rely more on the revenues from the consumer side of the market. Some insiders even
claim that free-TV is slowly coming to an end, as many major broadcasters cannot
afford free-to-air programming anymore (see for instance Vanacore, 2011, who names
the impact of the recession years as one of the main reasons for declining advertising
expenditures in the U.S.).
Running a profitable online platform is eminently important for media outlets, since the
economic downturn has reduced the size of corporate advertising budgets.3 Evidence in-
dicates that especially print media may be a casualty of the fast-growing online market.
The signs of consolidations on the U.S. newspaper market are already clearly visible:
From 2008 to 2010, eight large U.S. publishers4 have filed for bankruptcy, while some
of them were purchased by hedge funds and have emerged from bankruptcy (Kirchhoff,
2010). Whether online platforms are able to cushion the downturn in media revenues
will depend on using adequate pricing instruments on both sides of the market. The
model developed in Chapter 4 has shown that conventional pricing instruments like
the Cost Per Mille combined with levying access fees from consumers do not seem to
work in the right direction. For the U.S. newspaper market, a survey of the Center
for Digital Future among a representative sample of 2,000 American households shows
2Consumers’ spending more time and money at home is symptomatic of a declining economy, as
consumers cut back on the expenses of going out. While 52% of individuals in the U.S. cut back on
going out to eat, and 53% do less shopping due to the current economic condition, 35% watch more
television at home, and only 3% claim that they are likely to cancel their cable TV service to save
costs. See Cable & Telecommunications Association for Marketing (2009).
3The advertising budget allocated to U.S. newspapers has dropped from $48,670 million to $22,795
million from 2000 to 2010. See Newspaper Association of America (2011).
4The Tribune Co., Philadelphia Newspapers LLC, Sun-Times Media Group, Star Tribune Hold-
ings Co., Journal-Register Co., American Community Newspapers, Creative Loafing, and MediaNews
Group Inc.
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that 22% of the study participants have already replaced their subscription to a news-
paper by online contents (Center for the Digital Future, 2009). Hence, it is essential
to explore how media outlets can evade the problem that arises from consumers’ sub-
stituting oﬄine by online contents, for instance by employing novel ways of pricing
platform contents like for instance bundling pricing as suggested in Section 4.6. On
the advertising side of the market, it may be interesting to analyze novel pricing tools,
as for instance auctioning individual consumer contacts to potential advertisers. These
pricing tools will presumably gain importance in the years to come, as consumers can
easily be tracked in their web activities, which enables the platforms to provide each
potential advertiser with a close match to his target group. Still, the analysis in Chap-
ter 4 has shown that the prerequisite for media outlets to run their online platform
profitably is that they not only raise their online ad effectiveness but also increase their
market size by attracting new consumers.
Recent revenue figures from 2010 show that there is a silver lining on the horizon
(Rosenstiel and Mitchell, 2011). Still, a major challenge for traditional media outlets
is to adapt to the new multimedia environment by searching for new business models,
and to establish a clear-cut profile in the way how they report the news on their oﬄine
platform that prevents them from being replaced by online contents.
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